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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION, THESIS, RATIONALE
Introduction
One strand of historical discussion between devotees of Islam and Christianity highlights
the impasse of the opposing viewpoints on the nature of the Deity (or how He is understood to
exist) respective to each religion.1 On the one hand, Islam’s understanding of

affirms in

the strongest terms Allah’s aloneness, without partner, rival, or equal.2 On the other hand, the
Christian doctrine of Trinity asserts that God lives forever as intra-relationships, not alone
because the one God is an eternal coinhering community of equals.3 This impasse is all the more
immoveable because both doctrines are derived from each respective religion’s Scriptures: the

1

Timothy of Baghdad, Apology for Christianity, Questions and Answers 1 and 2. Kindle. “And our
[Islamic] king said to me: “Do you believe in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit?”—And I answered: “I worship them and
believe in them.”—Then our king said: “You, therefore, believe in three Gods?"—And I replied to our king: “The
belief in the above three names, consists in the belief in three Persons, and the belief in these three Persons consists
in the belief in one God. The belief in the above three names, consists therefore in the belief in one God. We believe
in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as one God” (Ques. and Ans. 1). “And our [Islamic] King said to me: “If He is one,
He is not three; and if He is three, He is not one; what is this contradiction?”—And I answered: “The sun is also one,
O our victorious King, in its spheric globe, its light and its heat and the very same sun is also three, one sun in three
powers” (Ques. and Ans. 2). “And the King said: “You appear to believe in three heads, O Catholicos.”—And I
said: “This is certainly not so, O our victorious King. I believe in one head, the eternal God the Father, from whom
the Word shone and the Spirit radiated eternally, together, and before all times, the former by way of filiation and
the latter by way of procession, not in a bodily but in a divine way that befits God. This is the reason why they are
not three separate Gods” (Ques. and Ans. 2).
When writing about how Christians and Muslims understand “God,” without qualifying how each
religion’s unique attributes predicated of “God” distinguish “God” from the other religion, the term “Deity” is used.
Said differently, the term “Deity” is employed when focusing on the commonalities of the “divine” proper to each
religion without supposing that the “Deity” is ultimately the same because of prima facie similarities. When
speaking of the unique attributes (or lack thereof) predicated of the “Deity” according to Christianity, either “God”
or “Trinity” is the term employed. When speaking of the unique attributes (or lack thereof) predicated of the “Deity”
according to Islam, “Allah” is the term employed.
Also, the composite word, “nature/attribute,” is used because some sects in Islam affirm knowing some
measure of Allah’s attributes but hold Allah’s nature to be unknowable (Al-Nahl 74) whereas Christians within the
orthodox tradition of Nicene-Constantinopolitan Christianity affirm the knowability of God’s nature both through
Scripture and Nature (Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed; cf. also Romans 1:20; 3).
2

Qur’an, Surah az-Zumar 39: 62; Surah ash-Shurah 42: 11 – 12; Surah al-Ikhlas 112: 1-3; Surah alMuminoon 23: 84-89; Surah az-Zukhruf 43: 9; Surah az-Zukhruf 43: 87; Surah al-Ankaboot 29: 63; Surah az-Zumar
39: 3; Surah Yunus 10: 18; Surah al-Kafiroon 109: 2-5; Surah Sad 38: 5; Surah al-Mumtahinah 60: 24; Surah al-Fath
48: 6.
3

John 1:1; 17 (whole chapter); 20:28; Matthew 28:18 – 20; Philippians 2:6 – 9; Hebrews 1:1 – 3,
Revelation 1:5 – 9; 22:13; Mark 14:62; 1 Corinthians 8:6 (the modified Shema); Romans 9:5; Titus 2:13.

1

Qur’an for Islam and the New Testament for Christianity.4 In terms of the Old Testament, Islam
holds the Torah (Genesis – Deuteronomy) and the Psalms to be Scripture while Christianity
maintains the typical Old Testament canon (Torah, Ketuvim, and Nevi’im). Despite the Old
Testament Scriptures held in common, the contestation on the nature of the Deity becomes
clearly demarcated when the New Testament and Qur’an are compared.5 Moreover, Islam does
not directly theologize about the nature of the Deity from the Old Testament. Along these lines,
the exchange between Muslims and Christians has largely dealt with the a priori question of the
“inspiration” of the Qur’an and the New Testament. Within the aims of this dissertation, the
question will be posed: can an a posteriori apologetic be developed, working cataphatically from
the existence of human relationships back towards the nature of the Deity and asking which
nature (or how the Deity exists) better accounts for the evidence of human relationships?6 This is
an abductive argument, inferring from the evidence to the best explanation.7 This a posteriori
apologetic (and polemic) provides a potential tool for Christianity to contend with Islam and can
become part of a cumulative apologetic in that regard, supplementing the long history of a priori
polemic against the inspiration of the Qur’an.8 Such an argument will undergird the authority of
Christianity’s view of the Deity while undermining Islam’s view.

4

Although both religions hold to the Old Testament as well, the contention between Christianity and Islam
is not as sharp until the New Testament and the Qur’an are compared.
5

Islam holds the Torah, the Psalms (Zabor), and the Gospels (Injil) as Scripture.

6

Cataphatic(ally) means here thinking about God from below, taking what can be known from human
tradition, culture, reason, or nature and then interrogating what is known about God in relation to this evidence.
Specifically to this prospectus, what is known about God differs according to each, respective religion and so how
what is known about God will relate differently to human relationships.
7

Douglas Walton, Abductive Reasoning (Alabama Press, 2005), iiiv, 31, 122, and 142.

8

John of Damascus, “On Heresies,” in The Fathers of the Church, eds. Bernard Peebles, Robert Russell,
Thomas Halton, Hermigild Dressler, William Tongue, and Sister M. Josephine Brennan, Vol. 37, Saint John of
Damascus, Writings: The Fount of Knowledge, The Philosophical Chapters, On Heresies, and On the Orthodox
Faith, trans. Frederic H. Chase Jr. (Washington D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1958), 101. “ . . .

2

Thesis
This dissertation is therefore an inquiry into the nature of the Deity in view of human
relationships. Human relationships exist and they are definitive of what it means to exist as a
human, i.e., they are an inescapable aspect of humanity. Does Christianity’s doctrine of Trinity
or Islam’s doctrine of

ic Allah more adequately account for the existence of human

relationships and their inescapability?9 This dissertation is, then, a comparison between the
— or monadic — nature of Allah with the Trinitarian nature of God in order to
evaluate and clarify which doctrine is the best explanation for human relationships. The hope is
to demonstrably argue that Christianity’s doctrine of Trinity has greater explanatory depth and
scope over the doctrine of

Allah in accounting for human relationships and their

inescapability.
Rationale
Survey of Literature
In an effort to show the unique contribution of this present work, the pertinent literature
will be surveyed in order of importance and relevance to the stated thesis. The most important
works are those comparing Christianity and Islam. This is not to say that works only on the
Trinity or those merely on

should be overlooked. These works are important

foundational domains for the present inquiry, but they do not cover what it developed hereafter.

and although you do possess both wives and property and asses and so on through witnesses, yet it is only your faith
and your scriptures that you hold unsubstantiated by witness.”
9

The “inescapability” of human relationships is evident in the biological process of a mother and father
procreating to produce a child. In this sense, every person is always a “you” before s/he is an “I.” By the time
someone is cognizant s/he is an “I,” the brute fact of human relationality has long been definitive of his/her human
experience. It is this plain evidence of the human experience that undergirds the claim that human relationships are
inescapable.

3

This being so, literature that directly compares Islam and Christianity are the foci, and the
attention spent on each work is commensurate with its relevance for this thesis.
Timothy Tennent’s Christianity at the Religious Roundtable deals most directly with the
present work’s topics.10 Tennent first comments on the Islamic doctrine of Allah, highlighting
in particular and the consequence of shirk for compromising
briefly points out Islam’s difficulty in reconciling

.11 Tennent then

with Allah’s many attributes such as

the “ninety-nine beautiful names.” This difficulty with analogical predication is a recurrent issue
for Islam.12 Tennent presents the teaching of immanence with transcendence in the Qur’an, but
he only marginally speaks towards what this means for Allah’s ability to relate either to Himself
or to creatures.13 Building upon Tennent’s point about analogical predication, another question
reveals that the difficulty is no less for the Qur’an than for Islamic theology: if Allah is so “high”
that nothing from creation can be appropriated to describe Him (Surah 16:74), then why is
immanence understood by a spatial analogy in the Qur’an (Surah 50:16)? Allah is not spatially
situated like creatures, but the Qur’an does not hesitate to use the analogy of how close a jugular
vein is to an individual person to describe Allah’s nearness. It is this contradiction — nothing is

10

Timothy Tennent, “Part 3, Christianity and Islam,” in Christianity at the Religious Roundtable:
Evangelicalism in Conversation with Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam, (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002).
11

Ibid., 144 – 145. Shirk means “sharing” or “associating,” and, in Islam, it is the sin of associating anyone
or anything with the divinity of Allah. Taw
means “one” or “oneness” and is used, as will substantiated later, to
convey Allah’s utter simplicity and uniqueness.
12

Cf. Tennent, Christianity at the Roundtable, 147 – 149; Montgomery W. Watt, Islam and Christianity
today: a Contribution to Dialogue (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), 51; Michael Oldham, “The Attributes
of Allah,” in Allah and Elohim (Tate Publishing, 2013), chap. 3, introduction. Kindle; Samuel Marinus Zwemer,
Arabia: the cradle of Islam : studies in the geography, people and politics of the peninsula, with an account of Islam
and mission work (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1900), chap. 12, sec. 1. Kindle. Analogical predication is
activity of predicating something of the Deity that is taken from the world, creatures, or humans. This will be looked
at more closely a bit later.
13

Tennent, Christianity at the Roundtable, 150.

4

predicable of Allah from creation, but then the Qur’an predicates something from creation of
Allah — that is the difficulty Tennent emphasizes.
That God qua Trinity is immanently relational is Tennent’s final apologetic defense and
is offered in an exchange between himself and three Muslims.14 The representatives of the Sunni
and Shi’ite groups respond by emphasizing how either relational terms like “father and son” are
inappropriate to be predicated of Allah (Sunni) or affirm that all attributes predicated of Allah
are an assault on the purity of

and should be abandoned (Shi’ite).15 The Sufi

representative made some movement towards describing a relationship shared between Allah and
the devotee in terms of a possible mystical oneness with Allah.16 Although this Sufi
representative used a lamp and light analogy cited from the Qur’an to describe Allah’s “Light”
(Surah 24:35), he refused the same analogical allowance to Tennent.17 Commenting on how
Tennent noted that creation points to the concrete concept of internally differentiated unity, this
Sufi fell back into a radical stance on Allah’s transcendence: “Therefore, such comparisons are
unreliable because Allah is in a different class than anything in the created order.”18 How can
this Sufi understand himself to be becoming into a oneness with Allah? Is not “oneness” a
creaturely derived concept? Where else will any human find terms but from among other humans
using those terms? The Qur’an makes use of human terms (e.g., “jugular vein”). This

14

Ibid., 155. Tennent’s Muslim dialogue partners represent three major groups of Islam, Sunni, Shi‘ite, and
Sufism. The term “immanently” refers to the intra-relational reality of God, among the Father, Son, and Spirit.
15

Ibid., 156 – 157.

16

Ibid., 158.

17

Ibid., 161.

18

Tennent, Christianity at the Roundtable, 161. Tennent is equally careful to note God’s utter beyondness
(that is, real transcendence) but buffers this with the reaffirmation of the legitimacy of creaturely analogies since all
creation displays God’s glory.

5

inconsistent use of analogical predication of the Deity by these Muslims is a point Tennent
drives home decisively.19
Because Muslims in practice use analogies and understand Allah by the analogies in the
Qur’an, the analogy of creaturely relationships stands to be interrogated in view of a doctrine of
Allah — then contrasted with the doctrine of Trinity. Even the idea of the Sufi achieving
“oneness” is a thought that implies relationship, both humanly and with the divine. For how
could the Sufi know of Allah, His truth, and mystical “oneness” if he had not been told (via
humans passing the religion on), and how can he become one with Allah unless he stands in this
relationship? How does he know what a relationship is apart from a creaturely analogy? What,
too, is the nature of achieiving “oneness with Allah?” This last question centers on the essential
rift between Christians and Muslims. The way the two groups understand “oneness” differs.
Another significant work is Miroslav Volf’s Allah: a Christian Response, which is
written partly in a dialogical manner.20 Sheikh al-Jifri presents and defends

and

converses with Volf about the contentious matter of Trinity.21 Volf, a prominent Trinitarian
theologian, explains some of the difficulties of explicating the Trinity. For instance, to speak of
the Trinity biblically requires and the term “begets,” but it must be purified of creaturely
conceptions. Volf explains how belief in the Trinity is not a belief in polytheism. Further,
Christians are not trying to soothe their troubled conscience of their supposed tritheism by means
of a belief in Trinitarian monotheism.22 Volf makes a point by citing Denys Turner that has
concerning ramifications: showing that when thinking of the Deity, numerical values cannot be
19

Ibid., 162 – 163, 165.

20

Miroslav Volf, Allah: a Christian Response (HarperCollins e-books, 2011). Kindle.

21

Ibid., 128 – 129.

22

Ibid., 133 – 136.

6

predicated of Him since such numerical values would be understood from creatures. If numerical
conceptions taken from creatures cannot be applied to the Trinity, how then is it intelligible to
speak of “three in one?” It is true that careless application of how three creatures are one to the
Trinity will result in conceiving the Trinity as a tritheistic federation of gods. It is going too far
to claim that applying numerical notions to the Deity is altogether inappropriate; yet applying
numerical values based on how creatures exist to the Deity without removing properties that are
strictly creaturely may distort the knowledge of Him.23 Volf’s main contributions towards human
beings and relationships deal with love, mercy, and the difference in the nature of love between
Islam and Christianity. This work is essential in its comparison of “loves,” of what Volf calls
self-love versus the love of the other.24 His discussion on love brings up the important work by
Ibn Taymiyya (included below). Volf is direct with his analysis of the Deity-human relationship
(or more broadly, the Deity-world relationship). He aims to show that the way God’s nature is
understood affects how humans understand themselves in relationship to the Deity. Volf’s work
is a fine guide for this thesis, setting the human-Creator relationship squarely in view in a context
of Muslim-Christian dialogue. If the human experience of relationships can be apologetically put
to work to interrogate the nature of the Deity, then there will hopefully be a broadening and
amplification of Volf’s thought. What does it mean, after all, for human relationships if love
becomes self-love? This is drastically different than love as love for the other. There are
considerable ethical consequences to this differing view of the Deity. These ethical consequences
speak towards the sufficiency of any worldview, for better or for worse.

23

Denys Turner, “The ‘Same’ God: Is there an ‘apophatic’ Solution, or, Who’s to Know?” (unpublished
paper for the consultation on “The Same God,” Yale Center for Faith and Culture, September 23 – 24, 2009), 16 –
17, quoted in Volf, Allah, 141. Kindle.
24

Volf, Allah, 168 – 169. Kindle.

7

Historical theologian Timothy George has two works of import: Is the Father of Jesus the
God of Muhammad and God the Holy Trinity, both of which aim to show common ground and
differences between Islam and Christianity.25 This latter work asserts that the Old Testament
intimates a differentiated oneness in the Deity, what George asserts the church fathers called the
vestigial trinitatas.26 George notes that “Christians . . . predicate something essential and
irreversible about God that no Muslim can accept: we call him our heavenly Father.”27 This fact
provides a relational core, which is true of the Trinity, from which to question how Allah relates.
From this observation, George recognizes that God must have a Son because if God is only
Father in economic terms relative to His creation, then “fatherhood” is not something essential to
Him. He then contrasts this with Arius’ heretical view of God as solitary absoluteness: not an
unfitting description of Allah.28
Of George’s conclusions, the first is most significant for the purposes of this work: “God
is one but not alone.”29 Allah’s “oneness as aloneness” can be established to clearly distance the
Trinity’s nature from Allah’s nature. A fruitful datum used in this work, mimicking George’s
above conclusion, is that a human is one but not alone, although how this is true of God and
humans differs (cf. chap. 2, 3, and 4). What it means to be human includes intersubjectivity.
From birth, a human exists in relationship; it might even be said that from conception a human

25

Timothy George, Is the Father of Jesus the God of Muhammad: Understanding the Differences between
Christianity and Islam (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2002). Kindle; Timothy George, “The Trinity and the Challenge
of Islam,” in God the Holy Trinity: Reflections on Christian Faith and Practice, edited by Timothy George (Grand
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006).
26

Ibid., 116.

27

Ibid., 122.

28

Ibid., 122, 125.

29

George, Is the Father of Jesus, 80; George, “Challenge of Islam,” in God the Trinity, 126.

8

exists in relationship. No one, after all, has ever been born without a mother.30 That human
relationships exist and that they are an aspect of what constitute humanity are inescapable facts.31
William Montgomery Watt’s work, Islam and Christianity today: a Contribution to
Dialogue, contains a meticulous analysis of Arabic terms employed in Islam and how those
relate to Christian terms.32 Watt is perhaps the first one to use the term “unicity” to describe both
the Christian conception of God and the Islamic conception of Allah. He takes the Shahadah as
indicative of unicity and uses it as a synonym for “oneness.”33 Watt identifies Allah’s difference
from humans, parenthesizing the term

k ā f to signify this teaching.34 While giving a

favorable nod to the Qur’an’s ability to show Allah’s immanence, Watt nevertheless concedes
that immanence is more “at home in Christianity” than it is in Islam.35 Watt illuminates the core
slave-lord relationship that governs the Qur’anic view of humanity’s relation to Allah.36 If
human relationships are structured similarly to Allah’s relationship to humanity, then Islam

30

Adam would be an exception to this statement although it seems terribly important that Adam has
relationship with the Deity from the first moment and Adam had in himself Eve, to be taken out of him later. This
blueprint for Adam containing Eve in himself must be by design unless the Deity is to become ignorant.
31

It should be here noted that this point highlights the deficiency of a modernist anthropology although will
be greatly expanded upon in a following footnote. Postmodernity has pointed to the fact that truth is mentally
grasped in community although the postmodernist conclusion that truth is therefore constituted by community
should, on Christian grounds, robustly resisted. Jonathan Edwards knew that beauty and truth was something to be
understood in community because beauty and truth’s primordial constitution is inherently intersubjective, i.e.,
Trinitarianally constituted. For more on this: Edward Farley, Faith and Beauty (Burlington VT: Ashgate, 2001), 47.
Although the focus here is on the intersubjectivity of human existence, St. Augustine’s inner psychological
analogies (Vestigia Trinitatum) for the Trinity highlight the inherently intrasubjective experience of humans as well.
St. Augustine, “Book IX: That a Kind of Trinity exists in Man, who is the Image of God,” in De Trinitate, rev. ed.,
revised and annotated William Shedd, ed. by Paul Boer, trans. by Arthur Haddan (Veritatis Splendor Publications),
bk. 9, chap. 1. Kindle.
32

Watt, Islam and Christianity today.

33

Ibid., 49. The Shahdah states, “There is no deity but God” ( ā ā

34

Ibid., 51.

35

Ibid., 52.

36

Ibid., 125.

9

ā ā

).

produces (or can produce) a kind of unending theological vision and basis for human tyranny.37
This occurs because the most primordial relationship that has ever existed is one of qualitative
inequality. That is, one of “slave-lord,” and this relationship occurred at creation.38 The Islamic
theological vision of Allah as Rabb (Lord) over humanity as Allah’s ‘ b (slave) holds much
potential for investigation in a context of Trinitarian comparison. The practical ramifications are
crucial: what is more inflammatory than an unassailable protological-theology of relationships as
“slave-lord,” that can become paradigmatic for all other relationships?39
Kenneth Cragg’s influential The Call of the Minaret is highly relevant for the purposes
here, especially a section on “Interpreting the Christian Doctrine of God.” Cragg points out that
the Christian doctrine of God is not complex for complexity’s sake.40 Such complexity is not a
demerit to Christianity because the criterion of simplicity cannot apply to either the Muslim
affirmation that “there is no god but Allah” or the Christian assertion that “God is one.” In both,
notes Cragg, the only thing that is readily simple is the grammar of a referent (subject) and a
predicate.41 This, coupled with Tennent’s point that there are no concrete examples of the

37

Robert Letham, The Holy Trinity: In Scripture, History, Theology, and Worship (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R
Publishing, 2004), 10. Letham states and likewise calls for the present work: "I find it hard to see how Islam, or, for
that matter, any religion based on belief in a unitary god, can possibly account for human personality or explain the
diversity in unity of the world. . . . If the Christian faith is to make headway after all these centuries, it must begin at
the roots of Islam and the Qur'an's dismissal of Christianity as repugnant to reason due . . . to its teaching on the
Trinity."
38

And what does this produce for how someone “rules” their family who they “procreated?”

39

Watt, Islam and Christianity, 126. Watt further notes along similar lines: “In all this it is clear that in the
Qur’ān and in early Muslim thinkers no use was made of the conception of human freedom. . . . Any idea of human
freedom, however, would necessarily have implied a rebellion against the status of ‘abd or slave with regard to
God.” Others have noted this point as well. Dayton Hartman, “Answering Muslim Objections to the Trinity,”
Answering Islam, www.answering-islam.org, accessed January 18, 2014; Norman Geisler and Abdul Saleeb,
Answering Islam: the Crescent in Light of the Cross, 2nd ed., revised and updated, Grand Rapids: BakerBooks,
2002.
40

Kenneth Cragg, The Call of the Minaret (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 305.

41

Ibid., 306.
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categorical singular in reality, shows the difficulty in understanding the Islamic view.42 Indeed,
Tennent’s point is so important that Cragg later makes it himself.43 The Christian view is
obviously considered complex by Muslims, but the lack of categorical singulars makes Islam’s
doctrine of Taw

Allah look considerably difficult too. Islam and Christianity disagree on the

same difficulty of the Deity’s unity: “The Christian faith in God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit
is not a violation of faith in God’s Unity. It is a way of understanding that Unity . . . For the
Muslim, faith in God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit does violence to the Divine Unity.”44
Arguing on another level, Cragg adds that God’s action and relationships become the clue
to God’s personality. Cragg infers from how humans experience God to what this experience
teaches about God’s character and nature. Our inquiry asks how all humans experience their
humanity as a complex set of relationships and to infer to the best doctrine of the Deity herein
considered, either Islamic or Christian. Cragg makes the further point that the Deity is “by nature
revealing,” yet this appears wrongheaded.45 It seems that it would be hard to maintain this on an
Islamic view since Allah was not always revealing (or open to another) but only began to reveal
when He began to create. Cragg continues to speak of both doctrines of the Deity as the same:
“But further, this revelation — if it is of a living God — intends fellowship.”46 Cragg’s definition

42

Tennent, Christianity at the Roundtable, 158. “However, all unity contains plurality. The idea of
undifferentiated unity is only a theoretical construct of the mind or a mathematical abstraction. Ultimately, it is no
different from nonbeing. In nature we discover that the lower the degree of differentiation something has, the less
unity it has, meaning it is divisible or lacks the quality of indivisibility.”
43

Cragg, Minaret, 317. “On whatever grounds Muslims feel disposed to disagree with the Christian
understanding of God, it cannot validly be on the ground that it is not a doctrine of Unity. For the only sense in
which it can be thought not to be so is the one completely inappropriate, namely the mathematical. A bare unity,
philosophically understood, is a barren one. We have seen something of this problem in discussing the Qur’ān’s
relation to God, created or uncreated.”
44

Ibid., 307.

45

Ibid., 310.

46

Cragg, Minaret, 310. A question should be asked here. Is it enough to “intend fellowship” to truly
experience or have life? Or does having the fellowship constitute “living?” Intuitively — which likewise is, then,

11

of “living” includes the intention of fellowship. A definition of this type is devastating for the
Islamic doctrine of Allah. If “intending fellowship” constitutes “life,” then how could Allah said
to be “alive” prior to the act of creating since there would be no “other” with whom to
commune?47 Cragg is not unaware of such difficulties arising from a doctrine of

: “For

creation, to be meaningful as a loving transaction, it must originate in a purpose that is already
love within itself. We cannot say that “God is Love” and also say that “God is solitary” or, in this
solitary sense, that “God is One.” Entire transcendence is in the end a blank agnosticism.”48
The now famous work of Ibn Taymiyya cannot be overlooked in its guidance addressing
historic objections to Christianity.49 He is a controversial figure in how he used anthropomorphic
language, but his great influence on the development of Islamic thought is undeniable. His
section “Ittihad: Union of God with a Creature” addresses matters of revelation, the hypostatic
union, creation as necessity, the importance of the check of reason, the philosophical terms
applied to non-existence, pantheism, and the nature of transcendence, among others.50 Only a
persuasive — it is transparently obvious that it is the participation in the fellowship that is living, not intending to
participate in it. If ever someone had a child who was excluded from a friend-group that child intending to be in, the
same one knows that the child has loss something in this exclusion. The child is depraved of something “giving
life,” that is, joining in that fellowship of that friend-group. Or if someone ever had a child who had no friends or
had a hard time making friends, it is plain that the liveliness of that child is confounded to one degree or another.
47

Cragg’s use of the word “life” is specified, it seems, to higher life forms. There are clear examples of
“life” that lack “intending fellowship,” i.e., amoeba. The question of what constitutes “life” for a human, though, is
quite different than asking what constitutes “life” for an amoeba. It is not uncommon for all the factors entailed in
human experience to be designated by anthropologists as one’s “life-world.” Relating to others, things, and creatures
is part of every human’s “life-world.” The human who is banished or exiled alone may, at first glance, appear to be a
counterexample against the supposition that every human’s life-world entails “relating to others.” Such an objection,
however, would only stand from a very specific conception of what entails “relating.” Certainly, memory and
thinking about others, things, and creatures, could be argued to be forms of relating. In this sense, even to be exiled
alone is not necessarily be alone. Then, there is the matter of illness, that is, what is actually improper or contrary to
what it means to be human: what encourages our humanity and what discourages us from being uniquely human.
Exile and banishment are forms of punishments for a reason: because there is something contrary to being human,
something unpleasant, about the punishments.
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Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Jawab Al Sahih Li-Man Baddal Din Al-Masih [ M
Christianity] ed. and trans. Thomas Michel S. J. (Delmar NY: Caravan Books, 1984).
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few of these are directly pertinent to the present proposal. One example shows Ibn Taymīyya’s
form of argument against the Trinity. Ibn Taymiyya states, “demanding that the creator has a
need for His creature — which is clear blasphemy — is clearly forbidden by sound reason.
However, this is a necessary conclusion for Christians . . . . In a union each of the two uniting
elements must have the other, and is thus in need of the other, just as they represent it in their
analysis of the soul with the body . . . .”51 He is speaking of what appears to be the hypostatic
union. His reasoning is sound enough regarding the necessity of the two uniting elements since,
without both, there would no longer be a union. Saying that the union necessitates the uniting
elements and their mutual dependence on one another to retain that union does not address
whether or not the initial decision to unite was necessitated.52 Furthermore, Ibn Taymīyya’s use
of necessartarian logic impugns the real possibility of a decision. Decisions, especially by the
Deity, are free, not necessitated.53 Just as a free woman is not required to marry a man, so the
Creator is not required to unite to the creature. Like a woman can freely decide to marry, unites
to her husband, and the two constitute a union, both necessary for the union, so does the Creator,
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Ibid., 314.
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It should be noted that the two uniting elements in the hypostatic union are not of two symmetrical (or
equal) natures but is an asymmetrical union, the greater divine nature (uncreated) uniting to the lesser (and created)
human nature.
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At least this holds in this case. There are the questions of whether God would make a square a circle or
call good what is evil. Voluntarianism is not a helpful way to handle these but neither is turning to “necessities” that
somehow impose on God. Another way to handle the rational or moral dilemma is to claim that ration and morality
depend on God’s nature without God controlling the nature of ration or morality by merely “willing it”
(voluntarianism). In this way, the freedom of God is maintained because God acts freely from who/what He is
without making ration or morality arbitrary by virtue of God just willing it. It could be objected that God’s nature is
controlling God, but such an objection would remove God’s nature from the Lordly Subject God is and turn God’s
nature into an “objective necessity” that somehow imposes on God. An objection of this sort would only stand if
God were mutilated, i.e., God’s nature could be “cut” from God so that it were seen as some kind of external
imposition.
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in Jesus, unite the divine nature to humanity, both necessary for the union that is the theanthropic
one, Jesus.54
Two chapters in The Trinity in a Pluralistic Age, edited and contributed-to by Kevin
Vanhoozer, offer insight into God’s identity and the question of how Trinitarian is the Sufi
tradition of Islam.55 Vanhoozer draws on Paul Ricoeur’s work on narrative identity. From this,
two helpful constructs for forming “narrative identities” are discussed: an idem-identity and an
ipse-identity. The Latin terms convey what they represent, a way of understanding identity in
terms of its sameness (idem) or in terms of the identity’s consistency with its word (ipse).
Ricoeur’s main point, as described by Vanhoozer, is that “identities” in narratives are constituted
on the basis of their speech (i.e., ipse-identity) and then consistency to that speech.56 Ipse dixit
means “He Himself said” or “He said the very thing” (Dixit ipsum). The very things said by a
narrative character are part of this character’s identity formation. Whether or not the character
will uphold what he utters creates the identity of the character; this is how ipse-identity is
formed. Idem-identity is formed by maintenance of “sameness” across a span of time. Idemidentity faces the trouble of how communion can ever occur with new identities not on the scene
formerly. Ipse-identity makes room for communion by the faithfulness or unfaithfulness to one’s
word, but may well jeopardize the “sameness” idem-identity does so well to protect. These points
54

Although the character of God seems to preclude the possibility of the dissolution of the divine nature’s
union to humanity this is not to say that God is not free to dissolve it. Because God would not does not, at least
prima facie, entail that God could not. The continued gratuity of redemption might rest upon the fact that God could
indeed dissolve the union if He saw fit. There is a dangerous amphiboly suggested if the nature of God or the will of
God is made more basic and so “controls” or “necessitates” God to be of a certain nature or act in a certain way.
God’s love and freedom perichoretically entail the other, and so coextensively exist together, making all such
bifurcations in the nature/will of God fictive theological pitfalls.
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on identity might serve well when appropriated to this context of considering Allah vis-à-vis
Trinity. Specifically, how does the Islamic doctrine of Allah handle idem-identity and ipseidentity? How does the Christian doctrine of the Trinity handle them? Does ipse-identity imply a
betrayal of the Deity’s immutability? Finally, does idem-identity destroy all hopes of communing
with the Deity?
Roland Poupin charitably presents a case for Sufism’s similarity to the Christian doctrine
of the Trinity. He does this by demonstrating three manners of Allah’s love: lover, beloved, and
love — would St. Augustine be pleased?57 The problem is that this triad of love is unipersonal.
Further, the triad of love of Allah is accomplishable by making humans merely a fictive means to
carry out Allah’s love for Himself.58 This pushes all reality towards being understood as illusory
or only an emanation of Allah and His self-love. Thus, the quality of Allah’s “love” differs
significantly from Trinitarian formulation.59
In his endeavor to show Sufism’s logical consistency, Poupin’s presentation is terribly
fruitful — a strange outcome for a strand of Islam that emphasizes mysticism with its tendency
to obfuscate. The history of Hallāj and the work of Al-Ghazālī both testify to the logic of Sufism:
any proclamation of Allah’s
proclaims Taw

introduces an intractable dualism. The Muslim who

is actually announcing an abstract

(unicity) because such an

57

Poupin, "Is There a Trinitarian Experience in Sufism" in Trinity in a Pluralistic Age, 76. Summarily,
Poupin states, “. . . but in a God who is Love-Lover-Beloved, loving himself in the eyes of the loving creature for
the object of his love . . . .” Poupin likewise cites Ibn ’Arabi (on pg. 81): “. . . Who manifests himself to each
beloved and to the eyes of each lover. There is thus only one lover in universal existence (and it is God) so that the
entire world is lover and beloved.” Ibn 'Arabi,
, trans. M. Gloton, coll. "Spiritualit s vivantes"
(Paris: Albin Michel, 1986), 59. Further, Poupin adds, “God alone subsists as being himself love, lover, and beloved
(pg. 81),” speaking of Allah understood in terms of Sufism.
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, no true
unification of God, but in a God who is Love-Lover-Beloved, loving himself in the eyes of the loving creature for
the object of his love . . . .”
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Volf, Allah: A Christian Response, 170. Kindle.
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announcement by a human being “other” than Allah denies the absolute “oneness” (Taw

) of

Allah. In concrete reality, the human being is “another” that can be offset against Allah. This
bifurcates reality into two (at least): Allah and the Muslim who praises Allah. Thus, the
intractable dualism is erected. In short, the proclamation of Taw

is vacuous because it

concretely denies what it abstractly aims to affirm. This formulation assumes that the Creatorcreation relationship is inherently monist: emanational or illusory. That the dualism is
understood as intractable is based on a refusal to conceive creation as genuinely contingent and
other.60 The way to overcome this dualism and the doctrine of creation as contingent is to affirm
that the creation/creatures are Allah. All creatures and all of creation are assimulated into Allah,
understood as “emanations” or “illusions” while the creatures/creation yet live.61 For a human
person to claim this while living is considered the grave sin of Tashb h.62
God is not to be assimilated to man. Although

b h means the heretical introduction of

pantheism and/or idolatry of the creature, the evil of
the abstract claim of

b h dictates that

’ l (absolute apophaticism) understood in

more than subtly commends agnosticism.63 All creation viewed as

60

Poupin, "Is There a Trinitarian Experience in Sufism" in Trinity in a Pluralistic Age, 76, 81. Poupin
articulates well: “There is no true proclamation of the unicity of God but in this blasphemy and its punishment, in
this punishment-blasphemy. [He is talking about having to affirm the blasphemy that the creature is wholly united
and assimilated in Allah, with no difference] Without it, the unification, the proclamation of the divine unicity, is
only the abstract discourse of a creature who, while doing its abstract proclamation, is putting itself unconsciously as
the other aspect of a duality persisting in front of God — while it is trying to define as one this undefinable one”
(76).
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More on “assimilation” is addressed later. The word also means “annihilation,” and it implies absorption.
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Ibid., 79. “The theology of Ibn Daw d Ispahan (909), a great jurist and mystic, who sent a first f
against Hall j some years before, reveals the sin his contemporaries accused him of having committed: the
the assimilation of God to man, a sin against
, the proclamation of the unicity of God.”
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b ,

Ibid., 80. “For if the assimilation — the
b (with its risks of pantheism, and even idolatrous
tendencies) — is avoided, it is but for a purely abstract profession of the divine unicity — the
. And this is what
Hallaj or Ahmad Ghazāli refused.” Apophaticism is defining the Deity by what He is not. If the affirmation of
Taw
is only abstract, then Taw
is not represented, or does not occur, in concrete reality. According to the
Sufism Poupin is unpacking, such a situation turns Taw
into something fanciful that is not experienced by
humans. Instead, humans experience Taw ’s opposite, namely, that humans are concrete others, who can, as
contingent others, profess Taw . Therefore, the only true proclamation of Taw
on this logic is the claim that all
is Allah. If all is Allah, including all human persons, then professing Taw
is a concrete occurrence, rather than
abstract, of the oneness of all reality as Allah.
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Allah commends one evil (

b h) while taking creation as contingent (= cosmological

dualism) conjures another, namely, the denial of Taw
By a human being’s announcement of
which is a violation of

, which could well lead to agnosticism.64

as “other,” cosmological dualism is achieved,

according to the logic of Sufism. Extending Poupin’s thought a

bit, a merely abstract claim of

is seen, on the basis of a monist understanding of so-called

creation, as self-referentially defeating. So in a strange twist of fate, it is the danger of
means of a vacuous abstract assertion of

’

by

that comes across as more mystical than

Hallāj’s claim and Ghazālī’s logical point that “otherness” violates

.

Christian Krokus’, “Divine Embodiment in Christian-Muslim Perspective,” highlights the
problem that Islam has with its claim that the Qur’an is divine Speech.65 Krokus supplements a
point Volf makes in his work: “all individuality, all multiplicity is then ultimately an illusion.”66
All reality is

(“one”), united in Allah so much so that the only reality is Allah himself.

The importance of this article comes from its articulation of the Deity-creation relationship in
both Islam and Christianity, with a special focus on the human participation in divine immanence
proper to each religion.
Jonathan Martin Ciraulo has recently written “The One and the Many: Peter and Peters,”
which offers insights on human identity, the Trinity’s relationship to human identity, Christ and
identity, and ecclesiology.67 Identity formation of a “self” occurs in a context of intersubjectivity.
64

This last clause, “which could well lead to agnosticism,” follows from the fact that Taw
is implied in
both the Shahadah and Surach 112. Therefore, the inability to affirm Taw
is to lose the core and foundation of
Islam.
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Christian S. Krokus, “Divine Embodiment in Christian-Muslim Perspective,” Studies in Interreligious
Dialogue 22, no. 2 (January 1, 2012): 158–169.
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Jonathan Martin Ciraulo, “The One and the Many: Peter and Peters,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 48,
no. 1 (Winter 2013): 45–57.
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Especially in the case of Christ, there is a consistent plurality, either from above (his unity
among the Persons of the Trinity) or from below (his unity with those He redeems: church). The
Trinity overcomes the dualism of the One and the Many — more on this later. Multiplicity of
church leadership, therefore, can be fashioned into co-equal church authorities, attainable when
undergirded by a doctrine of the Trinity. Ciraulo wants to effect a reunion between Eastern
(Greek Orthodox) and Western (Roman Catholic) churches based on a model of church
fashioned after the Trinity.68 In this way, there need not be only one group (Orthodox or
Catholic) who can allege authority for its church, and both can claim co-equal authority and
status as true successors of the apostles.69 The doctrine of the Trinity’s unique ability to undercut
“either-or” categories while maintaining a fundamental unity stands out in this article without
leading to pantheism. It is the fundamental equality of the Persons of the Trinity that makes
possible this vision of equal authority of both the Catholic and Orthodox churches. Furthermore,
Ciraulo’s development of a “corporate personality” for both Christ and for the church, following
John Zizioulas’ lead, suggests that a human person, inside or outside of the church, is constituted
together with a community, in all cases.70
In “Taw

and Homooúsios: Narrowing the Gaps between Muslim and Christian

Understanding of God’s divine Oneness,” Evan Longhurst highlights how “unity” in both Islam
and Christianity are more similar than different.71 Although the title, “Tawḥīd and Homooúisos,”
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seems particularly promising for comparing Islam’s and Christianity’s dotrine of the Deity, it is
more a simple cursory comparison for showing how both faiths understand divine essence (or
nature) to be one. The Christian doctrine concerning the nature of God and the Islamic doctrine
of

ic Allah are shown to be largely the same, both intending to emphasize and protect the

divine unity. Longhurst does not comment on the “multiplicity” already implied in the term
homo-oúsios (homo = same) — asking “the same to whom” infers multiplicity. Such plurality in
terms of the Trinity is never apart from unity, but the matter of the multiplicity must be broached
to avoid disproportionally emphasizing the unity. Longhurst’s goal in his article is to find the
common ground between the two religions, which is laudable. This common ground, however,
will not remain once the Father, Son, and Spirit enter the conversation.
In “Accommodating Trinity: A Brief Note on Ibn ‘Arabī’s Views” Qaiser Shahzad
makes Ibn ‘Arabī’s comprehension of the Creator-creation relationship clearer.72 The world is all
an emanation of Allah. Anywhere one looks, Allah is there. Humanity is a special case of Allah’s
divine manifestation because humans are the names of Allah manifested. 73 Ibn ‘Arabī
accommodates the doctrine of Trinity to facilitate a rigorous unity (

) despite apparent

creaturely multiplicity: perhaps creatures are modes of Allah. Ibn ‘Arabī’s exegesis of Surah
5:73 exposes that the Qur’an does not condemn those who say “God is the third of three” as
polytheists (

k

) but as unbelievers (kāf

). Shahzad cites Arabī’s approval of the

, a “oneness of composition.”74 This, however, is a confused

Trinity as another kind of
understanding of the Trinity.
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Survey Conclusion
What comes clearly to the fore is the absence of literature that deals directly with
Allah vis-à-vis Trinity in view of human relationships. No literature attempts an
abductive apologetic (and polemic) from human relationships, and their inescapability, to the
Trinity as the best explanation of this evidence over
literature on Trinity, some on

Allah. There is certainly much

, and some for the Trinity’s impact on anthropology —

more on specifying “anthropology” as used in this work follows below.75 There is an obvious
need for potentially uniting these domains of knowledge to see if such can be constructively
fruitful for elucidating distinctives proper to the Trinity vis-à-vis Allah. Moreover, once properly
integrated, the path stands open to possibly provide new insights into the way anthropology
might well serve the apologetic task of Christianity (via Trinity), the polemical discussion with
Islam, and comparative religion.
Fields of Direct Relevance
This dissertation has several dimensions of relevancy for the philosophy of religion,
theology, apologetics, and religious polemics. The broad questions of religion are ones about the
nature of the “ultimate” and about the ultimate nature of reality. In one breath, Islam and
Christianity affirm the “ultimate” to be a monotheistic Deity, omnipotent, omniscient,
omnipresent, glorious, and worthy. In another breath, both religious faiths concurrently deny
that the “ultimate” is some impersonal force, chi, or an amorphous cosmic power. Denied too are
75
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all articulations of atheism, agnosticism, or neo-pagan self-deification. The Deity is thought to
superintend reality by both, with the ultimate religious aim being the worship and glorification of
this Deity.76 This issue is well suited to the current domains of knowledge — i.e., Christian
studies, Islamic studies, apologetics proper to each, semiotic matters pertaining to the Deity, and
anthropology. Not a few have sought to compare these two religions, but few have compared the
theological convergences and divergences between the two religions that arise from an analysis
of

ic Allah vis-à-vis Trinity. It is this comparison that will enable us to describe and

specify more effectivetly the contours of each respective religion, advancing the dialogue
between these two Abrahamic traditions.
If, in the first place, the relevancy of this dissertation for religion presented Christianity
and Islam as close akin, similar, and common to one another like two cords of a tight-knit knot,
then an analysis of theology proper to each religion on the matter of the doctrine of the Deity
unbinds or loosens this knot. The unique elements of both religions occur in the human activity
of theologizing about the Deity, so they demand careful terminology to properly capture the
specific exclusivity of each religion. For the purposes of this dissertation, it is partly the doctrine
of the Deity that is under analysis, which does not remain thoroughout the generalized “doctrine
of the Deity.” This phrase under the rigor of theology proper to each religion thereby becomes
the “doctrine of Allah” for Islam and the “doctrine of God” or the “doctrine of Trinity” for
Christianity.
Within the larger question of creation’s relationship to the Deity is the more limited
question of humanity’s relationship to the Deity. It is evident that human relationships exist and
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Muhmoud M. Ayoub, Islam Faith and History (Oneworld Publications, 2013), chap. 2, sec. 3. Kindle.
He states, “The ultimate end of human existence is to worship God in righteousness, gratitude, and obedience.”
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that they are inescapable. These observations function as a basis for interrogating the doctrine of
the Deity in Islam and Christianity to see which theological formulation offers a better
explanation of this evidence. Further, such an interrogation must articulate an Islamic doctrine of
Allah in order to emphasize Allah’s dissimilarity to human beings, whereas the Christian
doctirne of God highlights similarity.77 A tertiary question occurs at this point: how is the Islamic
doctrine of creation configured compared to the Christian doctrine of creation? Is creation
illusory, emanational, or contingent? How this question is answered will figure in what to make
of human relationships. It is not a

ē-ic (psycheic hereafter, as adjective) anthropology that

is illuminated in this dissertation. Rather, a k

ōnia-ic (koinoniac hereafter, as adjective)

anthropology is in view, one that demonstrates the “koinoniac” essence of human reality and the
way this koinoniac reality is inescapable.78 To state that human reality is koinoniac is the same as
stating that human reality is intersubjective. The contours of each religion’s doctrine of the Deity
commend a distinguishable anthropology.
The fact of human relationships and their inescapability has not been developed in a
context of distinct articulation of a doctrine of Allah vis-à-vis the doctrine of Trinity along with
the consequential and manifest differences between them. In order to explain how these two
religions account differently for human relationships and their inescapability, three categories are
77

Such a statement must be understood within the context and purpose of this work. Compared to the
Islamic doctrine of Allah, the Christian doctrine of God highlights the similarity between humans and God. This is
because God chose humanity as His analogy (Gen. 1:26 – 28, 2:4). For Christianity, there is similarity between God
and humans and dissimilarity, with individual Christian traditions paying attention to one or the other with more or
less neglect of to the one payed less attention.
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P
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highlighted: relatedness, distinctness, and oneness. These matters will then be set against the
backdrop of the doctrine of Allah and the doctrine of the Trinity to thereby observe the depth of
explanation and how similar or dissimilar the Deity must be reckoned in view of this evidence.
Reflecting carefully on the nature of human relationships and their inescapability in view
of Christianity and Islam gives place to the inquiry of whether such human evidence functions as
a means towards understanding the Deity or not. Some of the authors previously surveryed have
pointed to the difficulty that Islam’s doctrine of Allah has in accounting for human relationships
while maintaining that Christianity’s doctrine of Trinity offers grounding for them. This study
endeavors to advance this insight, developing and thereby rigorously demonstrating that this
observation in nuce also gives a penetrating sapience on a grander scale when unpacked,
explained, and investigated. The use of human relationships and their inescapability as an
abductive apologetic results from a coalescence of renewed interest in the Trinity in connection
with the labors of Christian apologists towards Islam. This convergence has enriched the “soil”
for the current advances and the treating of these divergent fields of knowledge together. This
inquiry also continues, albeit only a tertiary resultant, the assault on a warped notion of
anthropology and personality. In sum, this present work aims to provide another tool for
Christian apologetics, the abductive argument from human relationships and their inescapability.
It is likewise a polemic against the Islamic view of the Deity’s radical oneness. The question of
what it means to be a human being (anthropology) according to each religion is secondarily
illuminated along the way. This includes a special emphasis on the intersubjectivity of human
existence that observers how “relationality” constitutes part of the human nature of each human
being (= inescapable). Said differently in a way useful for later, “human relationality” constitutes
an aspect of the “ontology” of a human being. Human relating, or human intersubjectivity, can
23

be accurately retitled “human-onto-relations.” This is because the shear reality of all human
existence occurs in a context of human relationships that influences who or what a human being
is and becomes. Thus, such relating is connected to human ontology, or human nature, because
this relating contributes to the constitution of each human being. No human being is who he is
apart from his relationships.79
Some impetuses of the current study came from concern in matters of philosophy of
religion, political theory, social matters, anthropology, and a personal desire to mine and
fruifully use the great riches of Christian Trinitarian theology. Alvin Plantinga has called for
Christian philosophers — and so by extension to theologians as well — to present ideas that are
radically qualified by Christianity’s specificities (here, this would be appropriating God as
Trinity) rather than settling to discourse by what is fashionably approved by non-Christian
philosophers.80 Timothy George lobbies for the same, but he focused on which theism is true,
noting that bare monotheism is far from enriched with the biblical portrayal of YAHWEH.81 Robert
Letham named the need for a study such as the one at hand a decade ago.82 Thomas Torrance
effectively noted the analogy between humanity and their relationships to that of God the Trinity
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and the intra-relationships He is.83 Karl Rahner pointed out that it is a real question of proper
theology whether to understand God as a self-same identity without intrinsic mediation. This he
says in a context of how “an “apologetics” of the “immanent” Trinity should not start from the
false assumption that a lifeless self-identity without any mediation is the most perfect way of
being of the absolute existent.”84 S. M. Zwemer remarked, just over a century ago, that little
analysis has been put towards the Muslim idea of the Deity.85 There still is a relatively small
amount of literature of paratactic-like comparison regulated by Islam’s and Christianity’s
doctrine of the Deity. Miroslav Volf explains the import of the Trinity for Christians, which is
likewise confirmed by Scott Horrell: “. . . that the triune God stands at the beginning and at the
end of the Christian pilgrimage and, therefore, at the center of Christian faith.”86 Horrell likewise
confirms that truths for informing someone about self and interpersonal relations are readily
available in consideration of social models of the Trinity.87 Fred Sanders points to the complete
Trinitarian immersion that Christians participate in by just existing.88 Donald Fairbairn considers
the essential contestation over the “oneness” of the Deity to be the major tension among the
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Abrahamic traditions (Islam, Judaism, and Christianity).89 A Deity who has no intra-relationships
falls short in offering anything relationally substantial to humans in salvation.90 Salvific matters
are at stake since, as George opines, “For in Islam revelation is, essentially . . . , what Allah’s
project is about, in this world and in our history. . . . What is missing here is a concept of
redemption. God is not only a revealer; God is a redeemer as well. The Trinitarian understanding
of God tells us that this God is sufficiently sovereign to come as well as to send.”91 James White
recently presented the need to accurately unfold

and Trinity for the sake of meaningful

dialogue.92 Finally, Brannon Wheeler, too, has voiced that not enough material exists for
teaching Islam.93
Criteria
This dissertation will assume that it is empirically obvious that human interrelationships
exist (even from birth no one is alone!) and that they are inescapably part of what constitutes
human existence. On the first assumption, that human relationships exist is utterly undeniable on
realism: how can the reader read this if they are not related to the author? The reality of human
relationships, moreover, has three definite coutours. To be human is to be in oneness with others,
be distinct from others, and be related to others. This is the evidence from which the best
explanation is inferred. In this sense, the launch of this inquiry is empirical, but perhaps even
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surer than sense data outside of humans (if one’s epistemology leans Kantian). To be in oneness
with others, to be distinct from others, and to be related to others, are features of human
relationality that are immanent to and inescapable for each and every human.94 Two criteria will
be used to arbitrate between a Trinitarian view of God and a
criteria will be used to judge whether

view of Allah. These

Allah or the Triune God handles the existence

and inescapability of human relationships better. Specifically, the criteria will adjudicate on how
well the Christian doctrine of the Trinity or the Islamic doctrine of Taw

Allah handles the

mere existence of human relationships and the scope of the evidence. The first criterion is
explanatory depth: how deep does this doctrine of the Deity (Trinity or Monad) account for the
94
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existence of human relationships?95 Are there sufficient resources in a respective doctrine of the
Deity to explain and ground the existence of human relationships? How much of the evidence is
explained with ease, and how much ambiguity is cleared away by a respective doctrine of the
Deity? These questions mark the explanatory depth a doctrine of the Deity goes in explaining
human relationships and their inescapability. Second is explanatory scope: How wide is the
scope of a doctrine of the Deity in accounting for the evidence of the existence of human
relationships, their inescapability, and their contours of oneness, distinctness, and relatedness? A
doctrine of the Deity that can more broadly account for the scope of the evidence is superior in
its explanatory scope.
A theory with less explanatory scope may be said to possess more “ad-hoc-ness.” The
theories to be tested in this inquiry are Islam’s view of Allah in contradistinction to Christianity’s
view of the Trinity. The more ad hoc something is, the less compelling it is in view of its limited
explanatory scope. The more ad hoc a theory is means that it can only explain this or that datum,
but is less and less effective in accounting for all data. This sense relies on the denotation of the
Latin “hoc” as neuter rather than masculine (“towards the data”). There is the second and more
traditional way the phrase ad hoc is used in investigation as well. The second denotation for ad
hoc is when someone relies on nonevidenced assumptions in her hypothesizing in order to make
her theory appear more appealing. In this case, certain assumptions are taken for granted by the
theorizer; in other words, a theory may appear to work-well based on nonevidenced assumptions
that belong to this certain person (ad hoc or ad hac; “to this man” or “to this woman”). It is
critical to vet oneself and those he discoures with because often these ad hoc elements are
undergirding biases or unwarranted presuppositions.
95
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Method
This argument will be made in a five-step manner with corresponding chapters. The
current introduction unpacks the need, rationale, criteria, and current state of literature on the
related topic. Chapter two addresses five prolegomena topics: analogical predication, the
respective meanings of Hypostasis (ὑπόστασις) and ousia (οὐσία), the relationship between
Hypostasis and ousia, anthropology, society and the Deity, the “ninety-nine beautiful names of
Allah,” and providing a definition of
strict categories but the doctrine of

.96 Hypostasis and ousia tend to be understood as
ō ēsis (Latin: circumincessio) helps to explain the

relation between them and suggests a fluidity between person and nature.97 The third chapter will
present

and Allah’s oneness, distinctness, and relatedness. Chapter four presents the

Trinity, focusing on oneness, distinctness, and relatedness therein. Chapter five compares the
Islamic doctrine of Allah with the Christian doctrine of Trinity in view of the evidence of human
relationships: which doctrine better accounts for human relationships, their inescapability, and
their contours of oneness, distinctness, and relatedness? Following this conclusion, trajectories
for further thought are provided. The modest assumptions that human relationships exist and that
they exist inescapably are intuitively and experientially accessible to every human being.98 This
comparison hopes to demonstrate how the Trinity better accounts for human relationships than
Ta

Allah. The conclusive trajectories contend that how someone understands the Deity’s
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nature as either Trinitarian or Taw

(monadic) influences the way humans relate, human

governance, and especially about the inner logic of love.
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CHAPTER 2: PROLEGOMENA
Introduction
This chapter deals with the technical terms that will facilitate this theological comparison
between Islam and Christianity in the light of human relationships. Also, as laying a crucial
linguistic-theological foundation to the argument, an interpretative approach explaining how
human language is and is not properly predicated of the Deity must be carefully presented. This
work will make use of the long tradition of analogical predication. After an explanation on how
analogical predication works and why it will be vital here, scriptural texts from both religions are
treated in order to observe the need for analogical predication. From this, there are certain
analogies based on creation that also need to be accounted for simply because Scripture uses
them. Analogical predication sets the context for specifying definitions of crucial terms that
follow: hypostasis,

ōē

, ousia,

, and “the beautiful names of Allah.”

Furthermore, the apophaticism often complementary to any inquiry into the extent of human
knowledge concerning the nature and attributes of the Deity is addressed.
Analogical Predication
Analogical predication is sometimes called analogous interpretation. In order to remain
consistent with the terminology in the foregoing context and to avoid confusion, the phrase
“analogical predication” will be preferred over “analogous interpretation” hereafter. Analogical
predication is a comparison that must include two elements: similarity and dissimilarity.99
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Focusing on John Duns Scotus’ thought, analogy can be considered even more exact: each
analogy is a comparison that contains element(s) of sameness and disparity.100 In this sense
herein, an analogy has a univocal element between the referent (subject) and object-compliment

position reasons that some predications only captures an approximation of what is true by abstracting out
complicating factors.
100
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predicated of the referent: the same element.101 Also, an analogy has an equivocal element
between this same referent and object-compliment: the disparate element.102
The use of analogy in this essay aligns well with the classical tradition. The usage of
analogical predication here is intended to protect humans’ ability to have true knowledge of the
Deity — by affirming that true predications can be made — while circumscribing that
knowledge against the backdrop of the infinite and ineffable transcendence of the Deity, never
able to exhaustively uncover or fully articulate His mysteriousness. God reveals Himself truly to
humanity while nevertheless concealing Himself in His infinite mode of being, as Scotus
argues.103 This appears paradoxical, but it need not be taken that way. The univocal element
predicable of both God and a creature may be spoken of as possessing a “common meaning true
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of God and a creature.” Scotus names the univocal element, which is predicable of God and a
creation, “a perfection.”104 Goodness is such a perfection, and a creature is capable of being good
(good/goodness will be used as exemplar in what follows). The human intellect grasps goodness
in a creature, abstractizes it, postulates goodness to the highest degree possible, and then applies
that to God.105 The original “goodness” of the creature has the same meaning as the “goodness”
applicable to God (i.e., univocity). Although God’s goodness is also rightly conceived as
infinitely exceeding a creature’s goodness, this does not deny that goodness is a perfection
common to God and creatures. God’s goodness shares the common meaning of the goodness of
the creature, but God’s goodness is not restricted to it: “Fourthly, I say that we can arrive at
many concepts to God in the sense that they do not apply to creatures. Such are the concepts of
all the pure perfections when taken in the highest degree.”106 Scotus argues that combining a
“pure perfection” with the “highest degree” is essential because it is necessary to clarify “what is
proper to God in the sense that it is characteristic of no other being.”107 Univocal predication in
Scotus’ sense does not threaten God’s transcendence. This is because God’s goodness exceeds or
transcends creaturely goodness without denying that the goodness of the creature shares a
common meaning with the goodness of God. Said more precisely, God’s goodness shares a
common meaning with a creature’s goodness, yet infinitely transcends it. Therefore, univocal
predication demonstrates that humans can speak truly of God while God’s transcendence
104
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maintains His beyondness without making Him so beyond that nothing can be known or
informatively said about Him.
If univocal predication is achievable based on Scotus’ formulation, why bother with
analogical predication at all? Making God into the image of creation is idolatry, and it is one of
the chief evils committed by humanity (Romans 1:23). Furthermore, creatures only in some of
their aspects represent the perfections univocally predicable of God. Thus, in considering a
creature in toto, there are disparate elements that are properly and only predicable of creatures,
and not God. When a creature is considered in its “total” being, they are analogies containing
more disparity from God than sameness to Him.108 The process of removing the disparate
elements and rightly finding a “perfection” common to both God and a creature is not easy.
Analogical predication highlights the disparity that exists between God and creatures and
cautions against idolatry. Moreover, analogical predication also allows for understanding
creaturely goodness as both univocal with God’s goodness and analogical with God’s goodness.
This is not a contradiction. Insofar as a creature’s goodness is in view, it can be spoken of as
common to God’s goodness (univocal predication). However, insofar as God’s infinite goodness
is in view, a creature’s goodness is relativized by it. The creature’s goodness is thereby shown
only to be partially the same to it with an ever greater degree of difference between a creature’s
finite goodness and God’s infinite goodness. Because of these concerns and because univocal
predication can be part and parcel to analogical predication, this latter theory of predication is
preferred for the purposes of comparing the Christian doctrine of Trinity with the Islamic
doctrine of Taw

Allah.
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Accordingly, humans understand the Deity analogically. If Muslims or Christians
maintain that only equivocal predications of the Deity are possible, then either group has taken
the agnostic turn. Complete equivocation in regards to predicating any perfection, like “good,” to
the Deity is ultimately predicating nothing informative of the Deity. If how creatures are “good”
is in no way the same to how the Deity is good (equivocal predication), then how can someone
speak meaningfully of the Deity?109 A theory of equivocal predication functions by predicated of
a creature what appears to refer to the same thing (e.g., “good”) when predicated of the Deity,
but it does not predicate anything of the Deity in the same way as what is predicated of the
creature. The example, “God is good” and “Gloria is good,” assuming equivocal predication,
concludes that, however Gloria is good, it is not in any way the same to the ways that God is
good.110
Univocal predication runs another risk that can be added to those formerly noted. This
risk is based on wrongly understanding univocal predication. If univocal predication is not
carefully laid out to show how the Deity’s transcendence is retained (as discussed earlier), there
is a danger of claiming a total equivalence between God’s infinite perfections and a creature’s
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finite perfections: i.e., God’s infinite goodness is not equivalent to a creature’s finite goodness.
For the Deity is infinitely beyond. Therefore, this way of forming “univocal predication” is awry
because it collapses and eliminates the analogical distance between the Creator’s infinite
perfections and creatures’ finite perfections.111 The best shorthand mantra, therefore, for how
humans understand the Deity is that they understand Him sufficiently but never exhaustively:
sufficiently because of the univocity (sameness) in analogical predication and never exhaustively
because such sameness is relativized in view of God’s infinite mode of being.
This mantra accounts for the true disparity that exists between God and creatures without
claiming that the disparity is absolute. There is both sameness and disparity as discussed
formerly. Complete equivocal predication ultimately undermines communication because it can
never be only equivocal or else communication would no longer be co-mmunication. Also, the
bent towards rationalizing God into merely creatural modalities so indicative of the
Enlightenment ethos is resisted. This bent takes various forms, but central to it was the
presumption in thinking to objectivize the Deity, i.e., turn the Deity into a creaturely object. The
error of attempting to “bring Him down” into the created order so that humanity could have
exhaustive understanding of Him is likewise avoided.112 Humans have access to objective truth
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This is not to say that univocal predication should not be pursued since it could well be the case that, by
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mind’s grasping of it (epistemically accesses it) intermingles creaturely elements so that what was truly univocal and
literal now morphs to what is analogical and figurative, with more or less univocity and literalness retaining.
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“Objectivize” means making the Deity into an object that can be thought of in terms of creatural
realities: totalities, or boundaries, or even the One who is the cause is in Himself (causa sui). Each of these
frameworks of thought about God commits Him to the contours of creational-being, which erroneously puts the
Deity on the creature side of the Creator-creature divide. Humans can understand God to degrees but must always
“hold open” their conceptions to the mysterium Dei rather than condensing the mysterium Dei to non-mysterium Dei.
Merold Westphal, Overcoming Onto-Theology: towards a postmodern Christian Faith, PERSPECTIVES IN
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of the Deity but always within the movement of the divine self-giving (in Christianity) or the
divine revealing of the will of the Deity (in Islam).113 For Christians, it is the supreme revelation
of the Word made flesh, Immanuel, who exegetes the “nameless One” (’
YAHWEH;

’aš

’

;

Exod. 3:14), that preeminently conveys the knowledge of the divine, the Bible being a

derivative “Word,” unitarily interconnected to, grounded in, and from this incarnate Logos,
accessed in and through one Spirit.114 For Islam, it is the miracle of Allah’s Speech to
Muhammad and thereby to humanity, the priceless Qur’an, which Sunni Muslim theologians
attribute “eternality.” This eternal Speech (Qur’an) explicates the will of Allah for humanity and
discloses humanity’s role and relationship to Him, inviting — at least in Sufi lines of thought —
each human to come, by the merciful hand of Allah, and be united to Him, knowing, thinking
upon, and being changed by the wonders in the “beautiful names of Allah.”
Analogia in Scriptur
That analogical predication is necessary for understanding the Deity is drawn not only
from philosophical theology but also from observing the way Scripture uses language. Especially
God, of course, can make Himself into a creaturely object, but He does not do so as an “object.” Instead
God makes Himself into the Lordly Subject as the doctrine of the incarnation of Jesus maintains. The objection in
the text above deals with humans attempting to do this in ways that terminate the transcendent distance of the Deity.
The incarnation does not terminate the transcendent distance, but, rather, it is the crux to connection humanity to the
transcendly distant Deity. The Son can speak of Himself as in the “bosom” of the Father while incarnated and that
His knowledge of the Father while incarnated is such that all other claims to knowing God are as nothing: “ . . . no
one knows the Father except the Son . . .” (Matt. 11:26).
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Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 13. Torrance says “God may be known only through God, and
is known only as he makes himself known to us through the revealing and saving agency of his Word and Spirit.”
Although Islam differs on what is revealed — it is rather the Deity’s will for humanity on what they are to do and
think rather than they are to think and do as aligned with who God is — there are certainly characteristics of Deity
made known (Ninety-nine beautiful names) through the Qur’an. Muslims are not uniform in considering the Qur’an
to be eternal but this is said to be the majority position. There is something eternal (the Qur’an) making known the
eternal one (Allah). Krokus, “Divine Embodiment,” 158 – 169.
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important is anthropomorphism, which is a specific type of analogy. Comparing humans to
Allah, and then to God, are central to this project, so it will benefit to see the way the Qur’an
compares humanity to Allah and the way the Bible compares humanity to God. Specifically,
does the Qur’an use language that supposes sameness (univocity) between humanity and the
Deity? Does the Bible do the same?
Anthropomorphism is found in both the Qur’an and the Christian Bible. In the Bible, the
Deity is said to have hands (Ps. 10:12) and is seen to hold something in it (Rev. 5:1). He has a
throne (Ps. 11:4) and is sitting on it as well (Rev. 20:11). The Qur’an, too, can speak of the Deity
as ascending His throne (Surah 32:4), having a throne (Surah 85:15), and being carried on it by
angels (Surah 69:17).115 Allah rules by His hand (Surah 67:1). Both the Bible and the Qur’an can
speak of the Deity’s “face” or “countenance” (Surah 55:27; Num. 6:25). The point is that there is
some analogy of humans’ everyday life and interactions with other humans necessary to
understand these texts. All have seen others use their hands to accomplish something. Many have
surely observed someone occupying a seat of power and authority. Certainly, we understand
“presence” through being near another human’s face. To recall, “analogy” in the sense developed
herein supposes some univocity (sameness) and equivocity (disparity). If the univocal element is
dismissed, then whatever the Bible and Qur’an are speaking about will simply be unknown.116
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Al-Ghazālī, Al-Iqtiṣā
- ’ qā [Al-G ā ’ M
B f] trans. Aladdin M. Yaqub
(Chicago: The Univesity of Chicago Press, 2013), 1 st Treatise, 8th proposition. Kindle. Ghazālī thoroughly endorses
analogical interpretation in this section for the scholars although he doubts the ablity of the “populace” to grasp what
is intended. For instance, he states, “Let us return to the meaning of ‘sitting’ and ‘descending’. As for sitting, it
unquestionably involves the throne’s having a relation to God. It is not possible for the throne to have a relation to
Him unless it is something known, or willed, or is an object of God’s power, or is a locus such as the locus of a
mode, or is a place such as where a body resides. Some of these relations are conceptually impossible and some are
linguistically unsuitable for metaphorical analogy.”
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David K. Clark, To Know and Love God: Method for Theology, FOUNDATIONS OF EVANGELICAL
ed. John S. Feinberg (Wheaton Il: Crossway Books, 2003), 356.” Clark discusses the same concern
about losing truly informative revelation via the Bible: “. . . evangelical theology cannot duplicate the Brahmanic
move by emphasizing God’s infinity and transcendence in such an absolute sense as to render human language
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The majority of Muslims and “orthodox” Christians hold their Scriptures to be revelatory
and to thus function as the Word or Speech of the Deity.117 This means that the
anthropomorphisms found in Scripture are analogies chosen by the Deity to describe Himself.118
For humans to understand what these analogies mean, however, they must draw understanding
from the field of their experience, knowledge, and intellectual processes (i.e., abstractizing,
reasonsing, understanding, sensing, acting, judging, willing, and so forth). There is a connection
here to the earlier discussion about Scotus’ position on univocal predication. The very possibility
of univocal predication assumes that there is a creaturely perfection that has a common meaning
completely inadequate for describing God. Certain Hindu and Muslim ways of understanding God move in this
direction. To concede that all speech about God is completely equivocal nullifies the evangelical commitment to the
Bible as truly informative revelation.”
117

It would be amiss not to mention that Islam understands revelation as less of “revealing” and more of
“solemn or awe-inspiring communication.” Yahya Michot, “Revelation,” in The Cambridge Companion to Classical
Islamic Theology, ed. Tim Winter, CAMBRIDGE COMPANIONS TO RELIGION (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2008), 180. Further, although that the Qur’an is Allah’s eternal Speech is the majority view today this has not
always been the case. It may at first appear somewhat ludicrous to suppose that the Qur’an could not be held to be
God’s Word but juxtaposed with Allah’s transcendence and
(singularity) it becomes clear why holding it to
be eternal is troubling — as is holding it not to be eternal. If the Qur’an is not to violate
and be thought to be
eternal, then it must be intrinsic to Allah’s essence. But, if this is case, then the Qur’an does give true propositions
about who/what Allah is and so complicates Allah’s transcendence. Moreover, this suggests an internal
differentiation in Allah’ essence, which begins to look much like the Christian doctrine of Trinity. Another problem
issuing from believing the Qur’an to be eternal occurs if the Qur’an is thought to be eternal to Allah’s essence. This
stance protects against violating Allah’s transcendence but now violates
by introducing a multiplicity by
taking the Qur’an as co-eternal but not internal to Allah’s essence. These thoughts are a paraphrase of Nader ElBizri’s work: “God: Essence and Attributes,” in Nader El Bizri, The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic.
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It should be further noted that there is the question of where the basis (or literal meaning) of analogy
lies, as either originating in the Deity or originating in humanity. To be fair to Torrance’s thought, his understanding
of humanity is one qualified by the imago Dei and, as such, man is not used to describe God but God should be used
to describe man. And this “describing” occurs in the reciprocity entailed in the God-man relationship, which is at
once a God-manward expression by God and, then, in response a man-Godward expression by man. This is more a
matter for Christian theology than for Islamic theology. Thomas Torrance, citing Oliver Quick, describes analogies
originating from the Deity as theomorphic analogies and anthropomorphism should be thought of as an ingredient of
this reciprocal relationship between God and man that entails, therefore, always a theo-morphic component. Oliver
Quick, Doctrines of the Creed (London: 1947), 29 – 32. Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 106.
Moreover, although a dictation theory of “inspiration” is accepted in Islam, there is participation in the
revealing process by man in the Christian view of “inspiration.” Briefly, God is the source of the content to be
revealed while man participates as the “agent through whom” the message arrives in history. The agency of man
may include style, vocabulary, genre, and structure, among other literary components. Thus, as an example based on
this potential Christian view, God may reveal the content that “He is the Creator,” and the human agent may choose
to use the anthropomorphism of a “Potter with clay” to relay this content. Theoretical bibliology is no easy task, so
hopefully this short comment on the matter suffices to avoid unneeded digression. Lastly, anthropomorphisms may
do more than just describe the Deity — i.e., direct, promise, encourage, etc.
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to the divine perfection when considered finitely. To use “goodness/good” again as an example
will be helpful. The creaturely finite goodness of Elijah would be the creaturely referent drawn
from the field of human creaturely existence (knowing, experiencing, reasoning, etc.). This
“notion” of “goodness” can be used as a basis to speak about the Deity: “The Deity is good.” It
must be recalled that the Deity would not be restricted to merely the finite “goodness” of Elijah,
but the knowledge of Elijah’s “goodness” logically precedes the knowledge of the “goodness” of
the Deity. Elijah’s goodness acts as the epistemological starting point for understanding “divine
goodness.”119 It is true that the Deity reveals that He is good, but there is no way to come to
know what “good” means apart from the creaturely processes involved in learning what is
“good” in creaturely existence.
Al-Ghazālī, perhaps the most significant Muslim thinker at any time, discusses the
process of predicating analogies to Allah.120 His process of handling them is similar to what,
following Anselm, Scotus advocated. Furthermore, it supports the contension above that humans
know creaturely things first before moving to know things about the Deity.121 A particularly
fruitful point Al-Ghazālī makes is about the function of analogies. He cites a saying of the
Prophet Muhammad: “The heart of the believer is between two fingers of the Compassionate.”122
Then, he describes how to understand this: “For the scholar, it indicates a metaphorical meaning
rather than a literal one. It signifies what the finger is for. It is as if He called His power “a
finger” because the function of the finger—and its spirit and nature—is the ability to turn things
119

Scotus, Philosophical Writings, 24. “According to Anselm, then, we first know something to be a pure
perfection and secondly we attribute this perfection to God. Therefore, it is not a pure perfection precisely in so far
as it is in God.”
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As cited above, Al-Ghazālī’s discussion of this is excellent. Al-Ghazālī, Al-G
treatise, 8 proposition. Kindle.
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ā ’ M

, 1st

as it pleases” (Italics mine).123 Before continuing on with Al-Ghazālī general treatment of
analogies, the importance of “function” in the question of predication of the Deity cannot be
overlooked.
William Alston adapted “functionalism,” a theory of the philosophy of mind, to address
the question of the possibility of speaking literally about God.124 David Clark appropriates
Alston’s thought as well to argue for the actuality of univocal predication of the Deity.125 The
contribution made by Al-Ghazālī’s point, supported later by Alston and Clark, is that the
function can be the univocal element that has a common meaning between a creature and the
Deity. It is “the power or ability to accomplish things as pleased” that the analogy of “finger”
presents as the common meaning between a creature’s figure and the Deity’s “figure.” Focusing
on “function” in this way is another helpful strategy for overcoming the disparity between the
Deity as infinite and creatures as finite. The function is the same (univocal meaning), which
enables humans to speak univocally about some perfection of the Deity, but the internal
structures (e.g., finite or infinite) or the modalities by which the function is accomplished are not
commented upon.126 During Al-Ghazālī’s discussion of what “sitting” means when predicated of
Allah, he cites Mālik ibn Anas, the founder of the Mālikī school of Islamic jurisprudence: “The
sitting is known, its modality is unknown, to ask about it is a heresy, and to believe in it is a
duty.”127 To refuse comment on the modality while affirming something true of the Deity has a
long history in Muslim thought.
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Al-Ghazālī continues to give examples of how to deal with analogies, and some of them
are anthropomorphisms. He deals with predicating of Allah the analogies of finger, trotting,
longing, the black stone, descending, and sitting on the throne. As he addresses each, what is
common to his method is the starting point of creaturely existence. He describes the literal
meaning of the above terms and phrases, then he appeals to reason, intuition, theology, or
“linguistic suitability” for deciding what needs to be removed and retained for predicating the
terms and phrases of Allah. The same general method for predication of the Deity observed in
Scotus is argued for by Al-Ghazālī. Scotus’ argumentation is more complex than Al-Ghazālī’s
development, but both methods share this process: mentally grasping a creature or some
creaturely reality, purifying it of what is only creaturely, and then applying it to the Deity. The
method for speaking truly of the Deity is not so different between Al-Ghazālī and Scotus. That
univocal predication is possible should remain an exigence because, without it, agnosticism is
not far off. Without univocal predication, therefore, humans would be unavoidably locked out of
speaking truly of the Deity.128 This makes religious speech of any sort an activity in ambiguity
and ultimately precludes the possibility of predicating truly of the Deity. It seems that
disallowing univocal predication turns so-called religious speech of the Deity into self-projecting
human subjectivism.129
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William P. Alston, “Religious Language,” in The Oxford Handbook on Philosophy of Religion, ed.
William J. Wainwright, OXFORD HANDBOOKS OF PHILOSOPHY, ed. Paul Moser (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005), chap. 10, sec. 7 and 8. Kindle. Alston effectively titles what has been developed herein as “partial univocity,”
and he notes that it has been pervasively ignored (sec. 7). Of course, if predications of God are partially univocal
with creatures, then that leaves elements of the predication that are equivocal, or unable to be applied to God. Hence,
what “partial univocity” entails in Alston’s treatment is the same as the recognition herein that there is sameness and
disparity in predications of God and that univocal meaning common to God and creatures is common in a finitude
but uncommon when considered by God’s infinity.
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Nader El-Bizri describes the Mu’tazilite position on the attributes of God having the same problem:
“God,” in Nader El-Bizri, The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic, 123. “The Mu’tazilite thesis regarding
the creation of the Qur’an appears as ill founded on the same grounds that it presupposes, namely, the radical
observance of God’s transcendence. By stressing transcendence, the belief in the scripture’s created status implies
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The Deity’s self-application of creaturely analogies to describe Himself is a fact of the
Qur’an and the Bible. Deciding what is properly predication of the Deity becomes increasingly
complex with the accumulation and recognition of the great diversity of human experiences and
systems of knowledge. The trouble comes from societal/cultural differences because, as John
Milbank elucidates, sociologists’ attempts to universalize “society” in their interpretive schema
for reductionistically explaining religion fails.130 It is historical particularity that grounds
sociology. So long as humanity continues to reflect its very diverse ways, no sociological attempt
to universalize that diversity can represent humans accurately. Hence, the meanings of both
words and their significance for a society are inevitably historically situated or contextualized.
John Searle, in his famous Speech-Acts, drove home how historical situatedness
contributes to sentence meaning and usage as real action in speech-acts.131 Devotees of Islam or
Christianity must today become attuned to the original historical context of the writer(s) of their
respective Scriptures, what historians call the “historical horizon,” to properly understand those
predications.132 The historical horizon of the original recipients provides the meanings of words
then, in that horizon. For instance, p

ē

(“gentleness”; Eph. 4:2) in the Pauline corpus of

the New Testament means something very different than what “gentleness” today probably
brings to the mind of the average American living in the South. P

ē

, in Koine Greek as

that the divine attributes are not real, but are rather revealed in a worldly language for the convenience of human
comprehension. The reality of divinity seems to be determinable by the judgements of human reason . . . .”
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John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: beyond secular Reason, reprinted (1990; Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers Ltd., 2001), 259 – 265.
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used during the first century while Paul was writing, signifies having a proper evaluation of
oneself, sincerity in conversation related to proper self-evaulation, and not to be presumptuous.
Thus, in analogical predication, the modern interpreter needs to learn this meaning, and then ask
what “gentleness” means when predicated of the Deity. Such predication would mean that “not
to be presumptuous” would have to be discarded since the Deity is omniscient. That the Deity
would be “sincere” in conversation would seem to be something properly predicated of Him.
This interpretive task would be similar for both Muslims and Christians. Admittedly, Islam’s
task may be easier or, at least, less open to perversion since Muslims affirm the “unique
inspiration” of the Arabic text of the Qur’an. Christians must account for the distance imposed
by both historical and linguistic considerations: those derived from affirming the inspiration of
translations to the extent that they reflect the original Hebrew, Greek, and Aramaic.133 In some
sense, both Muslims and Christians are attempting to form themselves in a community around
133

These limited epistemological comments, along with the former section on analogical interpretation,
present a largely traditional logo-centric account of sign and referent, albeit tempered by the wisdom of
postmodernity. This is no epistemological treatise and so these admittedly concise epistemological comments will
have to serve. If the sign is disconnected from the substantial-referent (i.e., the logo-centric “presence” or
“objective” correlate for the term “hand”), as would have to be the case if Allah’s use of the revelatory term “hand”
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the historical horizon of the scriptural text while accounting for the continual flux and essential
difference of the contemporary horizon.
Analogia Entis and Apophaticism
That there are certain anthropomorphisms in both the Qur’an and the Bible then sets the
question of whether other terms derived from creation can act analogically for understanding the
Deity. The case for creation as a means to know God (not presupposing salvation; e.g.,
prevenient) is well known in the New Testament passage, Romans 1:20, even if there is a
divergence in opinion on how the text should be understood: “For His invisible attributes are
conspicuously clear from the creation of the cosmos, being known by created things, both His
eternal power and divinity . . . .” (trans. mine). Creation is a mode of revelation, however this
mode is understood. Christian theology has long accepted creation as revelatory in manifesting
God and His attributes. This essay would be yet another example of thinking on what creation,
including human creatures, suggests about the Deity (especially since God chose the human
analogy as His image, Genesis 1:26 – 28; 2:4).134 Nevertheless, both Muslims and Christians
hold Genesis to be Scripture. This means that using humans and their interrelating (i.e.,
anthropomorphisms) are both

ā for both Islam and Christianity, and not

only anthropomorphisms drawn from analogia entis. Since

ā sanctions humans and their

relationality as analogies, then there is sure footing for looking to analogia entis for the concrete
actualization of these approved analogies.
Although it is clear that the Qur’an is meant to be a guide for mankind and thus not
revelatory in the Christian sense of God’s self-giving to be truly known as He is, it nevertheless

134

That all creation is reflective of God and especially humanity due to their being made in the
ō
is not contested but seemingly universally accepted by all Christians. As such, attention in this section will focus on
Islam since sometimes applying anthropomorphisms to Allah is considered the sin of
b .
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stands that humanity is guided regarding how to live and poise themselves in relation to Allah.135
The Qur’an’s teaching helps to form man into a proper way of life in view of Allah as Rabb
(Lord). The Qur’an intends to orient man to Allah. These three phrases, “in relation to,” “to form
man in view of Allah,” and “orients man to Allah,” all entail an inherent relationship to Allah
and presupposes the possibility of that relationship.136
It is in this sense that the Qur’anic revelation requires, as part of its mediatorial function,
an Allah-human relationship. The Qur’an is intended to mediate Allah’s will to humanity as
delivered by Jibril and passively received by Muhammad.137 From here, a number of
relationships come to the fore: the relationships between Muhammad and Allah, between
Muhammad and Allah’s Speech (Qur’an), between Allah and humanity, between Muhammad
and humanity, and between Allah and His Prophet (Muhammad; Shahadah) on the one hand and
the Umma on the other.
As Creator, Allah has been in relationship with humans since the creation of Adam. Islam
stresses dissimilarity far more greatly than similarity between Allah’s relating to humans and
humans relating to other humans.138 Nevertheless, what is the same to both is relating by speech.
All human relationships take as a constitutive aspect “speech” or “communication.” So this
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communicative “speech” of Allah takes an analogical correlate or similarity in human-to-human
relationships. But is this “inventing a similitude” of Allah, a

, which is expressly

forbidden in the Qur’an (Surah 16:74)?139 If “inventing” is understood as fabrication then, no,
this is not occurring. If taken as “discovering,” then, yes, these observations on the similarity
between how Allah relates to humans and how humans relate to one another could be accused of
violating Surah 16:74.140 Whether the accusation is viable or not given Al-Ghazālī “Mulism
position” on analogical predication is another question.
The validity of analogically predicating “perfections” of Allah (in Scotus’ and AlGhazālī’s sense) is supported by Allah’s “ninety-nine beautiful names” derived more or less
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If W. Watt, cited just above is right, it would be inventing similitudes and applying them literally to
Allah that would be inappropriate, not analogically. Further, it is
b , literal anthropomorphism, which is
regularly forbidden by Muslim scholars although where to draw on how much analogical anthropomorphism is
allowable is certainly not monolithic. No less a fundamental scholar than Ibn Taymīyya used categories of human
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independent in every respect from everything other than Him, and everything that is not him is in need of him in
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vol. 6, bk. 36, trans. Reza Shah-Kazemi.
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Two pairs of pericopae from the Qur’an illustrate the difficulty of the Qur’an’s teaching on
“similitudes.”
Legitimacy of Similitudes
57:3

He is the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden.

24:35 Allah is the Light of the heavens and the earth. The similitude of His light is as a niche
wherein is a lamp. The lamp is in a glass. The glass is as it were a shining star. (The Lamp is) kindled from
a blessed tree, an olive neither of the East nor of the West, whose oil would almost glow forth (of itself)
though no fire touched it. Light upon light. Allah guideth unto His light whome He will. And Allah
speaketh to mankind in allegories, for Allah is Knower of all things. (cf. 2:256, the famous Throne-verse).
Illegitimacy of Similitudes
16:74

So coin not similitudes for Allah. Lo! Allah knows; you know not.

42:11

Nothing is as His likeness.
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directly from the Qur’an.141 This is because so many of these names entail Allah-human relations
and must be analogically understood by human-human relations. Therefore, understanding Allah
by means of human relationships is a divinely sanctioned method, not one made up or discovered
by humans.142 As an example, the human experience of relating is part of the process of coming
to understand the name, Ar-Rahman (the All-Merciful). The exercise of mercy in human-human
relations enables humans to understand in finite terms how Allah is merciful (univocity), but not
simply merciful like a creature (analogical). His mercy infinitely exceeds such. Hence, this
“infinite exceeding” is well-conveyed with the addition of “all” in “All-Merciful.” Still, the
creaturely expression of mercy is the conceptual foundation from which to extend human
thought about Allah’s mercy, about how much greater His mercy is. This same type of
formulation is made for many of the names of Allah: Al-M ’

(Inspirer of Faith), Ar-Qahhar

(the Subduing One), Al-Hakim (the Judge), Al-Muqit (the Nourisher), Al-Wali (the Governor),
and so forth.143 To object to this with the argument that the names only indicate His activity is to
141

At least on a certain stance on how the attributes relate to Allah’s essence. As Nader El-Bizri articulates
regarding the Ash’arite position, “Ash’arī argued that God’s words about God, as manifested in the Qur’an, set up
the directives by virtue of which reasoned judgements about the essence-attributes question are to be measured. The
affirmation of God’s attributes should be coupled with the negation of implied anthropomorphic determinations.” Is
this not one of the tasks of Christian theology, purifying language applied to God of improper creaturely
implications? However, Ash’arī, reports El-Bizri, goes further: “Analogy is problematic when it hints at any form of
similitude between God and anything in His world of creation.” It might be wondered why anyone would go on
using the word analogy at all at this point. Nadri El-Bizri, “God,” Cambridge Companion for Classical Islamic, 128
– 129.
142

Harun Yahya-Adnan Oktar, Names of Allah (Global Publishing, 2011). This book goes through each of
the beautiful names of Allah and explains the Qur’anic foundation for each.
On a different matter, Muslims might find what is said here objectionable. Islam, however, is not
monolithic on these matters, which is both historically and contemporarily demonstrable. Ibn Taymayyi’s semantic
mode of reference for the Qur’an, for instance, is linked patently to creaturely language (which entails relating)
because “meaning is nothing deeper than the use of ordinary words in particular contexts.” Paul A. Hardy,
“Epistemology and Divine Discourse,” Cambridge Companion for Classical Islamic, 295; Hardy is commenting on
Ibn Taymīyyi, M j ‘
ā ā, ed. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Qāsim and Muḥammad (Rabat, n.d.), xx: 496.
143

If the name considered requires the question, “To whom?” then this beautiful name requires “another”
and since Allah is not internally differentiated (like the Trinity) the name implies relationship to creatures and so
likewise entails the analogy of human-to-human relationship. For a human to be merciful to another human is
always already an expression of a relationship for without the relationship there would be no condition for mercy to
be shown.
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commit the sin of

’ .144 This would be to deny that these names really convey truth about

Allah’s nature and so would divest Allah of His attributes.145
There may be another objection to analogical ascription to Allah, namely, using
mysticism to cut off continued investigation. This defense via mysticism emphasizes Allah’s
radical transcendence (Surah 16:74). The evidence used throughout — human relationships and
their inescapability — becomes dubious if Allah’s transcendence is understood in this radical
way. The question is whether or not the claim that Allah is utterly unlike anything in creation is
convincing. Nadir El-Bizri explains, “Analogy is problematic when it hints at any form of
similitude between God and anything in His world of creation.”146 Is such utter dissimilarity
defendable? Although Al-Ghazālī supported the use of analogical predication as seen earlier, a
few more responses will demonstrate the unfeasibility of claiming such a radical transcendence
for Allah.

The essential attributes attributed to Allah that “Muslims ascribe to God [are] all the noble names and
attributes that befit his holy character. However, traditionally they insist on learning and remembering the following
thirteen attributes specifically: “Existence, Eternity, Perpetuity, Dissimilarity, Self-Sustenance, Unity, Might, Will,
Knowledge, Life, Hearning, Sight and Speech.” Muhammad Abdul Rauf, Islam: Creed and Worship (Washington,
D. C.: The Islamic Center, 1974), 4 – 5.
144

Michael Oldham, Allah and Elohim (Tate Publishing, 2013), chap. 3, introduction. Kindle. “The
attributes of Allah are commonly known as alā’ ’ - fā — the Names and Qualities or Attributes of God.”
Most Islamic scholars caveat their remarks regarding the attributes of Allah. For, at its foundation, Islam has an
unresolved theological contradiction. Attributing human characteristics to Allah is regarded as a sin,
b , but so
is its opposite,
, which means divesting Allah of all attributes."
145

Even Ibn Taymīyya says the attributes disclose something of who Allah is because attributes for Ibn
Taymīyya subsist in the one whom the attribute describes. Ahmad ibn Taymiyya, M
’ R
to Christianity, 269, 272, 273, and especially 279, which states: “. . . for the life of God is an attribute subsisting in
God’s essence, not in anything else, nor particularized in some one of the created things outside of Him.”
146

Nadri El-Bizri, “God,” Cambridge Companion for Classical Islamic, 128 – 129.
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The Shahadah predicates aloneness (unicity;

) of Allah.147 Muslims, therefore,

are not ignorant about the nature of Allah in at least this regard. This monotheistic affirmation
cannot stand in agnosticism, which is the inevitable result of affirming an utter otherness of
Allah (or Allah’s radical transcendence). An irony occurs by holding to radical transcendence
because “otherness” is predicable of creatures, which means that “otherness” should not be
predicable of Allah. If the first phrase of the Shahadah is not to become completely vacuous
(“There is no god but Allah . . . .”), the typical portrayals of Allah’s singularity must act
analogically for understanding Allah’s aloneness.148 The response, “But Allah is beyond even
this,” only reiterates the original problem leading to blank agnosticism. If He is “beyond even
this” with no analogical/creaturely correlate, then how do Muslims know that “there is no god
but God?” There must be some link between what Muslims’ claim to know and how Allah
actually is for truth to be in the expression “there is no god but God.” Otherwise, the
monotheistic claim fails, and the question marks of agnosticism reign.149 In this way, the
creaturely understanding of “oneness/loneness” must be used analogically to comprehend
Allah’s

or else the first part of the Shahadah becomes empty.
Second, going with the majority view that the Qur’an is Allah’s eternal Speech, there is a

representation of Allah making known in the Qur’an what is necessary for humanity.150 Although

147

And the Shahadah does not appear in the Qur’an in its composite form although “its two halves occur
separately.” Surah 4:136 is the closest basis for the Shahadah. H. A. R. Gibb, Mohammedanism: an Historical
Survey, 2nd ed. (1949; New York: Galaxy Book, 1962), 53.
148

And this does not violate the prohibition against predicating something creaturely of Allah literally since
whatever singularity means in the creatural cosmos exist preeminently in Allah.
149

Why someone would know that “something” is there while claiming that any knowledge of whatever
this thing might be is inaccessible is incoherent. For this reason and because Islam is a religion of revelation, appeal
to transcendence to forgo investigation or to remove from creatures any ability to inquire into this Deity who gives
revelation is at once an affront to the revelation and an undermining of one’s own revelatory worldview and religion.
150

Taking the Qur’an as co-eternal suggests if not affirms that Islam is truly a binitarian tradition of
monotheism, which is no far different than the early Christian binitarian view of monotheism as God (Greek: “God,”
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the Qur’an is not a revelation of Allah’s self-giving to be known as He is, it is a revelation of His
guidance.151 Still, Allah’s “ninety-nine beautiful names” suggest that the Qur’an is more than a
revelation for guidance. Rather, the “ninety-nine beautiful names” indicate true predications of
who Allah is along with the guidance the “names” no doubt give. Allah reveals Himself partially,
but He also reveals to humanity, by His Speech, what is good for them.152 But how should this be
understood? There is a tension here between Allah’s “beautiful names” as disclosures of who
Allah is and the Qur’an as merely guidance to humanity (Surah 2:185). The revelation of what
Allah is like by His “beautiful names” and the guidance of humanity by the Qur’an must together
be understood as delivered in the one revelation of the Qur’an. Otherwise, the contents of the

Theos) and His Word (Greek: “Word,” Logos). It is doubtful that this would ever be admitted or put forth by
Muslims since it is a severe complication or even contravention of
. This is within their rights as a tradition
of revelation that always allows for ineffability, which does not demand that their views be seen as incoherent or
contradictory. Christians allow this for themselves in numerous theological doctrines. And if the Deity is truly
infinite then this stance is not only an option but indeed demanded. I owe this thought to my mentor, Dr. Edward
Smither. Watt, Islam and Christianity today, 49. Watt notes that problem of the Qur’an being thought of as distinct
as a major problem for
.
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Kateregga, Badru D. and David W. Shenk, Islam and Christianity: a Muslim and Christian in Dialogue
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980), 88. “Nevertheless, the Christian witness emphasizes the self disclosure of God
(hence the 'Trinity'), while in Islam it is the will and guidance of God which is revealed.” This is the Muslim
response (Kateregga) to Christian's section on God's oneness. Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur'an, 3. "The Qur'an
is no treatise about God and His nature: His existence, for the Qur'an, is strictly functional — He is the Creator and
Sustainer of the universe and of man, and particularly the giver of guidance for man and He who judges man,
individually and collectively, and metes out to him merciful justice." Michot, “Revelation,” Cambridge Companion
for Classical Islamic, 181.
152

Yahya Michot, commenting on Ibn Taymiyya, says that the godhead of Allah can be discussed from an
ethical standpoint: “It is relative to religion, not metaphysics, and thus beyond His seignioriality, that God’s godhead
can properly be investigated. Godhead ( ā
), the Damascene theologian Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) explains, is not
the power to create of a God ( - ā ), understood in the sense of the active participle ā , “creating”. - ā , “the
God”, is to be understood in the sense of the passive participle - ’ , “the divinized one”, or “the divinisable
one”, which is to say, He who has the exclusive right to be made divine (uliha) and is the only one entitled to be
worshipped and loved.” Yahya Michot, “Revelation,” Cambridge Companion for Classical Islamic, 181.
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Qur’an are presented reductionistically, stressing the guidance of the Qur’an to such a degree
that the disclosures of what Allah is like by the “beautiful names” are ignored or dismissed.153
The Qur’an as the eternal Speech of Allah contains both revelatory teachings about who
Allah is and how humanity should live. The Qur’an as Speech is a representation of Allah in
verbalized form. If the Qur’an is eternal as held by Sunni Muslims, it is a timeless Book, or
verbalization, on how creatures should act if or when Allah creates them and intimations of
whom He is. The Qur’an as a book of guidance for creatures is a sort of “other voicing” (or
conversation) with Allah’s potential creatures — creatures that are not eternal themselves and
thus “began” when created.154 The Qur’an’s address to these potential creatures would contain a
verbalized representation of Allah carried out by His “beautiful names” while also directing
these potential creatures by the guidance contained in the Qur’an. Therefore, Allah would
eternally be in a kind of relationship to Allah’s Speech, which Speech is not Allah Himself
inasmuch as Allah’s eternal Speech is Allah’s actual address to His potential creatures.155 These
potential creatures are said thereby to constitute “others,” which are addressed, but the Qur’an
would not need to include guidance to these “others” if these potential creatures were never
created.156
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Watt, Islam and Christianity today, 51. “The Islamic conception of God's transcendence might seem to
exclude any possibility of his immanence, but this is not so. There is some sense in which, according to the Qur'ān,
God acts through men.” Surahs 8:17 and 50:16 testify to this.
154

Some hold that the attributes are in the divine essence (so Ibn Taymīyya above) and others that the
attributes only reveal how Allah relates to creation and that the essence of divinity is totally unknowable.
155

If it is contested that the Qur’an is one with Allah and not other, then the question of how humans have
the Qur’an in their possession follows quickly after.
156

This raises the specter of whether or not a thought in the mind of the Deity that conceives creatures
constitutes their “otherness.” Looking at this from the creaturely side of things, the obvious answer is no since many
things can be imagined by humans, but this imagining does not make the things or persons so imagined true
“others.”
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Is not all of this strikingly similar to the way humans relate to other humans or even to
themselves in the sense of “internal dialogue?” When a human speaks, she conveys something of
who she is while addressing another with other words that can guide or direct the other’s
attention.157 Similarly, Allah’s Speech expresses something of who He is while also providing
guidance. Due to humanity’s finite nature, humans always speak in ways that lack total precision
in conveying the whole truth about that to which they refer. Thus, any human utterance partially
represents the human speaker and partially dissembles the speaker.158 Of course, with Allah, it
would not be the case that He has any weakness that would prevent Him from communicating
what He intends. Instead, Allah’s infinite wisdom guides how much to reveal to humanity either
in terms of guidance or of disclosing Himself. A human knows that she is an existent and that
there is speech around her other than what represents her, whether this is internal dialogue or
speech from others. The point of all this is that the human capacity for internal dialogue (i.e.,
self-relating) or relating with others by means of speech is a necessary conceptual foundation to
think on and proclaim that Allah’s Speech (Qur’an) is eternal with Him. Said differently, human
internal dialogue or dialogue with other humans is an analogy by which to understand the way
Allah and the Qur’an relate. How humans relate to their own speech provides the surest ground
for properly understanding Allah’s relationship to His Speech.
This analytical response to Allah’s “utter otherness,” or radical transcendence, closes
with an observation about otherness. What was argued formerly about the Qur’an addressing
“potential creatures” as substantial “others” has been largely refused by the great Muslim thinker
157

Although promoting that this is much like how humans exist, act, and think, such an anthropology
presents a serious bifurcation between who someone is and what he or she does and speaks (speech-acts). I do not
necessary endorse such an inner psycheic understanding while conceding that it does account for humanity’s finite
nature significantly. Luke 6:45 finds a tighter connection between who someone is and what they do/speak.
158

The capacity to properly represent what is intended is a skill that can be developed. Humanus
absconditus does not have to occur.
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Al-Ghazālī.159 For Al-Ghazālī, under the compelling influence of

, the logic of Islam

inevitably leans in the direction that creation is illusory and only the One is real. 160 Nevertheless,
the co-eternality of Allah and the Qur’an, and the apparent distinction between them, is worth
deeply considering: how can a human understand this if not by the analogy of his own
experience of internal dialogue or by interpersonal speech that does not strictly represent him?
Let us offer a final word on apophaticism. An apophatic ingredient is always warranted in
understanding the Deity. This ingredient protects the Deity from being robbed of His
transcendence. Cataphatic theology must complement apophatic theology or else the end result is
an agnosticism that can shade into atheism. Both are necessary in getting to know the Deity.
Thomas Torrance says it well:
We may not forget, however, that the Mystery of God sets limits to the reciprocity
which he establishes between us, and thereby sets boundaries to our knowledge of
him, which interdicts the projection of our human subjectivities and creaturely
relations into him. Thus while God appropriates our human words and
conceptions, along with their anthropomorphic elements embedded in them, and
uses them in the mediating of his reconciling revelation to us, he nevertheless
remains transcendent over them all and makes his Truth marvelously to shine
through them at the same time, and thereby reveals himself to us in spite of the
infinite difference between the creature and Creator.161
This applies readily enough to Islam by modifying the phrase, “reveals himself to us,” to
“reveals his will to us” although the prior comments about knowing Allah’s attributes/names
indicates that, to some extent, Allah makes Himself known in revelation.
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Al-Ghazali, The Revival of Religious Sciences, vol. 6, bk. 36. “God does indeed love them [people], but
in reality He loves nothing other than Himself, in the sense that He is the totality [of being], and there is nothing in
being apart from Him.”
160

Gibb, Mohammedanism, 55. Surah 28:88 records, “And cry not unto any other god along with Allah.
There is no Allah save Him. Everything will perish save His countenance. His is the command, and unto Him ye
will be brought back.”
161

Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 106 – 107.
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Anthropology, Society, and the Deity
Every human has been born into human relatedness — except Adam as addressed in an
earlier footnote. Every human is born into a divine-human relationship. These points are obvious
according to both Islam and Christianity. Each human person intuitively knows the three things
assumed in this work: that she is related, distinct, and in oneness to — or in union with — other
humans.162 Relatedness is being associated with others, and it is initially a consequence of being
born. In other words, it is constitutive of human nature or what it means to be human. Human
families form their structure in terms of human relatives, and no one has ever been without
relatives (except Adam initially).163 Oneness, though, is seen even in the primordial case of
Adam because Adam carried Eve biologically in Himself, as foreknown by the Deity (“Eve is
auwa in Islam; the Hebrew is

vv

).164 The Deity, as omniscient and

or

Rabb/Kupios/Adonai of all stands over all time as well.165 Whatever one’s stance, whether the
162

For an excellent discussion on the human identity in view of secular viewpoints analyzed under the light
of theology, see Wolfhart Pannenberg’s work. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective,
trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (1985; Edinburgh: T&T Clark LTD, 1999); Catherine Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual
Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 96. Bell’s term, “social person” capitalizes the embodied nature
of being human as always first a “you” for an “I”: the social human is a “complex and irreducible phenomena.”
Tamim Al-Barghouti, The Umma and the Dawla: The Nation-State and the Arab Middle East (London: Pluto Press,
2008), 38 – 39. The Islamic idea of the transcultural nature of the ‘U
similarly points in the direction of a
human always being in some oneness with others. Al-Barghouti states that the very idea of the ‘
is tied to the
collective pursuing the imam (“guide”). On both Christian and Islamic cosmological origins, the human person is
always a “you” to the Deity before the human is an “I” to self. This is also the case with a child, who is always
“you” or “him/her” to parents before an “I” to self. For an erudite discussion on how anthropological categories
relate to theology, Douglas Davies’ work is concise and broad. Douglas Davies, Anthropology and Theology
(Oxford: Berg, an imprint of Oxford International Publishers Ltd., 2002), 29 – 24 and 45; F. LeRon Shults,
Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the Philosophical Turn to Relationality (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
2003), 99 – 105; Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought (Albany: State University of New York, 1981), 7 –
9 and 39 – 54.
163

Someone may object the orphans are examples of persons without relatives. This is only an apparent
difficulty since an orphan still belongs to a generational tree, with or without personally knowing these family
members.
164

The Qur’an does not interdict the account in the Torah, but is more ambiguous on the process of Eve’s
creation: Surah Al-A‘rāf 7:189 and Surah An-Nisā’ 4:1. Eve was still derived from Adam.
165

There are at least four ways to understand the Deity’s relationship to time: sempiternal, transcendent
over but engaged in, temporal, and transcendently timeless. Classical theology in both Islam and Christianity stands,
with divergences noted, closest to transcendently timeless. However one goes, the transcendent superiority of the
Deity over time remains, and this seems to be true even in positions that take the Deity to have always been
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Deity predestines what He knows or only foreknows what will be, He is not ignorant of what He
will do, of how He will bring Eve into existence: through Adam.166 Hence, in the protological
creation of Adam is the kernel of all human relatedness, both in terms of the human-divine
relationship and in the human-human relationship that will obtain when Eve is eventually taken
from Adam. Human persons, wherever they are in the generational chain of life, are always
constituted together with others.
This point is reminiscent of the comments made earlier on human-onto-relations (in
“Fields of Direct Relevance”). To recall, human relating, or human intersubjectivity, can be
accurately retitled “human-onto-relations.” This is because the shear reality of all human
existence occurs in a context of human relationships that influences who or what a human being
is and becomes. Thus, such relating is connected to human ontology, or human nature, because
this relating contributes to the constitution of each human being. No human being is who he is
apart from his relationships. With this said, the “inter-” on “intersubjectivity” is to be stressed.
Distinctness of human persons entails separateness as well. There is something unique in the
embodiment of each human identity. Cain, for instance, carried in himself the biological genes of
Adam and Eve: flesh of his flesh and bone of his bone. However, Cain was not identical to his
parents, which is clear because they were separate from one another, among other distinctives
like actions and choices. For every son or daughter, therefore, there is a biological union that
obtains within him/her of their parents, but this does not make them precisely like their parents,
conditioned by time (temporal). William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); William Lane Craig,
E
: Ex
G ’ R
Time (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2001); Garrett DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time (Hampshire UK:
Ashgate, 2004); William Haskar, God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Alan Padgett,
God, Eternity and the Nature of Time, rep. (London: Wipf and Stock, 2000).
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Zizioulas, Communion & Otherness, 142. “As offspring of human nature, we are not ‘other’ in an
absolute sense; neither are we free. If we attribute either ἀρχη or ‘cause’ to a person, Adam, we acquire otherness in
unity.”

57

either in acts or in biochemical composition. In Islamic or Christian theism, there is always a
metaphysical component or aspect in all human identity as well (e.g., soul or spirit).167 Said
differently, there is always sameness and disparity between oneself and one’s parents — like an
analogy. Echoing Vanhoozer’s earlier work on identity, sameness and disparity in this biological
relation between parents and children makes a place for both idem-identity and ipse-identity.
Idem-identity shows the sameness between a parent and child; ipse-idenity makes room for
disparity between a child and parent by the child’s action to uphold or undermine his speech,
contributing to what is unique to his identity.
It must, again, be emphatically noted that human beings’ “distinctness” from one another
takes as a defining feature “separateness.” This will become important in chapter four during the
discussion of the Hypostaseis of the Trinity. These comments on “biological oneness” and
“distinctness entailing separateness” are apparently undeniable of every son or daughter. The
adverb “apparently” is added in order to avoid stacking the deck against potential Islamic
doctrine(s) of creation (cf. chap. 3). It has already been seen that Al-Ghazālī understood creation
as illusory, which requires the denial of any real “separateness” since all are claimed to be One.
Experientially, however, each human being understands himself to be separate from other human
beings except for the biological union already noted.
There is another type of oneness that needs explained to capture how humans experience
their relationships with others. It is “human cognitive oneness,” but it needs to be carefully
defined. Human cognitive oneness is mutual understanding, a syncing of thought so as to achieve
167

This is a repudiation of materialistic reductions of the human personality. Following both Hart’s insight
in the footnote below and that advice of Alvin Plantinga above, Christianity and Islam should flatly reject those
secular or “kuhr” (unbelieving) categories that takes as its ground the rejection of revelation and the supposition that
the cosmos and, so the human person, are to be understood non-theistically. “Metaphysical” could be replaced with
“spiritual” above if adequately qualified.
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more or less mimesis of thought between two human beings (or more). There is not a monist
framework underlying human cognitive oneness as this phrase is used at this point. Such may be
called for in later chapters depending on how a doctrine of creation is configured in Islam or
Chritianity. For now, however, human cognitive oneness indicates the ability humans possess to
recognize another separate person, receive communication, and appropriate this other human
person’s expressed thought as his own. Hence, it is experientially plain that each human person
is separate from another, but separateness does not preclude taking another human’s expressed
thought as one’s own. Cognitive oneness between humans contributes to an individualized
human identity, but not by some monist or metaphysical mind-meld. Instead, human cognitive
oneness between humans contributes by way of appropriating another’s thought as one’s own.
This occurs constantly in today’s world, and it is probably most vividly and pervasively
portrayed in advertising and marketing. Humans communicating (relating) with one another must
decide about how much influence to take from others, whether more or less. Any human being’s
thought communicated influences how others think, and, reciprocally, this person has influence
from others occurring to him.168 What is envisaged is a clearer recognition of the interconnection
between the categories of anthropology (as isolate individual) and society. Human experience
always entails intersubjectivity, so discussion about this reality must ever link the individual to
society and the society to individual. These categories, i.e., society and the individual, reflect
reality more properly if presented as intersubjective, reciprocating categories. In short, there “is

168

John Zizioulas, Communion & Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church, ed. Paul
McPartlan, rep. (2006; London: T & T Clark, 2009), 9. This book builds on this idea of the interpenetrating nature
(or intersubjective) of communion and otherness as constitutive of humanity’s personhood. He points to the Trinity
as the only way to “arrive at this notion of personhood: the Father cannot be conceived for a single moment without
the Son and the Spirit, and the same applies to the other two persons in their relation with the Father and with each
other.”
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no such thing as a societiless individual.”169 The forming of an individual human identity takes
as an integral aspect the influence of society, or the influences from others.170 No baby could
dare to suppose otherwise. Human cognitive oneness is communication realized, with stressed
laid upon the human ability to appropriate others’ expressed thoughts. Once someone
appropriates another’s expressed thought, she will act in certain manners attuned to, more or less,
this thinking. By action or speech-acts, she diplays and constructs her disposition (or who she is:
i.e., ipse-identity). Thus, human cognitive oneness brings this discussion back to the earlier idea
of “human-onto-relations.” Appropriating another’s thought leads to action, and “action is the
proof of disposition.”171 By reoccurrence of thinking, speech-action, and action, the nature of
one’s identity is formed. Hence, the humans to whom someone relates affects that person’s
nature, more or less depending on the degree of influence and the appropriation (or acceptance)
of that influence. Thus, it is evident that someone’s expressed thought can be part of forming
another person’s nature by appropriation, recurrence of thinking such appropriated thought, and
performance of that appropriated thought day to day. This process is represented well by the
phrase “human-onto-relations.”
169

Fazlur Rahman, M j
Q ’ , 2nd Ed. (1980; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1989), 37; Stanley Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Dei
(Louisville KY: John Knox Press, 2001), 304.
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David Bentley Hart. The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth. Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2003, 170 – 171. Kindle. Hart, quoting and then commenting on Nicholas Lash, states: “Lash . . .
recommends instead the Augustinian category of “subsistent relations”: “we have relationships,” he writes, “God is
the relations that he has. . . . God, we might say, is relationships without remainder, which we, most certainly, are
not.” [Hart says] “As theology this is sound enough (though I entertain considerable doubts regarding its value as
anthropology); . . . should not the Trinity be made the starting point for a theological assault on the modern notion of
person? Or for a more “constitutive” account of relationality within human identity? . . . Is not even our “purest”
recommends instead the Augustinian category of “subsistent relations”: “we have relationships,” he writes, “God is
the relations that he has. . . . God, we might say, is relationships without remainder, which we, most certainly, are
not.” [Hart says] “As theology this is sound enough (though I entertain considerable doubts regarding its value as
anthropology); . . . should not the Trinity be made the starting point for a theological assault on the modern notion of
person? Or for a more “constitutive” account of relationality within human identity? . . . Is not even our “purest”
interiority reflexive, knowing and loving itself as expression and recognition . . . .” In this regard, the present work
represents a continuation of that theological assault. Nicholas Lash, Believing Three Ways in One God: A Reading of
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(Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1993), 31 – 32.
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The three categories of oneness, distinctness, and relatedness capture what is
epistemically and intuitively obvious for every human person. It may be alleged that these
catergories are a case of arguing to my “Christian” presuppositions, namely, towards the Trinity
as the better explanation of this evidence, expounded in these categories. Two responses are in
order. First, should there be a better formulation of these categories or terminological formulae
that portray human experience in relationships more accurately, then what was just laid out could
be reconfigured on the basis of such. These categories are derived from what appears obviously
true of human relational experience, not from a doctrine of the Trinity or, for that matter, from a
doctrine of Allah. Secondly, human relationships exist in ways dissimilar to the Trinity:
“distinctness as separateness” is an obvious instance. Moreover, human cognitive oneness also
presupposes separateness, which likewise dissembles the Trinity.
Moving forward then, the person who denies the intuitive epistemic reality that he is
distinct from others, related to others, and is influenced by others (human cognitive oneness)
should be asked how he goes about living a single day of life without experiencing these three
things. The absurdity of denying these categories is seen by the shear fact that whoever reads this
right now must assume the three categories; for the reader is related to me, distinct and separate
from me, and either appropriating or denying my thought, that is, allowing or refusing human
cognitive oneness.172
Hypostasis and Perichōrēsis
In the last section, the contours of human relationships were argued to be human
biological oneness and cognitive oneness, distinctness entailing separateness, and relatedness.
172

This section does not impugn necessarily a worldview that sees all things as illusory or only some
manifestation. This, however, would be an ontological explanation behind humans’ immediate epistemic situation
and reality. The addition of “epistemic” and “epistemically” above means to accentuate the utter realness of these
categories to the human mind on a day-in-day-out basis.
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These categories were drawn-up for the purpose of clarifying the evidence, namely, that human
relationships exist and are inescapable. The categories help to unpack what it means to say
“human relationships exist.” Further, the inescapability of the categories indicates that they are
constitutive of human relationality. As such, these categories will be applied to the Islamic
doctrine of Allah and the Christian doctrine of God to observe how the pressure of a respective
theology proper reconfigures the meanings of oneness, distinctness, and relatedness.
This section presents the terminology necessary to discuss these categories in regard to
the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.When speaking about the Trinity, the celebrated
“Cappadocian compromise” is usually referred to: mia ousia, treis Hypostaseis.173 This is the
preferred Greek formulation, which in Latin is una substantia, tres Personae.174 Although both
ō

and hypostasis are briefly qualified, Hypostasis is given preference due to its

foreignness to the modern ear that has become so familiar with “person.” Hypostasis’
unfamiliarity allows that it be taken in its own right.175 This is not to say that

ōpos is

deficient; that it is a loaded term both by its frequency of use and because of modernity’s
(Cartesian isolated self) conceptions creates complications.176 In what follows, the connotations
173

One of the earliest writing of the formula: Gregory Nazianzen, “Oration 21, On the Great Athanasius,”
in A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, eds. Philip Schaff and Henry
Wace, Vol. VII, S. Cyril of Jerusalem & S. Gregory of Nazianzen (New York: The Christian Literature Company,
1894), ch. XXXV. Logos Bible Software, electronic. “We use in an orthodox sense the terms one Essence [ousia]
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The Latin Fathers can also speak of una esse, tres substantiae, “one essence, three substances,” where
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Augustine: De Trinitate, bk. 5, chap. 8 – 9. Kindle.
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This is a dangerous task indeed, per St. Augustine: “They indeed use also the word hypostasis; but they
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substances.” De Trinitate, bk. 5, chap. 8. Kindle.
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Rahner, The Trinity, 106. He says, “. . . when today we speak of person in the plural, we think almost
necessarily, because of the modern meaning of the word, of several spiritual centers of activity, of several
subjectivities and liberties. . . . And there is properly no mutual love between Father and Son, for this would
presuppose two acts.”
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of both P

ō

and Hypostasis will be explained, then these connotations will be joined to

Hypostasis, delimiting its meaning for the Trinity. The aim is to set forth what is meant by these
terms but not to give justifications for each connotation committed to Hypostasis/Hypostaseis —
the space needed for this would be immense.
Karl Rahner rightly notes that “person” should be taken in Trinitarian formulation as that
which distinguishes.177 “Person” should not be understood as isolated “self” or as a selfsubsisting center of consciousness.178 Neither should “person” conjure the creaturely assumption
that for more than one person necessarily requires separate natures — as with humans.179 Nicolas
of Cusa famously coined, “‘Not other” is not “same”” and “‘not-same’ is ‘not other.’”180
Otherness or distinction is a connotation deposited to Hypostasis that is conceivable only as
otherness without separateness. Maximus the Confessor discussed “difference” as an essential
feature of all things existing, but he also describes “division” (diairesis) as an evil perversion of
“difference” (diaphora).181 Thus, the Hypostaseis of the Trinity are different from One Another,

David Bentley Hart disagrees with Rahner: “For Pavel Florensky the language of divine persons — and
here he strikes a vein far richer, and far more faithful to the "economic" Trinitarian dynamism of atonement, than
that represented by the mere exclusion of a reciprocal Thou from the thought of God — is one of self-oblation,
according to which each "I" in God is also "not I" but rather Thou; for the divine circumincession is always a
relationality of "self"-renunciation in favor of — an opening out to — the other. It is thus that God in himself is, as
Hilary was fond of observing, never solitary. One might even say that, in God, divine "substantiality" is the "effect"
of this distance of address and response, this event of love that is personal by being prior to every self, this gift of
self-offering that has already been made before any self can stand apart, individual, isolate; God is as the differing
modalities of replete love (to speak like Richard of St. Victor), whose relatedness is his substance." Hart, The Beauty
of the Infinite, 171. Kindle.
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trans. Jasper Hopkins (Minneapolis: Banning, 1994), 107. At first hearing, this sounds like nonsense or
contradictory, but the nature of the Persons of the Godhead as One can be explained dialectically, or it can be
explained by a group of analogies although it must be emphasized that each analogy independent of the others can
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but difference neither entails “division” nor is the “separateness” contained in the “distinctness”
of humans descriptive of the divine Hypostaseis. The divine ousia (nature) is definitive of what
is the same among the divine Hypostaseis while the Hypostaseis are how the nature subsists. The
distinctives of the Hypostaseis are often called “properties.” It is essential that these properties be
understood in terms of how rather than what. John Zizioulas explains while commenting on
Maximus the Confessor:
Maximus uses for that purpose [developing an ontology on the basis of how
(hypostasis) along side an ontology of what (physis)] a distinction between logos
and tropos: in every being there is a permanent and unchangeable aspect and an
adjustable one. In the Incarnation, the logos physeos remains fixed, but the tropos
adjusts being to an intention or purpose or manner of communion. In other words,
the love of God bridges the gulf of otherness by affecting the changeable and
adjustable aspect of being, and this applies equally to God and to the world: God
bridges the gulf by adjusting his own tropos, that is, the how he is . . . . This
amounts to a ‘tropic identity’, that is, to an ontology of tropos, of the ‘how’ things
are. This is a matter of ontology, becaue the tropos of being is an inseparable
aspect of being, as primary ontologically as substance or nature.182
Thus, the Hypostaseis connotes how the Father, the Son, and the Spirit subsist. The properties
differentiating the Hypostaseis apply to how They subsist, and they do not divide or separate the
divine Hypostaseis. They only, instead, differentiate Them. Homoousia guarantees the identity of
nature (what: physis/ousia) among the divine Hypostaseis. The term enhypostasis clarifies the
way the Hypostaseis are related to One Another, namely, as several Hypostaseis in Each Other:
enhypostasis is a term for speaking severally of the indivisible Hypostaseis of the Father, Son,
and Spirit with the recognition that speaking severally of Them includes the Others.183 The idea
that the Trinity is a federation of three independent centers of consciousness should be rejected,
182

Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, 24 – 25; Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua 1, 5, and 67.
Maximus uses the Greek phrasing of τροπος ὑπαξεως (
x ō : mode of existence) and πως εἰναι ( ō
einai: how being exists) to explain.
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St. John of Damascus, The Philosophical Chapters, chap. 44. Enhypostasis speaks, in the second way
St. John lays it out, to the mutual indwelling of the hypostaseis of the Trinity, and not to one hypostasis subsisting in
a more substantial under hypostaseis.
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but the biblical portrayal of the Hypostaseis as altogether lively and dynamic should be
retained.184 The added term,

ōē

, elaborates enhypostasis further, indicating dynamism

and the full interpenetration of the Hypostaseis among One Another — “coinherence” can be
used to show the repose in

ōē

and rightly represents it as well.185 The verbal form is

ō ō, and it means “to interpenetrate.” P

ōē

clarifies the enhypostatic “indwelling”

of Each of the Hypostaseis. It specifies that None of the Hypostaseis are taken as more
ontologically substantial in terms of ousia/physis/nature. The Hypostaseis are not to be thought
of in terms of “layers” with the misconception that the Father is the “ground level” in whom the
Son and Spirit subsist.186 Rather, each Hypostasis fully indwells the other two Hypostasesis.
P

ōē

is a vital term for indicating that the mutual indwelling among the Hypostaseis of

the Trinity is “full,” that is, this term indicates that there in no uncommon “divine space” among
the Hypostaseis. Therefore, Hypostasis cannot connote “isolate” or “solitary” but, instead,
always entails a circumscription regarding the Father, Son, or Spirit, so coextensive with the
Others that He (Hypostasis in view) can rightly be said to already always entail the Others, and
thereby undermine conceptions of individual selves. More poetically, the Hypostaseis together
are a resounding plentitude of voice, voiced, and intonation, harmoniously “echoing” by a
creative elaboration as re-voicing — to adapt a Trintarian analogy of my own.187 The effect of
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Hart, Beauty of the Infinite, 171.
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The Latin terminological tradition will go on to highlight dynamism or repose by use of the terms
circuminsession and circumincession, respectively.
186

This does not deny that the Father is rightly discussed as the unoriginate cause of the ousia or the Son
and Spirit, but it does state that no temporality can qualify these causal relationships: therefore, there was not a time
when the Son (or Spirit) was not.
187

The use of “circumscription” here is not designed to “totalize” conceptualization of God, or of the
Hypostaseis, as though He is some totality to be known as a whole. But “circumscription” points to what is
particular of each of the Hypostaseis, that is, in classical theological terms, each Hypostasis has properties that are
proper to only that Person, which are incommunicable to the other two Hypostaseis. Yet “properties” is not to be
understood in a philosophical sense of “properties” belonging to each Hypostasis. Instead, it is the plentitudinal
fullness of the particularity of each Hypostasis, communally expressed among the dynamic relationships that is God.
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Hypostaseis/enhypostasis, in this way, ushers in

ōē

necessarily, as Gregory of Nyssa

taught so long ago: “This then is the hypostasis, or “understanding;” not the indefinite
conception of the essence or substance, which, because what is signified is general, finds no
“standing,” but the conception which by means of the expressed peculiarities gives standing and
circumscription to the general and uncircumscribed.”188 Joseph Lienhard opts to translate
“standing” as “restricts” and Anna Silvas uses “gives stability.”189 The verb suggests a
“presencing” by the particular attendance of someone, that is, by the mode of being/nature (how)
of that specific person. Hypostasis ends up connoting enhypostatic and perichoretic meanings to
present what is intimated in biblical-concrete scriptural language, like “in the bosom of the
Father” or especially the High Priestly prayer (John 17).190 It is no surprise that Thomas Torrance
speaks of Hypostasis and

ōē

together in one breath: “ . . . we seek to formulate in forms

of thought and speech the hypostatic, homoousial and perichoretic relations in the eternal
dynamic Communion in love and being loved of the three Divine persons which God is.”191 The
traditional way to understand the relationships of the Father, Son, and Spirit, is in their causal
That is, enhypostasis, considered severally of the three Hypostaseis, always already is perichoretic in the “one divine
space” (to use a spatial analogy) that is the divine ousia (being, nature). Zizioulas, Communion & Otherness, 9. “At
the same time, each of these persons is so unique that their hypostatic or personal properties are totally
incommunicable from one person to the other.”
188

Basil, Epistle 38, 3. This designation appears to largely have been revised to Gregory of Nyssa, Epistle
38, 3. The Greek of part of the text: Ἡ το κοινον τε και ἀπεριγραπτον ἐν τῳ τινι πραγματι δια των ἐπιφαινομενων
ἰδιοματων παριστωσα και περιγραφουσα. And as noted in an above footnote, this particularity is not to be
understood as “one substance in another,” which is dangerously suggested by both “hypo,” in hypostasis and “sub”
in substance. Nor should it indicate particularities obtaining within an undergirding layer (sub/hypo) — this
introduces a “fourth something” into the Trinity, a Quadrinity. The particularities consist in the relationships that so
penetrate one another that no reference to one hypostasis does not bring with it enhypostasis and so
ō ē , so
much so that the Father cannot be conceived apart from His mutual relationships with the Son, the Son apart from
the Father, the Spirit apart from the Father, or the Spirit apart from the Son.
189
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relations. The Father is the unbegotten or the unoriginate, the Son the begotten, and the Spirit the
one who is sent by the Father through the Son in the name of the Son. These are descriptive
relationships of the Trinity, but to these can be added the faithfulness relationships inherent in
the Trinity. That is, the Son yields and responds to the Father, the Father promises to the Son, the
Spirit glorifies the Son, the Father keeps the Son in the power of His Spirit, and so forth.192
Hypostasis also connotes an objective otherness by and recognized of each several Hypostaseis,
but such “object other” is still homoousially and therefore unitarily one in nature. In other words,
the objective otherness owes to the hypostatic ontology of the Trinity (per Maximus and
Zizioulas earlier). This objective otherness does not threaten the oneness of the Trinity because
of homoousia. The unity of the Trinity owes to the homoousial oneness of the three Hypostaseis’
nature. The “recognition” of an “object other” is one qualified by love, explicated by the phrase,
“for this other one.” This recognition and love is intrinsic to the mutual relationships, which is
the One God in Three Hypostaseis.
Hypostasis handles the denotation of distinction in terms of the “mode of being” or the
“how of being.” A reference to Hypostasis necessarily brings with it, in Trinitarian logic,
enhypostasis, homoousion, and

ō ēsis for the “one being” (ousia) is the three Hypostaseis,

who are enhypostatically related in dynamic coinherence, and gives places to (both logically and
historically)

ōē

as a needed explanatory conceptualization.193 For satefy’s sake,

although Hypostasis indicates a mode of being, modalism does not follow. The “modes of being”
are Each a distinctive Hypostasis and Each are perichoretically related Agents, who are
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Age, 67.
193

Zizioulas, Communion & Otherness, 5. Zizioulas makes the point that it is the “who” question the
Persons of the Trinity raise more than the “what” question. “Thirdly, and most significantly, otherness is not moral
or psychological but ontological. We cannot tell what each person is; we can only say who he is.”
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homoousially one. The Hypostasis of the Father has His unique set of relational properties, the
Hypostasis of the Son has His set, and the Hypostasis of the Spirit has His set as well.
Ousia
Ousia (οὐσια; i.e., essence/being/nature) is much easier to handle once Hypostasis has been
set in place.194 Ousia may be thought of generically as the existence and nature of an entity with
a certain set of “great-making” attributes. From this generalization, a short but crucial set of
attributes qualifies ousia:195 omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, omnibenevolent,
immensity, eternality, necessity, incorporeality, simplicity, unity, immutability, and aseity.196
Some of these are debatable (like simplicity), and others of them need caveats to clarify them
(like immutability), and still others could be included (like infinite or relational). These concerns
and clarifications are important, but it is the “oneness” the term ousia denotes that now requires
attention. The term “divinity” is used herein as a shorthand way to speak of these attributes as a
whole whereas ousia denotes the unity (oneness) of God while speaking summarily of the other
attributes. In other words, ousia indicates all the attributes while also stressing unity. Of central
concern is the existence of an entity, who is “one,” whose attributes constitutes what is meant by
“divinity.” Any “one” who can have these attributes predicated of him is divine and rightly titled
“God.” The ousia of the Triune God is both His existence and the essence of that existence. The
two (existence and essence) can be distinguished for analysis, but if “aseity” is attributable to
194
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Specifically, moving from the “generic ousia” to the ousia qualified by the list that follows presents the
distinctive Christian God of the Bible. Some of these attributes are derived directly from Scripture (e.g.,
immutabililty), others are only intimated in Scripture and need philosophical theological construction to reach their
distinctive form (e.g., immensity).
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J. P. Moreland and William Craig, “The Coherence of Theism I” and “The Coherence of Theism II, in
Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove, Il: InterVarsity Press Academic, 2003).
This list is developed from those attributes listed in these two chapters. Predicating incorporeality and immutability
of the ousia, rather than the Hypostasis, enables the Hypostasis of the Son to become corporeal (John 1:14) and
adapt His “hypostatic identity” to include humanity when He was incarnated (and after) without creating
contradictions for these attributes.
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God, existence and essence cannot be different, as Thomas Aquinas demonstrated in his Summa
Theologica.197 In short, ousia is indicative of God’s “godness” or divinity, with a special
accentuation on oneness. Ousia is proper to each the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, not as three
separate ousiai that are the same, but as one ousia wholly and common to all Three.198 With such
an assertion, there is a demand for answering the question of, “How so?” Briefly touched upon in
the last section, it is homoousia (or homoousion) that makes such an assertion feasible. The term
means “same-nature,” and it makes possible the claim that the Three are one and the same
nature. The Three are not one and the same nature by means of composition, but the ousia is
proper of Each of the Three in the same perfect plentitude. This sounds cryptic, but recalling that
Hypostasis entails the enhypostatic relation of the Three Hypostaseis in perfect perichoretic
fullness explains the way Each Hypostasis is fully the ousia, and not part of a composition that,
when combined, “builds” the ousia. Thus, the ousia is the one LORD God, not as adding a
“fourth thing” or supposing the ousia to be more foundational to divinity. Instead, the term ousia
refers to what is common to all three Hypostaseis, so ousia is never impersonal in actuality. To
refer to ousia is to refer to how God is only one LORD God. Since each of the Hypostaseis are
the same nature, They are one: They are homoousial. Because each One perfectly (fully) and
perichoretically (not confused) indwells the Others so that One is never who He is apart from the
other Two, They are completely one in nature or ousia.
Ousia emphasizes the unity of God, His oneness, and the way the Father, Son, and Spirit are
homoousial with One Another. Thus, it is evident that ousia also connotes relationships;199 God
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is relationships without remainder.200 Commenting on Athanasius, Thomas Torrence writes:
. . . ousia refers to the Being of God in the inner reality and unity of his coinherent
Trinitarian relations. . . . for the three divine Persons are inseparably interrelated
in being and act through mutual indwelling and a mutual movement toward and
for one another in the homoousial Communion of the Holy Trinity which They
constitute.201
To avoid an unduly static and lifeless conceptualization of ousia, the persons-in-relating quality
of the Hypostaseis, demanded by scriptural revelation (esp. John 14 – 17), bear on God’s ousia
so that conceptualizing ousia brings to mind the Hypostaseis that constitute God’s ousia.202
Conversely, ousia bears equally on the conception of the Hypostaseis in community. This is
summarized nicely by a notion put forth by James Torrance: God is “Being-in-Communion.”203
The ousia theou (“nature of God”) is fellowship-creating towards creation (economically
conceived) and so, antecedently, is eternally-fellowship-constitution before all creation
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(immanently conceived): the “Being [is] . . . as ever-living ever-dynamic Communion
(κοινωνία).”204 God is not undifferentiated but differentiated, and the Hypostaseis are not a loose
federation of gods but a homoousial communion of differentiation as one LORD God. Ousia is
comprised by a triunity of internally interpenetrating, enhypostastically coinhering, and
perichoretic relationships ad extra.205 The attributes of divinity, proper to all three Hypostaseis,
are connoted by the term ousia, with the central denotation being unity, oneness, or “one being.”
When dealing with the Christian doctrine of the ousia of God, homoousia must take center stage,
or tritheism inevitably follows.
and the Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names
Islam places central importance on the term,

. Simply, it means “one,” “oneness”

or “unity.” This term indicates more than this, but, first, some issues pertaining to the “ninetynine names of Allah” need revisited. These names, more or less of them, confer meaning about
the Allah’s attributes.206 By extension, they signify something about Allah.207 Many of them
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“space” the Father is in as God, so likewise is the Son in the exact same space as God, and the Spirit is also in that
space as God. “Ad extra” can sometimes signify “to the outside” in the sense of God’s action “towards creation” or
“economically.”
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The “attributes” of Allah and how they relate to Him have been debated with great fever since the
seventh and eighth centuries. The groups involved can roughly be summarized into three: the Mu’tazilites,
anbalites, and the Ash’arites. Nader El-Bizri discussion lays out the thought-frameworks for each of these groups’
approach to the attributes. Nader El-Bizri, “God,” in Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic, 121 – 122. ElBizri first sentence (on pg. 121) intimates the inherent problem Islam has with regard to Allah’s transcendence: “The
question of God’s essence ( ā ) and attributes (ṣ fā ) confronted Muslims scholars with perplexing paradoxes
touching on the divine unity (
) and transcendence (
).”
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Ibid., 122. El-Bizri writes, “Given that the Qur’an (as God’s Word) mentions the divine attributes in
conjunction with His “most beautiful names” (
ā’ ā
ā), one could easily assert that this entails an
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require the analogy of human relationships to retain the meaning they signify regarding Allah.
Looking to the “beautiful names” to help understand Allah also means, implicitly, looking to the
human relationships entailed and required in the descriptions that the “names” denote or
connote.208 It is in this regard that human relationships as analogical means enable the “names”
to be understood, which, in turn, makes possible understanding Allah. Furthermore, the “names”
are Qur’anic revelation, which means the “ninety-nine beautiful names” are divinely sanctioned
analogies since the Qur’an is Allah’s Speech. To refuse this means of understanding leaves one
in the realm of

’ , edging towards the abyss of agnosticism. Islam has a doctrine of creation

— or more rightly, doctrines of creation — that describe the Allah-world relationship.209 In it is
the teaching that man is Caliph (Khalifa), a vice-regent, which would be hard to understand if
man were not in some way related to Allah analogically.210 Allah would be Regent and humanity
vice-regent, which seems to strongly suggest some type of analogy between how humanity
affirmation of the ontological reality of these attributes. However, this will require a particular method of reading the
Qur’an that affirms the attributes without undermining transcendence and unity, or implying anthropomorphism.
Inevitably, one wonders how successfully anthropomorphism can be avoided when accounting for verses like “your
Lord’s Face ever remains” (55:27), or “I created with My own hands” (38:75). In addition, it is hardly evident how
the multiplicity which is implied by any affirmation of the attributes might be reconciled with the idea of God’s
absolute unity.
208

Rahman,
f Q ’ , 1. “. . . but, as we shall soon see, orderly creativity, sustenance, guidance,
justice, and mercy fully interpenetrate in the Qur’ānic concept of God as an organic unity. Since all these are
relational ideas, we shall have to speak of God a great deal in the following pages” [Emphasis mine].
209

David Burrell finds Islam’s affirmation of
as an intractable difficulty for a doctrine of creation.
“. . . [F]or the very drive to unity which human reason displays has not proved able, of itself, to attain the celebrated
“distinction” which T
and its corollary, creation demand. . . . that same distinction will turn out to defy proper
conceptualization, as the various attempts to adapt the categories of human speculation will testify, so there will be
no one Muslim account of creation. And the burden of this chapter will be to show that there can be no fully
adequate account, so the plurality of accounts is less a sign of the inadequacy of Muslims thinkers to their task than
it is of their fidelity to the founding revelation of their tradition: to
and its corollary, creation. . . . everything
which is not God comes forth from God yet cannot exist without God, so how are they distinct when they cannot be
separated. If God is eternal and everything else temporal, how does the act of creating bridge that chasm? If God
alone properly exists, and everything else exists by an existence derived from divine existence, how real are the
things we know? And the clincher: if God makes everything else to be, including human actions how can our actions
be properly our own? David B. Burrell CSC, “Creation,” in Cambridge Companion toClassical Islamic, 142.
210

Nasr, Islamic Life, 16 – 17. Nasr affirms that man is made in the image of God, but this appears to be the
minority position. “Humans are, according to the Islamic perspective, crated in the ‘image of God’ and are also
God’s vicegerents (k
f ) on earth. . . . Man as the theophany of the Divine Names and Qualities, or as the ‘image
of God’, participates in both this freedom and necessity.”

72

relates to creation and how Allah relates to creation.211
is direly important to Islam’s perception of Allah: no evidence making a better
case than Taw

’s constitutive role in the first phrase of Shahadah, even coming before

Muhammad’s mention.212 The Shahadah is the clearest statement about Allah’s uniqueness as
Deity alone. Ghamidi notes that
Not only does

is the most important of the attributes of perfection.213

appear early on in the Qur’an (Surah 37:4), but it effectively closes

Allah’s revelation to man (Surah 112; only two Surahs follow). Although Muslims hold great
reservations about the human ability to know Allah through His attributes,
known.214

is positively

is not only an abstract affirmation but one that is directly applied to worship

and the formation of the Umma (Islamic community).215 The whole of Islam rides directly on
Allah’s

, and all that the din (religion) of Islam represents derives from

.216

According to Islam, all pure monotheisms existing before Islam — when they still had not
polluted true monotheism by associating others with the Deity (shirk) — took as their sole task
the proclamation of

.217 The Taw

proclamation is the ground level for humanity’s

worship of Allah.218 This all-embracing vision of Allah as “One” suggests that humanity, too,
211

Rahman, Major Themes, 17; Kateregga, Islam and Christianity, 10 – 11.

212

The Shahadah claims, “There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is His Prophet.”

213

Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, Islam: a Comprehensive Introduction, trans. Dr. Shehzad Saleem (Model Town
Lahore, Pakistan: Al-Mawrid, 2012), chap. 1, sec. 2, subsec. 9. Kindle.
214

Kateregga & Shenk, Islam and Christianity, 1.

215

Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, rev. and trans. Ahmad Zaki Hammad (Indianapolis: American Trust
Publications, 1990), 65. “Before thinking of organizing a Muslim community, and establishing the Islamic social
system one must purify the hearts of people from the worship of anyone or anything other than Allah as we have
described above.” Longhurst, “
and Homooúsios,” in Journal of Ecumenical Studies, 225. “"In the Muslim's
mind
is no merely theoretical concept. It is not just a theological or philosophical postulate but the very
foundation upon which all creation is unified and sustained with and by its source.”
216

Ibid., 26.
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Abdel Haleem Mahmud, The Creed of Islam, (London: World of Islam Festival Trust, 1978), 14 – 15,
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Alhaj Ajijola, The Essence of Faith in Islam (Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1978), 5 – 15.
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should be one, giving grounds for social justice.219 Apart from affirming Allah’s oneness
), no one can truly worship Allah.220 No one may share any of Allah’s divinity with Him,

(

“even an atom of His divine power and authority,” and no one can be associated with Allah
because he “is one and one only.”221 A potential result of

is a deterministic cosmos

where Allah determines even whether humans will trust or distrust Him.222 If creation is to take
an illusory role, as Al-Ghazālī argued earlier (Chap. 1, Survey of Literature), then human beings
“are capable of embodying and manifesting the divine names and attributes.”223 Sufism handles
’s demand for an absolute unity more sensitively than other Islamic traditions.224 By
comparison, Sufism’s understanding of

is internally cogent and logical by subsuming

creation’s existence to Allah’s oneness, thus making creation a monist emanation of the
One or a mere illusion. Thus, the blasphemy of claiming that a human can be unified
with Allah comes not necessarily from an irreligious heart, but from a heart impressed by the
logic of

.225

Although many may become idolaters through their selfish hopes in identifying
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Qutb, Milestones, 25.
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Ibid., 64.
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Kateregga & Shenk, Islam and Christianity, 2. Keteregga is writing. Encyclopedia of Religion, 2 nd ed.
(Detroit, MI: Macmillian Reference USA, 2005), vol. 5, 3561 – 3562.
222

Watt, Islam and Christianity today, 126. A person's faith or unbelief might depend on whether God had
guided him or let him astray: 'if god wills to guide anyone, he enlarges his breast for Islam, but if he wills to lead
him astray, he makes his breast narrow and contracted as if he were climbing up into the sky' (6:125). Burrell,
“Creation,” in Cambridge Companion to Islamic, 142.
223

Krokus, “Divine Embodiment,” in Studies in Interreligious Dialogue, 165. Krokus ties this thought to
: “Thus
is sometimes understood not only as the internal unity of God but also as the absolute unity
of all reality such that in fact the only reality is God” (168 – 169).
224

Poupin, “Trinitarian Experience in Sufism,” in The Trinity in a Pluralistic Age, 76. Krokus, “Divine
Embodiment,” in Studies in Interreligious Dialogue, 165; Krokus describes the “stations” on the way to God
developed by “most of the great systematizers of the Sufi path . . . .”
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Poupin, “Trinitarian Experience in Sufism,” in The Trinity in a Pluralistic Age, 76. Poupin notes the
Hallaj understood that true proclamation of
was only possible as a blasphemy and as a sacrifice, a
blasphemy-punishment, where the worshipper knows that only Allah is and so by saying, “Allah and I are one” or “I
am Allah,” while in the semblance of a creature, rendered their death assured.
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themselves with Allah, this is not the only motivation. Opposite this motivation, another impetus
is possible: a desire to take seriously (reverently) the Qur’an along with the meaning and
consequences of the cherished belief of Allah’s

. It is true that many in the Sunni tradition

might withhold judgment or explanation on how creation relates to Allah, whether by
contingency, illusion, or emanation. The great Al-Ghazālī did not withhold judgment. He said
that creation is illusory. Therefore, the urge to make oneself identified with Allah is not designed
to commit shirk, but, rather, is designed to prevent shirk by denying the essential otherness of
anyone else but Allah, thereby protecting

. If creation is illusory, then is committing shirk

even possible?
With these comments,

is more clearly the descriptive attribute of Allah. The term

denotes that Allah is utterly unique, that he is unipersonal (a unicity), and that there is no
multiplicity conceived in Him internally. Taw

additionally connotes a tendency to understand

creation’s otherness as emanational or illusory — this assertion will be looked at more closely in
the next chapter. Sufism takes the doctrine of

to that logical end. The other traditions of

Islamic theology, even if the other attributes are contested among them, maintain that

is

positively known.
Conclusion
There is solid ground, then, for investigating what
to the Islamic doctrine of Allah.

means for humanity according

, as the attribute of Allah, is at the center and formative

of all Islamic thought, and, as such, provides a context for dialogue that respects what is
important for Islam itself. With these terms squarely in view, the nature of the Deity proper to
Islam and Christianity can be interrogated by the categories of oneness, distinctness, and
relatedness. In the chapter that follows, the doctrine of
package with each of these categories, observing how
75

will be brought into a paratactic
Allah relates to human

relationships and their scope.226

226

“Paratactic” used thorough signifies “close analysis of things side by side with emphasis on how they
relate.” The meaning of this word used in a grammatical context signifies “two clauses linked side by side without a
conjunction.” Thus, the two clauses are closer by lack of a conjunction, and the two clauses require greater attention
(analysis) due to the lack of the conjunction that would typical describe how the two clauses relate.
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CHAPTER 3: ON

ALLAH

Introduction
The three categories of oneness, distinctness, and relatedness set the framework of this
chapter. Specifically, how are Allah’s oneness, distinctness, and relatedness to be understood?
These categories were derived from how humanity exists. Each human being is related, distinct,
and in oneness with other creatures, both biologically and cognitively.227 The views of Muslim
scholars incorporated in what follows were chosen in an attempt to represent main currents of
Muslim thought. Abū Hāmid Al-Ghazālī (1058 – 1111 C.E.) and Taqī ad-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn
Taymīyya (1263 – 1328 C.E.) are two historical figures whose influence on Islamic thought
cannot be emphasized enough. The former has been called “probably the greatest theologian of
Islam and the most eloquent champion of Ash‘arism” and the latter is known for “the revival of
anbalism, . . . [and] culminated in the rise of the Wahhabi movement, founded in the eighteenth
century by Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab” (d. 1792 C.E.).228 Added to this list is Muhyi al-Din
Ibn ‘Arabī (1165 – 1240 C.E.), whose thought was influenced by Al-Ghazālī but criticized by Ibn
Taymīyya. This assortment of historical scholars aims to represent prevailing formulations of
Islam on a spectrum from the more philosophical and mystical thinking of Ibn ‘Arabi to the
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Biologically (and character qualities as well), what is indicative in a parent partly passes to a child: like
the colloquialism, “Like father, like son.” There are, of course, differences in them but not so much that no image of
the parent can be seen in the child. When there is an oneness cognitively, this does not refer to some metaphysical
“container” of abstracized ideas somehow collected and “floating” aloft, shared by all humanity. Instead, the
thought-patterns, affirmations, and beliefs indicative of one human can be communicated. Another human being
appropriating the communicated-expressed-thought can share these. One human can mirror another’s own thoughts,
likening then one to the other. This is human cognitive union or human cognitive oneness. It is not to be forgotten
that how one thinks effects how one acts and even one’s physiological “being/becoming.” Thus a human cognitive
union with another entails, by extension, psychosomatic dimensions. In short, human nature is characterized by
human thought. Also, every child has certain metaphysical data — the characteristics or qualities of their soul, spirit,
mind, or heart — from his/her parents: the two parents’ metaphysical data is summarized, complemented by, and
elaborated in their child. This child, this third person, entails the other two persons of their parents.
228

Majid Fakhry,
P
: B
’ G
, ebook ed. (1997; Oxford: Oneworld
Publications, 2011), chap. 5, sec. 2 and chap. 8, sec. 1. Kindle. The title of the original work published in 1997 was
Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism: A Short Introduction, reissued in 2000 and reprinted in 2003. This
work became part of the Beginners Guide series in 2009.
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moderated and theological view of Al-Ghazālī unto Ibn Taymīyya’s traditionalist position of
holding to the Qur’an and Hadith as interpreted by the Companions of the Prophet (Sahabah).229
Their thought, however, is too broad to offer an exhaustive account here. Al-Ghazālī’s views
should be regarded with prominence since there are few historical Muslim figures whose
influence and religious positions have been accorded as many accolades. Contemporary work of
Muslim scholars and teachers complement these forbearers.
Since this project seeks to deliberate on which nature of the Deity better accounts for
human relationships, each of the three categories above must be “thought without” creation and
then “thought with” creation. What does the oneness, distinctness, and relatedness of Allah mean
considered immanently, without reference to creation (thought without)? Then, what do these
mean in regard to creation (thought with)?
A preliminary matter is Islam’s doctrine(s)230 on the nature of creation that has come
down through the centuries to Muslims today.231 Islamic theologico-philosophical thought, as
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Fakhry, Islamic Philosophy, chap. 8, sec. 1. Kindle. Fakhry also notes that Ibn Taymīyya promoted the
interpretations of the immediate successors of the Companions of the Prophet, the b ‘ .
230

The complexities of the doctrines of Allah as He stands next to creation are manifold and part of long
fluxing discussions generally recognized as between the Kalam (theologians) representatives and the Islamic
philosophers. Although someone like Ibn Taymīyya is understood as “holding to the basics of the Qur’an/Hadith” it
is potently obvious from his writings that such a representation is woodenly reductionistic perhaps due to
pedagogical purposes of presenting him as distinct from other Kalam and philosophical representatives (This
thought owes to Burrell’s thinking in the work listed below, on page 144.). Each of the following authors
corroborate the claim here of the difficulties and complexities of the Creator/creation relationship in Islam. Burrell
CSC, “Creation,” in Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic, 141 – 144; Ian Netton, ā
:
Studies in the Structure and Semiotics of Islamic Philosophy, Theology, and Cosmology (New York: Routledge,
2006), 21 – 22. Kindle; Mahmoud M. Ayoub, “Chapter 9: Theology and Philosophy,” in Islam: Faith and History,
ebook ed. (rep. 2012; London: Oneworld Publications, 2013). Kindle; Fakhry, “Interactions of Philosophy and
Dogma,” “Philosophy and Mysticism,” and “The Progress of Anti-Rationalism and the onset of Decline,” in Islamic
Philosophy. Kindle; and Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to the Present: Philosophy in the
Land of Prophecy, SUNY SERIES IN ISLAM, ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 2006). I cite this entire source because of its great richness in discussing the matters of being, creation, and
Allah.
231

Burrell CSC, “Creation,” in Cambridge Companion to Classical, 142. Burrell sees the two equally
important doctrines of
and creation as unresolvable.
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outlined by Seyyed Hossein Nasr, is roughly broken down into three major tributaries: (1)
creation is somehow contingent, (2) creation is an emanation of Allah, and (3) creation is
illusory, and the only “Reality that is” certainly is Allah.232 Nasr concludes that the crowning
achievement of Islamic metaphysics came from the Persian School of Isfahan (founded by Mīr
Dāmād) with the principle of

-

j

or the “transcendent unity of Being” — first

discussed by Ibn ‘Arabī although not termed by him.233 In one of the only places Nasr discusses
, he writes:
As far as the “transcendent unity of Being” or
- j is concerned, it
must be said at the outset that this doctrine is not the result of ratiocination but of
232

Netton, ā
, 321 – 322. These three categories relate to Netton’s conclusion about
modern and medieval theology. The first, creation as seemingly contingent, corresponds to Netton’s category of the
“Way of the ‘Ulamā’,” where b ā k f’ is rigidly imposed, makes any real signification of signs (words) bereft of
the function of referencing — to the referent. Thus the addition of “seemingly” is appropriate since this contingency
of creation is just to be accepted without enquiry and is not, therefore, demonstrated as contingent. Creation is
“contingent,” but just how and in what manners and how creation relates to Allah are forbidden inquires under the
pressure of b ā k f’. Similarly is Netton’s category, “The Way of the Unknowing,” which still emphasizes
“quiescence and acceptance, . . . before the absolute transcendence of God.” Even the language of “contingency”
could be considered an innovation beyond the Qur’anic revelation; rational and theological discourse upon
revelation is necessary to demonstrate and, so, corroborate the revelatory claim. Nasr, “The Question of Existence
and Quiddity and Ontology in Islamic Philosophy,” in Islamic Philosophy, chap. 4, sec. 9. Kindle. After a riveting
and masterful discussion of these formulae on creation, Nasr summarizes: “As far as j is concerned, one can
distinguish between the concept of j and its reality. Furthermore, the concept or notion of wuj is either of
absolute j or of a particular mode of existence called "portion" (
) of j in Islamic philosophy. As for
the reality of j , it refers either to the all-embracing and general Reality of j (f
ā ) or to particular
"units" of the reality of j (f
k ṣṣ). The structure of reality is envisaged differently by different schools of
Islamic thought depending on how they conceive of these four stages or meanings of j . The Ash'arite
theologians simply refuse to accept these distinctions, whether they be conceptual or belonging to the external
world. The school of Mullā adrā, at the other end of the spectrum of Islamic thought, makes clear distinctions
among all four meanings of j . Certain philosophers accept only the concept of j and deny its reality, while
certain Peripatetics accept the reality of j but identify the multiplicity in the external world not with the
multiplicity of existents but with that of j itself so that they identify j not with a single reality with grades
but with realities (
ā’ q). Then there are those thinkers identified with the "tasting of theosophy" (dhawq al’
), especially Jalal al-Din Dawani, who believe that there is only one reality in the external world to which
j refers, and that reality is God. There are no other realities to which j refers. Finally, there are several
schools of Sufism with their own doctrines concerning the relation between the concept and reality of j . The
most metaphysical of these views sees j as the absolute, single Reality beside which there is no other reality;
yet there are other realities that, although nothing in themselves, appear to exist because they are theophanies of the
single Reality, which alone Is as the absolutely unconditioned j .”
233

Ibid., chap. 4, sec. 8, subsec. 1. Kindle. This largely neo-platonic view of the Creator/creation
relationship no doubt owes somewhat to Hellenization but recognizing the source whence an idea or tradition comes
does not verify its truth or falsity of representing what the Qur’an and Hadith teach. This is the genetic fallacy. Watt,
Islamic Philosophy, 33.
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intellection and inner experience. If correctly understood, it stands at the heart of
the basic message of Islam, which is that of unity (al) and which is found
expressed in the purest form in the testimony of Islam, ā ā
’ ā , there is
234
no divinity but Allah.
Islam’s doctrine(s) of creation resides somewhere among these three, but closer to (1), (2), or (3),
depending on the view of particular sects or individuals belonging to the Islamic faith.235 These
three positions can be generally associated with the historical Islamic scholars formerly
mentioned. Ibn Taymīyya is closest to (1),236 which is creation as somehow contingent.237 Al-
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Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, chap. 4, sec. 8. Kindle. The quote continues: “This formula is the synthesis of
all metaphysics and contains despite its brevity the whole doctrine of the Unity of the Divine Principle and the
manifestation of multiplicity, which cannot but issue from that Unity before whose blinding Reality it is nothing.
The Sufis and also the Shi’ite esoterists and gnostics have asked, “What does divinity ( ā ) mean except reality or
j ?” . . . [those purifying themselves] have realized that Reality or j belongs ultimately to God alone, that
not only is He One, but also that He is the only ultimate Reality and the source of everything that appears to possess
j . All j belongs to God while He is transcendent vis-à-vis all existents. The Quran itself confirms this
esoteric doctrine in many ways, such as when it asserts that God is “the First and the Last, the Outward and the
Inward (53:3) or when it says, “Whithersoever ye turneth, there is the Face of God.’[sic]”
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This is granting an actual analysis of their doctrine because Sunni Orthodoxy prescribes a refusal to
develop the doctrine in either great theological or philosophical depth. Burrell CSC, “Creation,” in Cambridge
Companion of Classical Islamic, 146; Binyamin Abrahamov, “Appendix I: The Creed of Abū Zur‘a ‘Ubaydallāh Ibn
‘Abd Al-Karīm Al-Rāzī (D. 264/878) and Abū ātim Muḥammad Ibn Idrīs Al-Rāzī (D. 277/890),” in Islamic
Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 54 – 58. Two clauses of
the second creed are especially important: “Belief in and acceptance of traditions as they are without question of
‘why’ and ‘how’” and “There are traditions which must not be interpreted.” Abrahamov concludes that “even among
the traditionalists there was no general consensus concerning articles of faith” (56). That creation is only seemingly
contingent is justified by the prohibitions against developing how this can be so. Certainly, to show creation as truly
contingent can simply be accepted, but it cannot be demonstrated without a great deal of innovation and kalām.
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Ibn Taymiyya, M
’ R
, 314. After waylaying the Christian idea
of
, i.e., that the Creator “subsisted” in the “substratum” of a creature, as in the case of Christ, Ibn Taymīyya
claims that “It is evident by sound reason and by the consensus of intelligent men that the creature has no
subsistence except in the Creator.” Ibn Taymīyya is equally vitriolic towards Ibn ‘Arabi’s putative pantheism, noted
only a few pages later: “They make the very existence of the Lord of the universe — the eternal, the one necessary
in Himself — the same existence as that of the contingent, fashioned, governed being, as says Ibn ‘Arabi: “. . . [the]
transcendent Truth is creation which resembles it. The factor that is the creator of the creature, the factor that is the
creature of the creator — all of that is of one essence.” [Taymīyya reports concerning Ibn ‘Arabī:] He says [in
another place], “. . . in respect to existence He is identical with existent things, those things which are called
temporal and exalted in themselves; but they are not He”” (317). It is striking that Ibn Taymīyya holds to what can
be identified as panentheism (“creature has no subsistence except in the Creator”) but is so intolerant of Ibn ‘Arabi’s
so-called pantheism. Even when the last quote of Ibn ‘Arabi is presented by Ibn Taymīyya, it is evident that Ibn
‘Arabi does not want to put forward full pantheism — “but they are not He.”
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The doctrine of “love,” even understood as “mercy,” in Islam presents no small problem towards
maintaining the distinctness of the creation, thereby retaining creation’s true contingency. (Mercy has, in Islam, a
“self-giving” character like how love is properly understood at its essential basis. Allah’s mercy is His giving a
pardon or, maybe better, freeing from consequences for sin. Either way, Allah’s mercy is an activity that gives a new
condition for the creature, for that creature’s benefit, upon whom Allah’s mercy shines.) How to maintain Allah’s
self-sufficiency and to attribute Allah’s love towards creation is the difficulty. For if Allah must create in order to
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Ghazālī affirms an experiential-mystical oneness with the divine or, as he puts it, confessing
God’s unity (

) is “extinction in unity” accomplishable by observation (mushahadah) on

the effulgence of divine light.238 After he was delivered from error, he also describes this unity as
a “purification of the heart from everything other than God Most High. Its key . . . is the utter
absorption of the heart in the remembrance of God. Its end is being completely lost in God.”239

love, then Allah is not self-sufficient; if Allah is self-sufficient but loves not, then the Sunna and Qur’an are false.
The consensus among Ibn-Taymīyya, Al-Ghazālī, and Ibn ‘Arabī, is that Allah does love, and does love before he
creates by loving Himself. This is no reciprocal thou but only a reflexive me. All creaturely love for the Creator is a
“being pulled into” Allah’s own self-love; in this, creation’s contingency is threatened since this love is an activity
of the Creator “loving Himself through” creatures. Ibn Taymīyya does the best to protect creation’s contingency by
saying that Allah’s love for creation is “subordinate” to His love for Himself. Ibn Taymiya, al-Ihtijaj bi-l-qadar in
M
‘
‘
-kubra (1323; Cairo: al-Matba‘a al- ‘Amiriya al-Sharafiya, 1905 – 1906), I, 374 and II, 115,
cited in Joseph Norment Bell, Love Theory in Later Hanbalite Islam, STUDIES IN ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY AND
SCIENCE, eds. George F. Hourani, Muhsin Mahdi, Parviz Morewedge, Nicholas Rescher, and Ehsan Yar-Shater
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1979), 69 – 70; Al-Ghazali, The Revival of Religious Sciences,
trans. Reza Shah-Kazemi, vol. 6, bk. 36. He says that “[Allah] does indeed love then [humans], but in reality He
loves nothing other than Himself, in the sense that He is the totality, and there is nothing in being apart from Him.”
On ‘Arabī’s view: Miguel Asin Palacios, El Islam cristianizado (Madrid: Editorial Plutarco, 1931), 243 – 244, cited
in Bell, Love Theory, 72. Ibn Taymīyya looks to two sayings of the Prophet for support to this sort of self-love:
“There is none to whom praise is more beloved than God, and for this reason he praised himself” and “I do not
number my praise for thee [but praise thee] just as thou hast praised thyself.” Volf draws the conclusion that creation
is illusory if love is worked out in this self-love way: Volf, Allah, 168.
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Al-Ghazāli, Mishkat al-Anwar [The Niche for Lights] trans. William Gairdner, Vol. XIX (London:
Royal Asiatic Society, 1924), sec. 7. Section seven is titled “The "God-Aspect": an "advanced" Explanation of the
Relation of these Lights to ALLAH” and begins so. “It may be that you desire greatly to know the aspect (wajh) [p.
21] whereby Allâh's light is related to the heavens and the earth, or rather the aspect whereby He is in Himself the
Light of heavens and earth. And this shall assuredly not be denied you, now that you know that Allâh is Light, and
that beside Him there is no light. and that He is every light, and that He is the universal light: since light is an
expression for that by which things are revealed; or.[sic], higher still, that by and for which they are revealed; yea,
and higher still, that by, for, and from which they are revealed: and now that, you know, too that, of everything
called light, only that by, for, and from which things are revealed is real--that Light beyond which there is no light to
kindle and feed its flame, for It is kindled and fed in itself, from Itself, and for Itself, and from no other source at all.
Such a conception, such a description, you are now assured, can be applied to the Great Primary, alone. You are also
assured that the heavens and the earth are filled with light appertaining to those two fundamental light-planes, our
Sight and our Insight; by which I mean our senses and our intelligence . . . .”; Netton, ā
, 321. AlGhazālī is a combination of the “Way of the Mystic” and the “Way of the Unknowing.” Al-Ghazālī identifies a
three-fold movement for how Allah brings something into existence in another place. From the Throne, through a
spiritual current called the Chair, and unto the Tablet of Destiny are the three moves. Al-Ghazzali, The Alchemy of
Happiness, trans. Claud Field, chap. 2. Kindle.
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Al-Ghazālī, -G ā ’ P
f :
v
f
E
-Munqidh min al-Dalal, trans.
R. J. Mccarthy S. J. (2000; Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2006), 57. The word for “lost” above is literally annihilation.
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And Ibn ‘Arabī’s position is tantamount to pantheism, that all is Allah, which corresponds to (3)
above.240
Islam’s doctrine(s) of creation present other challenges because of

; these

difficulties are addressed occasionally in what follows. We must be mindful that the Islamic
doctrine of creation is not uniform. While considering oneness, distinctness, and relatedness, the
discussion will have to remain elastic enough to account for the lack of Muslim consensus on the
nature of creation. How human relationships are accounted for by the doctrine of Taw

Allah

will be influenced by the way those human relationships are understood. Given the three possible
doctrines of creation noted in the last paragraph, three possible ways of understanding human
relationships follow. Human relationships can be (1) relationships among actual contingent
creatures, (2) relationships of creatures who are monistic emanations of Allah, or (3) illusory
relationships of illusory creatures.
Oneness
means “one/oneness/unity,” and there are at least four ways to understand the
term.241 (1) To apply “one” as a number to Allah is incorrect. He is beyond numericity.242 (2)
Allah is not “one” of a species or genus so He is not part of a group that Allah can be counted
within or part of. (3) Allah is unique, not “one of a kind,” but simply “one, stand apart, and
transcendent.” Allah’s oneness identifies Him as the One who is utterly unique. He is
240

It might be more accurate to say that titling it “pantheism” is a misnomer since, on this view, God is all
instead of all is God.
241

Encyclopedia of Religion, 2nd ed., vol. 5 (Detroit, MI: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005), 3561 – 3562.
The four definitions of “one” that follow come from this source.
242

This is a dangerous stance as the commentary on Denys Turner’s similar claim made clear in the earlier
section on the “Survey of the Literature.” On the basis of Taw , it is more understandable that a Muslim would
make the claim that numerical values are not properly predicated of Allah since such numbering supposes a
sequence of numbers and distinction among them, which is what Taw
as predicated of Allah denies considered
before creation.
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categorically singular

b (“of Himself and to Himself”). (4) Allah is not compound and

there can be no multiplicity or division in Him. He is Allah, who is unipersonal and to worship
Him is to be part of unitary monotheism.243 He is a unicity, sole, stand alone, and indeed “one.”
rightly denotes (3) and (4) but not (1) and (2).244 Therefore,

stands both for

Allah’s (4) oneness and that He is (3) unique. Three (3) focuses on the manner of His existence
and knowing He is unique is achievable according to apophaticism: Allah is not this, neither that,
nor those, and so forth until the entire creation is delineated. This uniqueness implies
dissimilarity to creation, but the degree of dissimilarity is important to parse out. What this
uniqueness entails positively is not necessary to affirm that the uniqueness is not to be confused
with creation or things in creation. In classical Islamic metaphysical terms, Allah is āj b
j

-

(Necessary Being), a reference applied wholly unto Himself since all else is either

contingent or somehow Him.245 If creation is indeed contingent, then this aspect of

forms

a stark divide between creation and Allah. Four (4), however, cannot be known through
apophatic logic because it affirms the unicity of Allah with certainty and positively, with no
room for compromise whatsoever. Those who have knowledge of

declare confidently

against Christians (and others) that Allah is unipersonal. To say all the things that Allah is not
cannot grant confidence to say certainly what He is without lucid and positive knowledge. Surah
112 gives this revelatory knowledge, expressing both what He is and what He is not: “Say: He is
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This term, unitary monotheism, is appropriated from James White. What Every Christian Needs to Know
About the Qur'an (Baker Publishing Group, 2013). Kindle.
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Al-Ghazālī, Moderation in Belief, 1st treatise, 10th proposition. He affirms the two senses noted above.
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Nasr, Islamic Philosophy, chap. 4, sec. 3. Kindle. Some would argue that Allah is beyond all categories
of being. The phrase, Necessary Being, could just be adapted to the One who exists (exists here made analogical)
before and above all things and upon Whom all else depends. Further, the nature of contingency, when it is
presented as actual, differs from Islamic tradition to tradition as represented above by Al-Ghazālī, Ibn ‘Arabi, and
Ibn Taymīyya.
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Allah, the One and Only; Allah, the Eternal, Absolute; He begetteth not, nor is He begotten; And
there is none like unto Him.”246
This Surah, and the Shahadah (“There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His
Prophet”) which encapsulates it, function to provide a strict wall around Allah’s (3) uniqueness
and (4) unicity. They demarcate a clear line between Creator and all creation by which shirk is
judged and through which Christianity’s belief in Jesus as the Son of God is denied.247
Comments on uniqueness will be saved for the next section on distinctness and attention paid
here to Allah’s unicity. There can be no multiplicity or division in Allah. From this perspective,
it is readily understood how historical Muslim figures like Al-Hallāj and Ibn ‘Arabī conceived
everything monistically.248 Al-Hallāj went so far as to praise himself, as an expression of
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Rahman, M j
f
Q ’ , 11. Fazlur says Surah 112 is the essence of Islam: “The short but
emphatic sura 112 — which has been rightly regarded by the Islamic tradition as presenting the essence of the whole
Qur’an — calls God “al- amad,” which means an immovable and indestructible rock, without cracks or pores,
which serves as sure refuge from floods.” It is not unimportant that this essential Surah for all Islamic tradition
contains tamthīl, through this rock analogy.
247

Kateregga and Shenk, Islam and Christianity, 1. Kateregga says that “The key Surah . . . in the Qur’an
testifies to Islam’s monotheism. Ghamidi, Islam, chap. 1, sec. ii, subsec. 9 – 10. Shirk is unfathomable because “if
God had partners and associates as they think, . . . at some time or another, [they] would have tried to rebel against
Him and overthrow Him and the whole system of this world would have been disrupted.” It ought to be wondered if
such a theological vision of polytheism is not already entirely warped due to the supposed “evil” that would have to
reside in the metaphysical realm of the gods for the possibility of war. Hypothetically, why would the realm of
Allah, pure as He is, have to contain, if there were other gods with Him, evil in the gods themselves? War, after all,
is the antithesis of peace but, if these other gods were like Allah, would they not be free from the type of vice that
would lead to war? Is this text in the Qur’an (17:42) imposing sinful qualities to these putative gods? Qutb,
Milestones, 68. “This action of the Jews and Christians was placed by the Qur’an in the same category of shirk as
the Christians’ making Jesus into the Son of God and worshipping him. The latter is a rebellion against Allah, . . .”
Shirk is outlined in Surah 4:48. If shirk is the unforgivable sin, then Fazlur Rahman’s comments about the massive
scope of humans’ committing this sin must cause no small problem for proselytizing: “ . . . that whenever a creature
claims complete self-sufficiency or independence . . . it thus claims infinitude and a share in divinity (shirk).” Major
Themes, 67.
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Ibn Taymīyya, in Muslim
’ R
, cites another passage of Ibn ‘Arabi
that concludes by saying that “There is no worship of anything other than God in anything which is worshiped”
(319). In other words, idolatry is impossible. I am using the term “illusory” to convey that creatures are those
things/persons which are extensions of Allah’s existence. In this regard, Ibn Arabī says that humans bear Allah’s
attributes.
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worshipping Allah, which would result in his death due to blasphemy.249 Al-Ghazālī does not
avoid this issue either but only subtly suggests at some ontological unity (in being with Allah)
while emphasizing a “self-forgetting” experiential union (“extinction in unity”). Even Ibn
Taymīyya could not afford teaching a full-fledged contingency of creation.250
This section has parsed Allah’s oneness into two distinct features: that He is unique (3)
and that He is simple, uncompounded, a unicity with no plurality or multiplicity in Him (4).
Allah’s unicity, which is neither internally nor externally differentiated, considered before
creation poses no problem.251 Allah with creation, however, effects a problematic plurality or
multiplicity. This problem is compounded by the Islamic teaching that Allah directly guides
creatures and that all derive their existence from Him, as memorialized by Ibn Taymīyya’s
statement: “[a creature] has no existence and no foundation except in the creator” and “Hulul
[indwelling] can only be understood if that which indwells is subsisting in and having a need for
that in which it resides.”252 If the creature exists somehow in the Creator, having no real and
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Poupin, “Trinitarian Experience in Sufism,” in Trinity in a Pluralistic Age, 80. The jurist and mystic,
Daw d Ispahan (900 C.E.), “sent a first f
against Hall j . . . .”
250

Ibn Taymīyya, in M
’ R
, 316 & 323. “Furthermore this is not
reasonable hulul. Hulul can only be understood if that which indwells is subsisting in and having a need for that in
which it resides” (323). This, again, looks to be panentheism or monism. It is not unimportant that Ibn Taymīyya has
every reason to clarify and distinguish his view of the Creator/creature relationship since he is refuting Christians
and other sects of Islam with great fervor and at great length. It is unclear how the creature “indwells” the Creator
but Ibn Taymīyya does not clarify further. This is in accord with b ā k f’.
251

Although it is no small point that man only imagines that he can image an undifferentiated singularity as
a person since this is never part of his experience and so never epistemically accessible. Joseph Ratzinger,
Introduction to Christianity, 128 – 129. “The unrelated, unrelatable, absolutely one could not be a person. There is
no such thing as a person in the categorical singular. This is already apparent in the words in which the concept of
person grew up; the Greek word "prosopon" means literally "(a) look towards"; with the prefix "pros" (toward) it
includes the notion of relatedness as an integral part of itself. . . . To this extent the overstepping of the singular is
implicit in the concept of person.”
252

Ibn Taymīyya, in M
’ R
, 316 and 323. Ibn Taymīyya is,
admittedly, attempting to parse out a piece of Trinitarian theology by one Sa‘id ibn Bitriq, a piece somewhat
tragically static and built on an analogy of layers (“substratum”). Nevertheless, what is the consequence of saying
that the creature subsists in the Creator as Ibn Taymīyya has it? Knowing Ibn Taymīyya’s stout stand on the true
contingency of creation elsewhere, as put forth in Al-‘Ub
[Being a True Slave of Allah], he is properly
understood as claiming this contingency (in Al-‘Ub
) but not demonstrating it (in Response to Christianity).
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relative contingence and distinctness of its own, the question becomes how to deal with the
changeableness of creatures that somehow reside in Allah (hulul) in view of His immutability
and oneness (Taw

). For, if Allah does not change, how does the perpetual flow and relative

change of creatures entering and exiting existence reconcile with His immutability?253 How does
creaturely hulul not introduce multiplicity or plurality into the Creator? It is here that what
Vanhoozer calls an idem (sameness) understanding of God — appropriated of Allah in this
context — comes powerfully to the fore.254 Allah’s Taw

(oneness) demands a certain static

sameness that must be protected. It is not surprising that the early Muslim debates about how to
understand Allah’s relationship to creation would hinge on retaining Allah’s immutability, which

In Al-‘Ub
, he distinguishes between a correct view of creation (that it is contingent), a mystical view of
creation, and a view of creation that is pantheistic (or makes creation illusory) belonging to the hypocrites and
heretics. His discussion centers on the word f
’ (oblivion). The wisdom of the prohibition of b ā k f’ is justified
by observing how Ibn Taymīyyah handles a more philosophico-theological context (entailing innovation) in his
Response to Christianity vis-à-vis how he handles it in a less innovative context of Al-‘Ub
. His inability to
maintain creation’s true contingency comes from the more philosophico-theological context (in his Response to
Christianity) and not from the less innovative Al-‘Ub
. Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyah, “
’ (“oblivion”),”
in Al-‘Ub
[Being a True Slave of Allah] ed. Afsar Siddiqui, trans. Nasiruddin al-Khattab (1999; London: TaHa Publishers Ltd., 2013), pt. 4, sec. 2; Burrell, “Creation,” Cambridge Companion of Classical Islamic, 144. He
notes that from the earliest time of the Mu‘tazilites “existence belongs to God essentially.” This sets the stage for
how to get that existence over to creatures without separating existence from Allah, yet somehow keep Allah distinct
from creation. Richard Frank, “Kalam and philosophy: a perspective from one problem,” in Islamic Philosophical
Theology, ed. Parviz Morewedge (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), 71 – 95. Frank provides
abundant primary sources.
Perhaps presenting Ibn Taymīyya’s rather robust philosophical statements is uncharitable without offsetting
it against that for which he is better known. His anbalism demanded restriction against innovation and prohibited
strictly kuhr: just accept what the Qur’an says without too much analysis [b ā k f’; a form of fundamentalism].
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Burrell CSC, “Creation,” in Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic, 144.
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Vanhoozer, “Does the Trinity Belong to a Theology of Religions?,” in Trinity in a Pluralistic Age, 48.
Vanhoozer contrasts the idem-like God, the God whose identity is that He says that same, with the ipse-like God,
whose identity is His faithfulness to His word. “Ispe-identity—selfhood—is not merely sameness. To be a self is to
do more than enjoy an uninterrupted persistence in time. And yet, to be a self, there must be some principle of
permanence through time. But is there a kind of permanence in time that is not simply the continuity of the Same? . .
. [keeping one’s word] relates the search for a principle of permanence in time to the question of “Who?” rather than
“What?” The principle in question is that of keeping one’s word. The continuity of the Same is one thing, the
constancy of friendship or a promise quite another. Ipse-identity, centered on the self’s constancy to its word, does
not exclude otherness, but requires it (49).” Ipse-identity makes room for a certain amount of dynamism within a
larger stability, what Millard Erickson calls a “stable” view of God. This stability is distanced from inert conceptions
of God and likewise Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover. To focus on “who” demands a certain degree of alienation from
inanimate categories of “the what.” Millard Erickson, The Word Became Flesh: a Contemporary Incarnational
Christology (1991; Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2000), 542.
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entails concern for His unity (Taw

), and thereby established a foundation for the doctrines of

Al-Ghazālī’s mystical oneness and Ibn ‘Arabī’s so-called pantheism.255 For oneness and
immutability reinforce one another to the degree that introducing plurality violates immutability,
therein infringing on oneness/unity (Taw

), based on the notion that creation is an extension

Allah’s existence. Poupin’s explanation of Sufism’s
one, a fortiori stands because affirmation of

-dualistic logic, outlined in chapter
by a creature that is a genuine other

demarcates an irresolvable dualism. Al-Ghazālī’s expression, “extinction in unity,” entails an
awareness of this problem.256 In sum, the articulation of Allah’s unicity without creation is
achievable, but accounting for His simplicity and unity in view of the Qur’anic revelation of His
role as direct Commander, Fashioner, and Giver of Existence (derived from Him) complicates
intractably the plurality of creation.257 Al-Ghazālī’s formulae are understandable in view of this
intractability: “extinction in unity” and “completely lost in God.” Ibn Taymīyya’s formulation,
“[a creature] has no existence and no foundation except in the Creator,” demands some bridge
between Allah’s Existence and creaturely existence imposing an irresolvable multiplicity ever
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Burrell CSC, “Creation,” in Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic, 145 – 146. The Mu‘tazilites
and later Ash‘arites were terribly concerned about agency and creating being linked, so much so their schemas
aimed to ascribe all agencies to the One agency of Allah. The trick was how to do this without violating his
distinctness, and so immutability, and at the same time affirm real moral responsibilities of humans for their acts
performed by their moral agency. The Mu‘tazilite program ultimately would be found wanting by Ash‘arī because
of its insistence on (1) that the Qur’an was created and (2) because of its moral deficiency in keeping Allah from
being involved in the evil actions of men. The Sunni orthodoxy that would result from Ash‘arism took a “hands off”
approach to parsing out the creator/creation paradigm: “Sunni orthodoxy . . . is that which denies an overarching
conceptual scheme for creator and creature” (146).
256

Poupin, “Trinitarian Experience in Sufism,” in Trinity in a Pluralistic Age, 76 and 80. “For if the
assimilation—the
b (with its risks of pantheism, and even idolatrous tendencies)—is avoided, it is but for a
purely abstract profession of the divine unicity—the ‘ . And this is what Hall j and Ahmad Ghaz lī refused”
(80).
257

Al Ghazālī, Al-Maqṣad al- ā f har
ā’ ā
ā [The Ninety-nine Beautiful Names of
God] trans. with notes by David B. Burrell and Nazih Daher (Cambridge: The Islamic Text Society, 2013), 49 –
149. The “names” in the text above are English translations of a few of the “ninety-nine beautiful names.” AlGhazālī discusses each one at length. Of course, if creation is actually contingent, then the unity of Allah stands
strong without invasion of plurality.
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inimical to

, Allah’s oneness.258 Appeal to b ā k f’ is merely an ad hoc retreat from the

arguments of how creation relates to Allah, not an engagement of them.259
To reiterate, there is no “otherness” allowed in this unicity, considering it without
creation. As noted earlier,

demands, contra Christianity, that Allah be unipersonal: He

begets not nor is He begotten. Without severe distortion to the denotation of “otherness,” there
can be no formulation of “otherness” on this schema. Otherness means to be distinct or
different.260
Perhaps, if it were allowed that Muslims are genuinely binitarian, taking the Qur’an as
true Other and Allah as Another, otherness could be established. A proposal of this sort issues
from the Sunni position — or majority Muslim position — that the Qur’an is eternal and
uncreated. On such a proposal, it would be accepted that there are two eternal Ones, Allah and
the Qur’an, which are clearly distinguishable, but, concerning both, divinity is predicated. Any
step in this direction by Islam would be a concession to the binitarian formulation of Christ as
Logos put forth in the New Testament.261 “Otherness” can be denoted, as appropriated to sentient
entities, as an “actual being” engaging in recognition and response as well as in initiationing
highly organized and complex communition to another. 262 This would seem to suppose a real
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Ibn Taymīyya, in M
’ R
, 316; Burrell CSC, “Creation,”
Cambridge Companion of Classical Islamic, 144; Richard Frank, “Kalam and philosophy: a perspective from one
problem,” in Islamic Philosophical Theology, ed. Parviz Morewedge (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1980), 71 – 95.
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B ā k f’ means “neither question too much nor innovate, but accept what is taught.”
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This definition is expanded below but using such a modern day conventional definition at the outset
hopefully curtails any suspicion of bias driving the definition. “Otherness,” Dictionary.com (Dictionary.com LLC,
2014), http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/otherness?s=t accessed 17 March 2014; “Otherness,” Merriam
Webster: an Encyclopædia (Merriam-Webster Inc., 2014), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/otherness
accessed 17 March 2014.
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The language of “binitarian” is no repudiation of “Trinitarianism,” but the usage of “binitarian” is
designed to signify the New Testament theme of pairing the Son and Father together frequently.
262

In mind are human persons, who have had existence predicated of them (contra Kant), and are
sufficiently endowed with will, power, and mind to carry out above said acts; “communication” means that extended
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distinction between one entity and another — the ability to point to distinctions without losing
element(s) of sameness between one and another. Otherness can be applied to an item or thing,
which makes it distinguishable from the one so observing it (I-It).263 If the Qur’an were
considered “an Other” in this way, it would be distinguishable from Allah yet the same as Allah
as His Word, a Representation of Him. This would not achieve a sound foundation for otherness
between personal entities (I-Thou),264 but it would between a personal entity (Allah) and a thing
(Qur’an). Nevertheless, it would be a brick towards constructing otherness/distinction as a real
possibility for the Islamic view of Allah independent of creation. This all sounds too dangerously
like the Logos of Christianity, who is personal and not a mere thing. This could be a reason for
Islam’s refusal to establish a binitarian view of Allah and the Qur’an despite the status of the
Qur’an — the Mu‘zalites having been defeated — as uncreated and eternal.265 A binitarian view
might help resolve the difficulty of Allah’s unicity in view of creation’s distinctions. The Qur’an
would be a Treatise, being Allah’s eternal Speech, always already distinct from Him. This would
establish otherness on the basis of the relationships between the “mother book” (Qur’an) and
Allah. Admittedly, this formulation derives it logic from Trinitarian rationality.
movement of signifying (although not necessarily phonetically based) by which a person can “connect” with
another. The phrase, “highly organized and complex,” has been added to hopefully differentiate communication
performed by or claimed to be performed by humans, angels, jinn, Allah, God, Father, Son, Spirit, from that of
creatures with less communicative ability (various animals and simpler forms of life).
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Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smither, Scribner Classics ed. (1958; New York:
Scribner, 2000), 3 – 9. That “otherness” depends on the “mind” or “psychology” of the “I” in observing or viewing
an actual “other” has troubling ramifications. Zizioulas rightly argues that Buber’s position does not overcome the
totalizing of the self since the “I” still holds priority in how the “I” decides to view the actual “other.” Zizioulas,
Commounion and Otherness, 47. At this point, “recognition and response,” i.e., communication, is connoted in the
concept of “otherness” while “distinct” or “different” is the denotation. Although these are the ideas used to discuss
otherness herein, it may well be the case that “otherness” is nothing more than the irreducible quality “to be
youself.” This “being of youself” (how you exist) must have the same ontological status as mere existing (what you
exist as) or else “yourself-ness” will be swallowed up by “what-ness” because “what-ness” does not particularize on
“how you are” but on “what you are.” These issues are a bit more technical than what is needed, so, in the interest of
concision, the simple denotation of “distinct/different” with the connotation of “communicative capacity” suffices
for the definition of “otherness.”
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Ibid., 7 – 8.

265

Mu‘zalites held the Qur’an to be created.
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All this, however, is not the case according to the Din of Islam. Allah is unipersonal and
indeed solitary. Allah’s mental conceptualization of others, i.e., His potential creatures, does not
effect or actualize “otherness.” These potential creatures could in no way recognize and respond
to Allah prior to being logically and temporally actualized. There could be no co-mmunion, no
mutual recognition and response, in Allah because, before creation, there is no external
differentiation and Allah is not, under the rubric of

, internally differentiated. Allah could

recognize Himself and perhaps reflexively respond to Himself, but He could not as “another” or
in relation to “others.” If it is argued that the “self” becomes “other” or an attempt is made to
understand “otherness” to mean “self,” then this inevitably commends a totalitarianism of “self,”
subsuming “otherness” into its domain of “same/self.” It is readily obvious, contrary to such an
argument, that to be oneself is not to be another. Allah, considered apart from creation, is not
“other as object known” but only “other as self known,” which provides no foundation for
distinctness/otherness.266
Taw

Allah, considered even with creation, still has a tough time grounding otherness

as the authors surveyed demonstrate. To be extinguished in view of Allah’s unity (Taw

) is to

lose the ability to recognize and respond. It should be granted that the human activity of
recognizing and responding leads a human to Al-Ghazālī’s mystical-experiential “extinction in
unity.” Is it apt, then, to say that the real telos of otherness is absorption into Allah’s unity? If
these creatures, which are to be extinguished in this unity, retain their actual otherness, how is
Allah’s unity retained, as demanded by

? If Ibn ‘Arabī’s paradigm is accepted, then the

real otherness of creatures was never the case, but only Allah’s mental projections, which are
dispersed at the onset of Allah’s

. How does this account for human relationships and
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Emmanuel Lévinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (1978; Norwell, MA: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1995), 93 – 95.
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how humans experience them? If creatures subsist in Allah’s Existence, as one strand of Ibn
Taymīyya’s thought would have it, then emanational otherness is possible, but Allah’s
distinctness (

) is compromised. Creatures would exist in the “plane” of Allah’s

Existence.267 If the Sunni teaching “accept but do not innovate” nor “question too much” (b ā
k f’) is allowed, it only perpetuates this problem, as it is to this day.268
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Perhaps this is an ungenerous treatment of Ibn Taymīyya’s use of “in”; maybe he could mean “within
but different from” but among the works covered he does not make this clear by explaining “in.” He claims that the
creation is contingent and moves on. This is not to say the Christianity has its doctrine of creation distilled of all its
quirks either. The resolution for both religions is advanced by use of the preposition “by” rather than “in.” Creation
“is being sustained by the Word of His power” (Heb. 1:3; φέρων τε τὰ πάντα τῷ ῥήματι τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ
translates as, “and sustaining all things by the word of His power . . .” [translation mine]; R ē
’s usage is
important since ē refers frequently to the spoken word or proclaimed word, that is, the “word” exteriortized
from the one so speaking whereas logos is the “order, ration, reason, logic, sentiment, wisdom, or coherence” by
which the language of the spoken word ( ē ) takes as its foundation. Colossians 1:17 potentially controverts
Hebrews 1:3, using ἐν (en; in) although the syntactical range for en provides numerous escapes if the context allows:
en can be instrumental (by), locative (in), causal (because of), among other options. Speaking of the Son of God,
Col. 1:17 is inscribed in Greek: “καὶ τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκεν, . . .” and translates as, “and all thing in Him
hold together [or “endure” or “consist”; translation mine]. Without innovative theologoumena, clearing the way for
how “in” can still point to a truly contingent creation without involving an identity or monist continuity between
Creator and creation is doubtful.
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This set of concerns is not something hoisted upon Islam by an external critical Christian eye. These
difficulties listed in this paragraph are historical to Islam, as the various schisms of the authors above illustrate. AlGhazālī’s minor spiritual biography, his Deliverance from Error (al-Munqidh min al-Dalal), best captures the
mythos of the several sects attempts to articulate and expound Islam. Several sections are worth quoting. “You also
want to hear about my daring in mounting from the lowland of servile conformism to the highland of independent
investigation: and first of all what profit I derived from the science of
ā ; secondly, what I found loathsome
among the methods of the devotees of ‘
[those who held that one Imam alone taught and knew the truth], . . .
thirdly, the methods of philosophizing which I scouted; and finally, what pleased me in the way pursued by the
practice of Sufism” (pg. 18). “I began . . . with the science of
ā . . . it [is] a science adequate for its own aim,
but inadequate for mine. For its aim is simply to conserve the creed of the orthodox for the orthodox and to guard it
from the confusion introduced by the innovators. . . . [new paragraph] A group of the
k
[Kalām
theologians] did indeed perform the task assigned to them by God. They ably protected orthodoxy and defended the
creed which had been readily accepted from the prophetic preaching and boldly counteracted the heretical
innovations” (pg. 26). “I noted, however, that not a single Muslim divine had directed his attention and endeavor to
that end [of learning philosophy par excellence]. What the
k
had to say in their books, where they were
engaged in refuting the philosophers, was nothing but abstruse, scattered remarks, patently inconsistent and false,
which could not conceivably hoodwink an ordinary intelligent person, to say nothing of one familiar with the
subtleties of the philosophical sciences” (pg. 28). It is further worth mention that Al-Ghazālī’s Moderation in Belief
treats on the obligatory or free act of creation (treatise three) but not the metaphysics of the creation/Creator
relationship. Al-Ghazālī, “On the Acts of God (Exalted is He): The Entirety of the Acts of God (Exalted is He) are
Contingent, and None of them may be described as Obligatory,” Moderation in Belief, 3rd treatise, sec. 1. Kindle.
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Distinctness
, Allah’s transcendence, or uniqueness, is the other major denotation of
Although

.269

denotes transcendence, but this transcendence should be distinguished from

what the Christian doctrine of God’s transcendence emphasizes. Both Islam and Christianity
affirm that “the Deity is beyond the cosmos,” but Islam takes dissimilarity as one of Allah’s
thirteen essential attributes.270
Allah’s

proves to be more than just about Allah being “beyond.”

has such gravitas that, for some Muslims, it makes Allah completely dissimilar to

anything in creation.271 For others, like Al-Ghazālī, analogical predication is allowed. Some
hesitate, however, to use anthropomorphism; this is not a surprise since, according to Islam, man
is not made in Allah’s image. Thus, either radical dissimilarity or just dissimilarity is as an
essential feature of

. This is not to say the Christianity’s doctrine of God’s transcendence
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Stephen Myongsu Kim, “Divine Transcedence: A Religio-Hisotrical Portrayal,” Transcendence of God v
f
O
Q ’ , PhD thesis, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, 2009:
yymmdd < http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-10172009-125341/ accessed on March 2, 2014; Al-Ghazālī,
-M qṣ
- āf
ā ā
ā [The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God] trans. with notes David
Burrell and Nazih Daher, THE ISLAMIC TEXTS SOCIETY (1992; Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 2013), 25. AlGhazālī says that “What completes the enumeration [of names of Allah], however, will be the meaning of God’s
unity [
], whether conveyed by the expression ‘the Unique’ or ‘the One’. For it is highly improbable that these
two expressions hold place of two names when their meaning is one.” Kateregga elsewhere (pg. 2) also claims that
“In His unity, God is not like any other person or thing that can come to anyone's mind. His qualities and nature are
conspicously unique. He has no associates.” Similarly: “No human language is good enough to describe God, for
there is nothing else like Him. God's nature is far beyond our limited conception. Nevertheless, we do know that He
is one” (pg. 1).
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Rauf, Islam: Creed and Worship, 4 – 5.
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Mahmoud Ayoub, Islam Faith and History (Oneworld Publications, 2013), . Kindle. Ayoub states
something shocking only because it is so contradictory: “Muslims believe that God, in his essence, is unknowable,
inconceivable. He is above all categories of time and space, form and number, or any other material or temporal
attributions. Yet he can be known through his attributes, called in the Qur’ān “God’s most beautiful names.”” The
obvious question is, “So can He be known or not?” The second plain question is, “Do not the most beautiful names
require creaturely conceptions to be understood? If so, how are the “names,” which are not beyond “time and space”
because they need time and space to be understood, a pathway to understanding He who is beyond time and space?”
Kateregga and Shenk, Islam and Christianity, 88. Kateregga states, “According to the true teaching of Islam, God is
not to be conceived in an anthropomorphic way.” The question here is, “How can Allah be said to be dissimilar
then? Does not dissimilarity entail being “other,” which is properly predicable of humans? Thus, dissimilarity is
anthropomorphic. Ghamidi, Islam, chap. 1, sec. 1, subsec. i. Kindle. Regarding the “being of Allah,” Ghamidi states:
“The reason is that this means can only be employed if the thing which is compared and likened to is found in some
form or the other in a person’s imagination or in the world around him. Man has no such data within or outside him
regarding God’s being. Thus, this means too can be of no use in this regard.” He then cites Surah 16:74 to
substantial this.
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does not do the same, but it does not weight dissimilarity to near the degree that
prescribes. Without losing sight of Allah being “beyond the cosmos,”

stresses Allah’s

uniqueness, or difference, mightily. The following discussing pays attention to it accordingly.
Anyone who proclaims

entails viewing Allah as ontologically other. Uniqueness

supposes others by which to account for the differences that ground uniqueness. Difference, then,
is always necessary for any uniqueness, and in some cases the terms are synonyms. Allah,
however, is undifferentiated before creation, and there certainly is not external differentiation
either. Is Allah dependent on creation for differentiation? How is Allah’s uniqueness so “beyond
the creation” when it takes creation to ground the difference necessary for it? Said differently, to
predicate the attribute of “difference” to Allah is only possible by creation. What is seen here is
that difference — a necessary part of
Therefore, the

of Allah’s

(Surah 112) — is only made possible by creation.
does not achieve what some Muslims hope. It aims to

distance, that is, make Allah dissimilar from creation and human creatures. Instead,

likens

Allah to creation since differentiation only occurs with creation. The quality of difference is
similar to both Allah and creation, each in relation to the other, but such difference is only
possible via creation since Allah, in and of Himself, is unipersonal and undifferentiated.
A point already intimated is that

, when conjoined to Allah’s unicity, exacerbates

the intractable dilemma noted earlier — the dualism obtaining by a creature’s affirmation of
. The major problem with this dualism is the “different,” which it introduces.
cannot obtain without difference, and such difference cannot obtain without creation. Because
Allah is utterly unique (

272

), He can have no external associates.272 Because He is one

Nothing and no one created (external to Allah) can be associated with Him so as to be worshiped along

with Him.
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(Taw

), He can have no internal (to Himself) associates.

must therefore be handled in

light of the ontological reality the term describes, as relative to creation inasmuch as it supposes
difference.273 Should

have

removed from it? If this analysis is right, then, yes, it

should be removed as a legitimate description if

is meant to describe Allah eternally, not

just temporally.
The first pillar of Islam (focused on the first clause of the Shahadah or Surah 112), for
Muslims holding to radical transcendence, is itself the ontological violation of which it seeks to
protect against. Through a creature’s affirmation of

, if creatures are true others,

“difference” is demonstrably real. This makes the dissimilarity prescribed by
creation and, therefore, impossible without creation. Hence, if Taw

entails

relative to
, it cannot

be eternally true of Allah. The Sufi concern over generations about “dualism” obtaining and
violating

is valid. The “different” introduced by cosmological dualism, which is strongly

implied in a creature’s affirmation of

as deposited in Surah 112, likens Allah to creation

rather than distances Him from it. No wonder Islamic writers like Ibn ‘Arabī and Al-Ghazālī
found it necessary to lean towards understanding creation as illusory. The other way to avoid the
dualism is to suppose that creation is some kind of emanational extension of Allah’s Existence. It
is not at all clear, though, how Allah is so distinct when the ontological gap between Creator and
creation is crossed by the unitary bridge of divine-existence/creaturely-existence.274 If this is so,
Allah’s transcendence becomes convertible with/to Allah’s immanence in His undifferentiated
identity with what appears to be external contingent reality.
273

In other words, this is not only a semantic problem but a real ontological issue.
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Burrell, “Creation,” in Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic, 144 – 145. This is the irresolvable
problem: “[A]ny pretension to have articulated the founding relation [between
and creation] adequately will
have reduced that relation to one comprehensible to us, and so undermine and nullify the distinction expressed by
, the heart of this tradition.”
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Would the act of creation, thereby making Allah a “different One,” impose on His
identity? Allah’s identity would no longer be a unicity wholly apart from all notions of
difference as would be the case prior to creation, when there was no “difference” inside or
outside of Allah. Instead, He is now a different One among other different ones, but this was not
the case before creation. The Shahadah, Surah 112, and the classical Islamic attribute of
dissimilarity, all point to Allah’s difference as a chief attribute. If it could only be a divine
attribute once Allah created, how could Allah’s Taw

identity, being eternal and unchanging,

be linked to creation in this way? Unless creation is somehow eternal, then Allah’s attribute of
dissimilarity could not obtain until the act of creation, at which time Allah would have something
from which to be different. If creation is eternal in the same way Allah is eternal, then affirming
it as contingent is ruled out, and two eternal realities exist: Allah and the creation. The larger
difficulty is the question, “How can

Allah (Monad) create anything differentiated from

Himself in the first place?275 To be One is to be only One, not many and not One among many.
The final phrase of Surah 112, “And there is none like unto Him,” could be clarified with the
additional phrase, suggested by this analysis, “And there is none like unto Him,” except in the
difference all things have from Him and His difference from them, in which they are the same.
The mode or how the difference is structured may differ, but the function of difference in
distinguishing Allah from creatures and creatures from Allah is univocally the same. The
predicate “other” entailed in “difference” is univocally true of both Allah and creatures in at least
the sense of “distinct from” that the term “other” entails. Of course, this assumes creatures to be
actual contingent others, which might not be an Islamic doctrine of creation in the final analysis.
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I owe this insight to Dr. John Morrison.
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There is a semantic problem as well. Only creaturely analogies are available to Muslims
in all their religious formulations about Allah; this is even more pronounced due to the Qur’an’s
use of creaturely language to describe Him (e.g., “ascending the throne”). How is it proper to use
creaturely things to describe what is beyond all creaturely things, i.e.,
does the affirmation of

?276 Further, how

maintain its status as an affirmation, staying clear of vacuity? The

plurality of creation exacerbates the problem of affirming Allah’s uniqueness because of the
rather obvious difference of the creaturely realm of multiplicity.277 There is no human existing
that is not within a pluralized environment of both things and persons.278 So do Muslims have
any analogy whatsoever to give real substance to this uniqueness of Allah?279 Is the only way
open the via negativa with its associated agnosticizing pressure? Thus, affirming Allah’s unicity
(oneness) is complicated by His transcendence (distinctness) since there is nowhere in all
creation from whence to derive such a concept; if there is, then Allah’s distinction was really not
276

Al-Ghazālī, Moderation in Belief, 1st treatise, sec. 1, 10th proposition. Kindle. Commenting on how
“one” can point to something’s utter uniqueness, he says, “‘Being one’ might also be used to indicate that the thing
has no analogue of its kind, as we say that the sun is one. The Creator (Exalted is He) is also one in this sense. There
is no counterpart to Him.” The question here is what does Al-Ghazālī mean by “analogue.” He has just finished
discussing how analogies can be used by scholars, but not the populace, to understand and “apprehend” God.
277

Ibid. While discussing Allah having no counterpart, Al-Ghazālī states that “If every difference is
removed, multiplicity is necessarily removed, and hence unity is necessitated.” Can men truly imagine a singularity
like Allah given their creaturely situatedness? Al-Ghazālī had just used an analogy of a man to make this point: “If it
were permissible to say that they are two things without there being any difference between them, then it would be
permissible to point to a man and say that he is two men, or even ten, but that they are identical and parallel in
qualities, place, all accidents, and all necessary conditions without distinction.” This analysis seems largely right
within the framework of traditional (Aristotelian) metaphysics. What the Christian revelation of God as Trinity
questions is the
ē or principium of identity and relationship. Said differently, the Christian revelation of God as
Trinity suspects, following Christianity’s own hermeneutic of suspicion, that properties (qualities) belonging to an
individual man can never be properties isolated from other men. All men stand in relationships to other men, and for
any individual man there is some set of relational circumstances that contributes to the properties to men, perhaps
even (it is possible) proportional dynamism. The point in unphilosophical terms is that any analysis of man without
the consideration of other men’s influence upon that man is to never have actually started an analysis of man in the
first place. Is Ghazālī’s deliberation about the nature of Allah’s oneness all too human, a severe anthropomorphism,
since using such a blatant human analogy? Or worse, is this idealistic anthropomorphizing a case of obfuscation
since man, evaluated in traditional philosophical terms, is always more than the reductions imposed upon it by an
overly “materialistic” or “substantial” anthropological metaphysic?
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Further, it might be wondered if there is anything that is not internally differentiated as well.
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a distinction worthy of the Creator.280 Are we returning again to the via negativa? If reality is
seen as an extension of Allah’s existence, then somehow the multiplicity of existence is distinct
from Allah although subsisting in His existence. If, however, creation is put forward on Islam as
truly contingent, the affirmation of

continues the problem: “The stumbling-block which

becomes as one tries to render it conceptually may be identified by its sharp edges:
everything which is not God comes forth from God yet cannot exist without God, so how are
they distinct when they cannot be separated?”281
There is another issue regarding “otherness” as well, which is tied to difference.282 If a
creature is offset against Allah as a genuine “another,” then perhaps there is a terminological
analogy since being “another” would analogously coordinate with Allah being the “Other.”283
There would be “one-and-anotherness.” This semantic point looks back to the earlier ontological
point that creation is necessary for Allah to become “Another.” It is, however, this type of
anthropomorphizing that Islam is voraciously against.284 The “one-and-another” phrase, and
actuality of it, is only possible with creation, which means predicating “other” to Allah owes to
creation. Is “othereness,” therefore, properly only a creaturely predicate? A basis for
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Someone might object that a singularity can be imagined by the cognitive process of abstractizing that
property. This objection will not work because it assumes plurality in the process of abstractizing singularity. A
human mind apprehends some object, which makes two things, the human and the thing observed. Then, the human
mind abstractizes from that object to the imagined idea of a lone singularity. There are always two things in this
processs, not one, which makes knowing oneness apart from this pluarity impossible.
281

Ibid.
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It is not being suggested that “otherness” and “difference” are different categories as much as thinking
on these terms separately suggests either more or less personal essence. “Difference” seems to be a term that is more
readily used of non-persons whereas “otherness” pertains more directly to persons. Admittedly, my connotations
might be due to more of my bias than to these terms taking these connotations in all times and contexts. Terms
connoting otherness are “other, another, foreign, alien,” and perhaps more.
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But this would reduce the Creator and creation distinction.
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understanding Allah’s transcendence requires understanding Him as “Another,” does it not? The
terms connoting otherness, and the realities they represent, are soundly creaturely on Islam. All
otherness would arrive at and through creation. The “otherness” realities, and the terms used to
refer to those realities, take their principium at the time Allah says “be.” To appropriate the
terminology of “other/another” to Allah emphatically represents the method of improper
anthropomorphizing disapproved by major segments of Muslims. If “otherness” were
disapproved and banned under anti-anthropomorphizing, then all seemingly contingent reality is
really One, either by emanation or by illusion. Is there a way forward apart from shear fideism to
parts of the Qur’anic revelation that creation is contingent? There is a very real problem of how
to ground “distinction” and “otherness” by the doctrine of
Transcendence (

Allah before creation.

) or Allah’s distinctness is applicable from the beginning of

creation, as outlined formerly. Although contested among Muslim scholars themselves, maybe
the Qur’an (eternal divine Speech) or Allah’s attributes can ground “distinction” before
creation.285 Both the attributes of Allah and the Qur’an are to be identified with Him, although
distinguishable from His essence — distinguishable by whom is the imperative question. These
last two sentences might be seriously repudiated by Muslims themselves since such a
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Ghazālī, Moderation in Belief, 1st treatise, sec. 1, 9th proposition. Kindle. “It is known that positing
such a perfection in clarity and illumination is not impossible regarding the known existents that cannot be
visualized, such as knowledge, power, God’s essence, His attributes, and so forth. In fact, we almost apprehend that
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these known things. We say that this is not impossible; there is nothing that renders it impossible. Indeed, the
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“distinguishing” is suggestive of a violation of the oneness of

, introducing some

composition. It would be better to think of the distinguishing as an activity of human cognition,
needing to process in categories He who is infinite because the human mind is finite.
Nevertheless, Islam does not allow for internal differentiation in Allah, which means the Qur’an
(as eternal Speech) and the attributes must be retractable to the divine essence, or simple
oneness, of Allah.286 Given that such a retraction occurs to avoid multiplicity, does this divest
Allah of His attributes? Moreover, how then is “distinction” to be grounded in Allah before
creation? Further, there is clearly zero foundation for personal distinctness — between persons
— in Allah prior to creation. If creation is understood in illusory, panentheistic, or pantheistic
terms, then personal distinctness has no grounding after Allah’s so-called creating. If all is
illusory or somehow Allah, then why bother speaking about this in terms of creation? Trying to
make a case of how to ground distinction in Allah in positive terms proves to be a considerable
problem. Perhaps it is best to follow Islamic apophaticism. Is the via negativa the only way
open? There is nothing like Him; one can only say what He is not. There is no grounding of
distinction before creation in Allah. The development of historic Islamic thought — Al-Ghazālī,
Ibn ‘Arabī, and Ibn Taymīyya’s movement towards Existence/existence as monolithically
connected or in monist framework — implies the importance of this consideration when trying to
advance the Creator/creation relationship in Islam.
Relatedness
With the explanations accomplished in the first two sections on oneness and distinctness,
this section on relatedness does not require quite as much space. The possibility of Islam being
considered binitarian monotheism can also be left behind since T
286

Al-Ghazālī,

demands oneness, both in

-M qṣ , 15. He says that “the thing qualified by all of them [the attributes] is the

essence.”
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unicity and uniqueness. This unicity of Allah is also indicative of a unipersonal identity.
Although Muslim scholars can point to Allah’s infinite nature for the multiplicity of creation,
this does not substantially account for the multiplicity of personal entities, whether angels, jinn,
or humans. Although Allah’s power, mercy, knowledge, and so forth can be imagined as an
infinite interval of endless extension, this cannot be the case for the personal identity of Allah.
Morevoer, the creation of multiplicity by Taw

infinite Allah is uncannily strange. His

infinity cannot admit differentiation without the violation of Taw

. Allah’s infinity does not

provide a principle or foundation for personal differentiation or otherness since He is surely
One.287 Shirk guarantees, as does the Qur’anic revelation, that He is one, alone, and solitary.288
No one else may be associated with Him.
Thinking about Allah alone before creation, there is no otherness, and so, no relatedness.
There is reflexive relatedness, but this is a vortex that always excludes anyone or anything else.
Hence, any dimension of relating that might be considered, the conclusion will always involve an
exclusion of the other. Under

, the conclusion follows necessarily. Nothing is but Allah.

Allah is unipersonal. Allah relates, ergo, Allah reflexively relates. This leads us to the conclusion
that relatedness in Islam is grounded in reflexive relatedness that does not include another
(thinking without creation). Some Muslim theologians have made use of the Augustinian
formula for the Trinity: God is lover, beloved, and love.289 This is not necessarily objectionable.
When used for Allah, the formula becomes equivocal from its meaning when applied to the
Trinity. When appropriated to Allah, the one person (uniperson) is the Actor of the love, the
287
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Object of His love, and the Concurrence of the activity of His love. Allah’s loving activity is
cyclonic, always leaving Allah (as Lover), centered on Allah (as Beloved), and the “winds” of
that love is always Allah (as Love).
If a theory of how humans are “persons,” or become “truly human,” should be put
forward on Islam’s doctrine of Allah, then Allah as unipersonal is the antitype by which to
adjudicate on what is truly “personal.” Allah’s

is a personalizing framework by which an

Islamic anthropology might be understood. To be alone, therefore, would be a guideline of
becoming truly human, as truly a vicegerent under Rabb Allah. Society would be a barrier to
becoming human, a true “person,” since all such “others” in this society would invade the
necessary solitude for becoming human or “a person.” Despite the alarming inferences — those
surely inimical to the importance of human relatedness and community — that could be drawn
from this, there is the larger matter of how this relates to the Qur’an.
These ideas are surely against the Qur’anic revelation, which emphasizes how humans
should live together in an Islamic world. These ideas are nevertheless not against a theology of
anthropology derived from Allah’s ontology as unipersonal. Therefore, there is an obvious rift
between what it means for Allah to be a “person” and what it means for a human to be a
“person” or “mia Hypostasis” if the Qur’an’s teaching on human community is placed vis-à-vis
Allah’s nature. The real problem with this is that the Qur’an is viewed as Allah’s uncreated
Speech, and must be somehow representative of Him; if it is not largely or wholly so, how does
shirk not occur? Thinking of what it means to be a human person from Allah’s

(ontology

of solitude; unipersonal) is at odds with thinking what it means to be a human person from
Allah’s Speech (Qur’an). Thus the Qur’an would teach not to be like Allah (i.e., solitary).
Another way to look at this is to say that humans are not to be like Allah as He is in Himself, that
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is, immanently or without creation, but to be like Allah as He is in relationship to creation. This
results in the concerning conclusion that Allah — the Author of all personality, persons, and the
personalizing One — tells humans to be opposite how Allah is in Himself and how Allah was
before He created. If this is the case, how is there any real confidence that following the Qur’an
guides humanity (human persons in community) into true “godly” community? The Author of
humanity — who evidently made humanity like Himself, corroborated via anthropomorphisms
as demonstrable from the Qur’an itself — has a self-identity differently constituted, namely,
without reference or in relationship to others. Humanity formed around the Qur’an might guide
them into Qur’anic revelatorily formed humanity. This, however, could not guide humanity into
“godliness” since Allah is clearly unipersonal, solitary, and alone. He is always alone in His
ultimacy as the One. Although the Qur’an guides humans into a community of Islam
(submission), it does not guide humanity into “godliness” in the strict sense of becoming like
Allah. Instead, the Qur’an as Allah’s Speech guides humanity into being “ungodly” by ensuring
that human persons’ identities always subsist in a way that is totally dissimilar to Allah
(immanently conceived). Humans as persons are “persons in community” while Allah’s
“Personhood” is always opposite that, namely, alone without community. It would be
blasphemous for Muslims to say that Allah’s “Personhood” depended on creation. The
blasphemous nature of this derives from making something as essential as Allah’s Personhood
unable to stand alone. In such a case, who Allah is becomes continually linked to something
outside of Himself. Furthermore, it is impossible to link an eternal Being’s Personhood to
something that is not eternal, not without undermining this eternal Being’s (Allah) Personhood
altogether.290 The disallowance of this linking, consequently, removes any possibility of
290

If Allah’s personhood is linked to something created, something that becomes, then His personhood is
an emergent property.
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constructing Allah’s Personhood together with creation since it would make Him interdependent
on it for His Personhood.291
Allah as the Author of all persons is presented through anthropomorphisms to be some
measure of an antitype for humanity as persons.292 Allah’s

, namely, Allah’s nature as

unipersonal and alone, stands antithetical to humanity as persons in relationships. Moreover,
Allah’s eternal Speech (Qur’an) teaches an anthropology that is ungrounded in Allah’s
“Personhood.” It is in this sense that the Qur’an begins to look more and more like a “true other”
next to Allah, nervously suggesting shirk. The tension between humanity being like Allah
(attributes; anthropomorphisms) but guided by the Qur’an to not be like Him is ripe with
difficulties. Here again, the monist schemas of Ibn Taymīyya, Al-Ghazālī, and Ibn ‘Arabī
between Existence and existence are attractive options. If all are one, then the unipersonal nature
of Allah is not compromised by Allah’s creating (or better imagining); furthermore, if all are
one, the Qur’an’s guiding humanity to be persons in community is only a wisp of fog appearing
as multiplicity for a time, later overtaken by the truth of Allah’s

. The Qur’an, then,

would not counsel humanity to be other than Allah, but only provide guidance to humanity
during their apparent stay, however falsely substantial it may seem, as community. The Qur’an
could just be a “brief word” of Allah on how to function during this apparition of
community/humanity until the time of “extinction in unity.”
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This would be much like the “becoming god” of Heidegger (esp. Hegel) or the intra-creation god of the
process theologians.
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It should not be missed that the thirteen attributes ascribed to Allah are shared with humanity but subsist
in creatures in a creaturely way.
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Conclusion
Salient points from the above analysis abound. First,

denotes singularity and

uniqueness. There can be no internal or external differentiation contributing to the identity of
Allah. This is obvious precreation.
Second, Allah’s

, in view of creation, attempts to protect against allowing external

differentiation from being included in Allah. Depending on the author or sect considered, there is
more or less success in protecting the pure separation of Allah from creation. Hulul (indwelling)
even in Ibn Taymīyya was suggestive of panentheism.
Third, maybe the biggest issue was the introduction of the “different” by creation as a
truly contingent creation. If it was not truly contingent, then existence comes from the existence
of Allah as either more (per Ibn ‘Arabī) or less (per Al-Ghazālī) illusory. Is Allah’s identity in a
quest of becoming the “Different One” among “different ones?” All “otherness” would be
entirely constituted by creation, not by being inherent in Allah. How could
forth otherness from

Allah bring

? There is no internal logic in the theology proper of Allah that

explains difference, otherness, or one-and-anotherness. Otherness is not any mimesis or
reflection of who Allah was precreation, but, rather, is in antithesis to who He was precreation. It
is hard to see how Allah’s identity, being known by all creatures on the basis of the “Allah other
than me,” can be understood in His attributes by anything that implies difference. Even Allah’s
own self-knowledge would no longer be “the lone God utterly without otherness” but “the lone
God distinct from others.” The problem is not that Allah is distinct from something new, but that
He has a new “quality of being distinct” introduced by His relationship to creation. Any
attributes of Allah that imply difference cannot be eternal since difference does not exist in
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undifferentiated Taw

Allah. The same would go for any attributes that imply relationships

as well.
Fourth, even if Allah’s identity is not shaken, how is describing Allah as the “dissimilar
One” not guilty of describing Allah’s by a term that is altogether creaturely, having no basis in
Allah before creation? What this means is that the Taw

nature of Allah does not ground

“otherness.” In other words, although creaturely realities are part of coming to know things about
the Deity (per chap. 2), do these creaturely realities also convey something univocally true of the
Deity? If the term does not, but it is applied to the Deity, then this is a case of idolatry. Is not this
occurring by claiming Allah to be “other?” Is not using the term “dissimilarity” to describe Allah
the worse sort of making the Creator like the creation, even idolatry? Otherness is actualized by
creation, so should not “dissimilarity” be highest on the list of prohibited terms for describing
Allah? Instead, we find that it is one of His thirteen essential attributes. How can this be so?
Furthemore, how does Islam avoid the accusation of agnosticizing their own religion by those
Muslims claiming that Allah is “utterly other” than all else in creation. If He is not known by
means of created terms and concepts, He will not be know at all (cf. chap. 2).
Fifth, the human creature who proclaims

as a real “other” manifests a true

“difference” of this creature from the Creator. Since the whole notion of “the different” has no
grounding in Allah, the proclamation establishes an intractable dualism. “Difference” is
constituted by creation, but

(Surah 112; Shahadah) aims to distance Allah from creation.

All such attempts to affirm Allah’s uniqueness from creation only serve to remove that
uniqueness by attributing to Him an attribute wholly creaturely, namely, the attribute of
“otherness” or “dissimilarity.” As noted earlier, imagining “another” is not an ontological
grounding for “others” as truly “distinct.” Instead, imagining “others” only serves to show how
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unreal they are as “true others” since these imagined “others” remain in the fabric of thought
only as long as a mind imagines them. This is just another example of the problem of the One
and the Many.
Sixth, the semantic problem of how to name Allah’s

showed that it is hard to find

a suitable analogy in creation. Even the via negativa has been removed as an effective retreat for
Muslims since appealing to Allah as being “wholly different” or “wholly Other” only shows
Allah to not be “wholly different” precisely in the fact that He differs like creatures differ, and
such a difference is only made possible by the actualization of creation. Further, does affirming
Allah’s radical distinction become merely a phonetic act divested of its significance? Not only is
He not utterly other, but a concrete occurrence of a singularity in a non-pluralized context is not
available in creation. Creation, instead, manifests unities in diversities. Is a proclamation of
Taw

really an abstract and somewhat vacuous affirmation as Sufis have feared?
Seventh, without difference, reality is illusory. This option has a long history and

powerful Islamic figures to represent it. Given the great many problems noted above,
understanding all things as really just the One is quite attractive. To hold that reality is just an
apparition demands a certain betrayal of realism or the intuitive immediacy of humans’ daily
experience.
These analyses on oneness, distinctness, and relatedness will be reviewed and
paratactically compared with the same in Christianity in the final chapter of this dissertation. The
next chapter, however, will perform the same task as here but in terms of the doctrine of the
Trinity. The fruit from this will then be set next to the data garnered above. This conclusive
chapter, following the next, will weigh how well each religions’ doctrine of the Deity accounts
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for human relationships and their ubiquity. After this comparative endeavor, final comments will
be made towards the broad range of relevancies projected from the work here undertaken.
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CHAPTER 4: ON THE TRINITY
Introduction
The Christian Tradition, through the rigorous conversations and deliberations of the
church fathers, made explicit the inherent teaching of Scripture on the Trinity in the NiceneConstantinopolitan Creed (381 C.E.).293 Much that is necessary for the construction of Trinitarian
theology is either explicitly or implicitly mentioned within this Creed. Also, Gregory the
Theologian oversaw the Second Ecumenical Council, whose proceedings led to this Creed and
the clear affirmation of the Holy Spirit’s divinity — it was Gregory Nazianzen who first applied
homoousion to the Holy Spirit.294 For the purposes here, the two most important lines from this
Creed are about the Son and the Spirit.
Καὶ εἰς ἕνα Κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, τὸν Υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸν μονογενῆ, τὸν ἐκ τοῦ
Πατρὸς γεννηθέντα πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων· φῶς ἐκ φωτός, Θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ
Θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, γεννηθέντα οὐ ποιηθέντα, ὁμοούσιον τῷ Πατρί, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα
ἐγένετο. . . .
Καὶ εἰς τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ Ἅγιον, τὸ κύριον, τὸ ζῳοποιόν, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς
ἐκπορευόμενον, τὸ σὺν Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ συμπροσκυνούμενον καὶ συνδοξαζόμενον
....
The foci are the begetting by the Father “before all the ages,” that the Son is “true God from true
God,” and especially that the Son is “homoousion (same being, or essence) to the Father.” The
Spirit is called the Creator in a finely nuanced way by means of the Greek ō

, which could

be translated literally as “life-maker” or “maker of life” although the English of the Creed in the
“Prayers at the Assembly” and the English Language Liturgical Consultation (ELLC) use “giver
of life.”295 Furthermore, the Spirit is worshiped and glorified in oneness with the Son and the
293

The full creed can be found online. “The Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed,” Antiochain Orthodox
Christian Archdiocese of North American, 2000 – 2013, accessed May 15, 2014, www.antiochian.org/674.
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Gregory Nazianzen, Fifth Theological Oration [Oration 31], bk. 10.
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Liddell and Scott, “ζῳοποιεω,” in An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, 7th ed., E-book ed. (Logos
Bible Software, 2014); “Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed,” Together at One Altar, National Catholic Education
Commission, 2014, accessed May 15, 2014, http://www.togetheratonealtar.catholic.edu.au/receive/dspcontent.cfm?loadref=78; “The Nicene Creed,” The ELLC Texts; A Survey of Use and Variation, Worldwide Usage

108

Father. To worship anyone but God is prohibited according to Scripture. The “with” (Gr.: συν-;
sun-) appended to the Greek words proskunoumenon and doxazomenon points to the essential
oneness of the Three Hypostaseis. There are no “gaps of separation” between the Hypostaseis, so
to worship and glorify the Spirit entails “with-worshiping” (συμπροσκυνούμενον) and “withglorifying” (συνδοξαζόμενον) the Father and Son.” The divinity, or ousia of, the three
Hypostaseis is not in doubt although how to work this out has been heavily debated. This Creed
is an enduring marker of orthodox Christianity because there is no more succinct statement of the
Christian doctrine of God that was ecumenically accepted. The doctrine of the Trinity presented
hereafter will remain within the parameters set by this Creed, within the boundaries of Scripture,
and assisted from the Athanasian Creed (500 C.E.).296 This later Creed was not ecumenical, but
abides in the boundaries established by the orthodoxy of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed.

of the Revised Common Lectionary, 2007, accessed May 15, 2014,
http://www.englishtexts.org/survey.html#thenicenecreed.
296

The title of the Creed suggests that it was first outlined (?) by the great defender of Christology and
early Trinitarianism, St. Athanasius. Some think this title is a misnomer, and, rather, it ought to be titled after its first
Latin words: Quicunque Vult (“whoever wishes”). These words are followed by salvus esse (“to be saved”). Letham
thinks this latter title is better than the “Athanasian Creed.” Letham, The Holy Trinity, 186. For access to the Creed
in English, Fordham University provides it online. “Medieval Sourcebook: Quicunque Vult, or The Creed of St.
Athanasius,” Fordham University: The Jesuit University of New York, August 1998, accessed March 31, 2014,
www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/quicumque.asp. The important line, in Latin, from this Creed on the Spirit’s
relationship to the Father and Son can be contested as ambiguous: Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio: non factus, nec
creates, nec genitus, sed procedens. “The Holy Spirit is from/of the Father and the Son: not made, neither created
nor begotten, but proceeding” (trans. mine). The Latin word “a,” translated as “from/of” above represents a long
seated tension between the Eastern Church and Western Church, sparked by the uncatholic (non-universal) insertion
of the filioque clause into the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed (381 C.E.); the Council of Toledo (589 C.E.) records
this intrusion. The filioque clause was not original to the Creed, but was added by the Western Church without the
consent of the East. Thus, what was developed and affirmed ecumenically (catholically/universally) was changed
uncatholically, or, said differently in modern political rhetoric, what was a bipartisan affirmation was changed to suit
a partisan agenda, without unity to the opposite party together with whom the Creed developed. Scripture says that
the Spirit is sent both by the Father and the Son, and it records Jesus directly giving it to His disciples by breathing
on them (John 20:22). I am sympathetic to the Eastern view on this and opposed to the Western view because of
John 14:16, 14:26, 16:7, and 16: 13 – 15. Jesus shows deference (due to order, not superiority) to the Father by
asking Him to send another Advocate to the disciples in 14:16. This asking highlights Jesus’ mediatorial role
between God and man and underscores how Jesus can be said to send the Spirit in 16:7. Jesus, further and a fortiori,
recognizes and adopts this advocate/mediator title for Himself by saying that “another Advocate” will be sent.
Whatever Jesus’ sending of the Spirit involves, it cannot oppose or deny that Jesus’ sending entails asking the
Father. In Greek, using hupo and dia could convey how the Spirit is send both by the Father and the Son while
retaining the primacy of the Father in the divine taxis (“order”): To Hagion Pneuma pempetai hupo Patrou dia
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The following discussion of the Trinity attempts to remain true to the orthodoxy
established in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed and elaborated by the Athanasian Creed.297
Christian esotericism or special pleading is a real danger when the Trinity is presented beyond
superficial explanations. It is hoped that presenting the Trinity within the boundaries of the
creedal formulations will avoid either of these problems. Since aiming to stay within these
Creeds’ demarcations is the goal, sources will range from ancient to modern, always with an eye
to explain the doctrine of the Trinity by the Creeds’ parameters.298
The Trinity’s oneness is the area of greatest contention between Islam and Christianity.
This is for good reason because the analyses of the Trinity’s distinctness and intra-relatedness
hinges on the nature of this oneness. This was a similar consequence in the last chapter on
Allah’s oneness (

). Kateregga notes strongly the Muslim sentiment about Allah’s

essential lone-oneness: “So, because [Allah] is one, no one else can share even an atom of His
divine power and authority. [Allah] alone possesses the attributes of Divinity. . . . to associate
any being with God is both a sinful and infidel act.”299 All Muslims do not share the potency of
this repudiation. Miroslav Volf comments on the Athanasian Creed’s refusal to divide the divine
essence, looking to “Seyyed Hossein Nasr, a preeminent contemporary Muslim philosopher,
Huiou (“The Holy Spirit is sent by the Father through/by the Son”; Greek construction and trans. mine). Hupo points
to source while dia shows intermediate agency; this construction still has its own Trinitarian complications in view
of the correct stance that the divine Monarchia should be predicated of all the Persons in the Trinity so that each
Person is autotheos (God in Himself). John 16:14 – 15 is important in constructing the divine taxis.
297

It might be thought that the Christian doctrine of God is being treated more carefully than the Islamic
doctrine of Allah by using this universally accepted Creed (Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed). If Islam had a similar
universal Creed that clarified how to understand Allah and His relationship to creation, it would be used, but such
does not exist to my knowledge. There are some creeds, reports Binyamin Abrahamov, but there is not a consensus
among them. Onc creed holds creation to be absolutely separate from Allah. Binyamin Abrahamov, “Appendix 1:
The Creed of Abū Zur‘a ‘ubaydallāh ibn ‘abd Al-Karīm al-Rāzī (D. 264/878) and Abū ātim Muḥammad ibn Idrīs
al-Rāzī (D. 277/890),” in Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1998), 54 – 55.
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Due to the ecumenical acceptance of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, remaining consistent with it
in what following is more important than to the Athanasian Creed.
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Kateregga and Shenk, Islam and Christianity, 2.
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[who] agrees: ‘The doctrine of the Trinity certainly does not negate Divine Unity in mainstream
Christian theology.’”300 Volf is particularly irenic in his appraisal of the Qur’an’s correction and
denunciation of the putative Trinity. He sees it as correcting misconceptions held by certain
“misguided Christians.”301 There is little doubt that Muslims and Christians agree about the unity
of the Deity’s essence, that it neither can be divided nor is it compounded. The nature of that
unity, however, is where Muslims and Christians part ways.302 Volf is not unaware of this
tension. He reports that the director of Kalam Research and Media in Dubai, Aref Nayed, says
that Muslims must reject the entirety of the Athanasian Creed.303 James White noted that Surah
5:72 – 73 calls ascribing divinity to the Messiah (Jesus) both unbelief (kuhr) and idolatry
(shirk).304 Volf and White therefore make clear the contention about the oneness of the Deity,
which influences, as in the last chapter, how to understand distinctness and relatedness. To honor
the specificities proper to both Allah and the Trinity, the dissimilarities between Them reign,
which are presented in the final chapter.305
Oneness
Appropriately, it is impossible to speak of only the Trinity’s oneness without necessarily
speaking of God’s distinctions and relationships internal to Himself. It is possible to bracket out
ousia for analysis, but ousia must also denote the unitary connection of the homoousia proper to
each Hypostasis and thereby perichoretically intra-relate the Hypostaseis One to Another, and
300

Volf, Allah, 135; Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “We and You: Let Us Meet in God’s Love,” a lecture delivered
at the “Common Word” meeting with Pope Benedict XVI, Nov. 6, 2008, 2.
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Volf, Allah, 143.
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Christopher Evan Longhurst, “Tawḥīd and Homooúsios: Narrowing the Gaps Between Muslim and
Christian Understanding of God’s Divine Oneness,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 48, no. 2 (March 1, 2013): 256.
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Volf, Allah, 131.
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James White, What Every Christian Need to Know, Chap. 3, sec. 2. Kindle.
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Speaking of both Allah and the Trinity as real and separate Deities is for the sake of the argument, not
because this could be an actual states-of-affairs.
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not merely interrelate Them. Because of this, the first section on oneness is longer, and it touches
upon distinctness and relatedness as well. As a result, the sections on distinctness and relatedness
are shorter and involve a certain amount of recapitulation of what is said in this section on
oneness. That this section on oneness is longer might be all for the best since defending
Christianity as Trinitarian monotheism is paramount. The significance of this Trinitarian
presentation has consequences both for Christianity’s coherency and towards rebutting Muslim
accusations that Christianity is not monotheism.
Christian theology’s articulation of the Trinity ultimately refused the ancient
philosophico-metaphysical speculations about the cosmological origin.306 The doctrine of the
Trinity showed that the only supposed options of either taking singularity or plurality as a
starting point were not the only possible choices.307 This is the problem of the one and the many.
A starting point of a cosmological singularity expresses itself through history as an unending
force bent on returning to the “one.” Islam’s doctrine of Allah shows sizable signs of such a bent.
A beginning point of cosmological plurality resists the taming influence of unity, oneness, or
homogeneity, and always desires to return to the chaotic diversity from whence it came. The
doctrine of the Trinity proclaims that there are not just two choices: not just the choice between
the unending flux of plurality forever assaulting those trying to tame the vicissitudes into
contrived unities or the violence that always occurs in the subsuming of plurality to oneness, that
306

Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, 180. “Theologically there is no value in speculation about ideal or
metaphysical causes of difference, ontic or ontological; the triune perichoresis of God is not a substance in which
difference is grounded in its principles or in which it achieves the unity of a higher synthesis, even if God is the
fullness and actuality of all that is; rather, the truly unexpected implication of trinitarian dogma is that Christian
thought has no metaphysics of the one and the many, the same and the different, because that is a polarity that has
no place in the Christian narrative.”
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Joseph Ratzinger [Pope Benedictine XVI], Introduction to Christianity, 128 – 129. “. . . the belief in the
Trinity, which recognizes the plurality in the unity of God, is the only way to the final elimination of dualism as a
means of expanding plurality alongside unity; only through this belief is the positive validation of plurality given a
definite base. God stands above singular and plural. He bursts both categories."
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is, taking oneness as principium, with difference only residing as an interruption and an illusory
disruption of singularity.308 Provided the Trinity can be explained cogently, although not without
its mysterium, the Trinity has a definite edge in explaning the ongoing realities of unity in
diversity. God the Trinity explains the relationship between oneness and diversity as an original
peace, taking the immanent Trinity’s intra-relationships as the substantial logic of how this is
possible.309 The doctrine of the Trinity repudiates the false dilemma of either singularity or
plurality in favor of a doctrine of the one God who is internally differentiated.
The Trinity is three distinct Hypostaseis, but not “in such a way as to understand one
perfect nature compounded of three imperfect natures, but one simple essence, eminently and
antecedently perfect, in three Persons.”310 To recall chapter two, the Hypostaseis indicate “the
how” the one ousia of the Trinity exists while the ousia indicates “the what” of the Trinity. What
John Damascene cautions against is taking the “Persons/Hypostaseis” to Each possess three
natures (“the what”) that can be compounded to produce the one ousia.311 Due to the one ousia
of the Triune God, “the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit intimate a divine unity of one and
the same substance in an indivisible equality.”312 Therefore, God is One although never alone.313
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Hart, “Part 1: Dionysus against the Crucified,” in The Beauty of the Infinite. Few contemporary scholars
have explored the utter rejection of ancient philosophy’s most cherished formulations — along with their modern
expressions — and demonstrated the Trinity’s utter inversion of necessitarian logic in favor of reality’s (creation’s)
gratuity better than Hart. Hart was building on John Milbank’s thesis about so much of postmodern philosophy
being essentially “violent” in his Theology and Social Theory. This work was viewed as controversial and far
reaching, by Hart’s account (29, 35 – 36). However, following Hart’s devastating critique of ancient and modern
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Human cognitive abilities are finite and flawed, which requires a decision to be made about
whether to start thinking on the Trinity from a position of oneness or Trinity. Fairbairn’s advice
to start “to think in terms of Three, who have always been in relationship one to another and who
are united in such a way that they are a single God rather than three separate gods” is appealing
for three reasons.314
First, the early chapters of Genesis point to differentiation in God’s oneness.315 The
Hebrew E’ ō

is plural, which when taken together with the singular verbs predicated of it

intimates something of diversity when clarified later with the illumination that Jesus brought (Lk.
24:44).316 Second, God’s image bearers, Adam and Eve become “one” flesh (Gen. 2:24: Hebrew
 ’ ;אֶ חָדā ), which is the same term predicated of E’ ō

YHWH

in Deuteronomy 6:4: אֱֹלהֵינּו יהוה

אֶ חָד, “. . . your God YHWH is one” () ֶאחָד.317 Thirdly, Genesis 18:1 – 21 has been said to strongly
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Bruce Waltke and Charles Yu, An Old Testament Theology: an exegetical, canonical, and themantic
Approach (Zondervan), chap. 8, sec. II, subsec. A. Kindle. Waltke and Yu recognize that the traditional way of
taking the “Us” as a pronoun representational of God is to see it as pregnant with the Trinity. He concedes that “this
view satisfies the canonical context superbly.” He then claims “The canonical argument is true but violates the
accredited grammatico-historical rules of interpretation.” Taking the canonical approach as contrary to or opposed to
the grammatico-historical approach — instead of viewing them as complementary — is to approach theological
method with an imperialistic viewpoint. The biblical theological task is judged to “command” greater validity. This,
of course, is precisely what Bernard Lonergan complains about. The biblical theological task is an obvious task that
has to occur, but it has its role in the understanding and presentation of the Christian worldview. It does not
domineer over the other theological tasks, but is part of the Christian theologian’s many activities. Lonergan states,
“My only concern is that there be recognized that the eight performances consist of eight different sets of operations
directed to eight interdependent but distinct ends. This concern is, of course, a concern for method, a concern to
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Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), chap. 7, sec. 8 and chap. 5,
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interdependent lest one domineer over the others.
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The verbs b ’ (“ ;בראcreated”), ’ (“ ;אמרsaid”), and ’ (“ ;ראהsaw”) are all singular in verses 1, 3, and
4, respectively, predicated of ( אֱֹלהִיםplural of “God”).
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Although ’ ā does not always refers to a oneness entailing diversity in the OT canon, the regularity of
it connoting such diversity is not marginal: Gen. 1:5, 1:9, 4:19, 11:1, 11:6, and the list could continue well on.
Comparatively, the Hebrew adjective, ā
( )י ָ ִחידis uniform in its describing a solitary, only, or lone person or
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intimate an Old Testament Trinity. This text should not be grouped together with other vaguer
intimations about diversity in unity from the Old Testament because it is far more explicit
(although still mysterious) than other Old Testament texts that bear on the question of the
Trinity. St. Augustine establishes the most important observation about this text, namely, that the
narrative starts out with YAHWEH appearing to Abraham under the oaks of Mamre, but, then,
there are three men.318 After this, the narrative oscillates between YAHWEH being addressed in
the singular and the three men speaking singly to Abraham. However much mysteriousness is
maintained or however large the reservations, that YAHWEH revealed Himself to Abraham in a
manner conveying plurality is undeniable.319 What is done with it from there is up for debate, but
the three men speaking together as one (vv. 5 and 9) demands serious thought in the light of
canonical intextuality towards the question of the Triune God in the Old Testament.320 It may be

thing. It occurs twelve times in the OT (compared to over nine hundred times for ’ ā ) including the important
chapter about Abraham sacrificing Isaac: Genesis 22:2, 12, 16, Judges 11:34, Jeremiah 6:26, Amos 8:10, Zechariah
12:10, Psalms 22:21, 25:16, 35:17, 68:7, and Proverbs 4:3. ’ ā in Deuteronomy is commonly used to describe
“one” that belongs to a larger set.’ ā can focus in on the differentiated whole or on one of the things/persons that
constitute that diversity (cf. Deut. 4:42, 12:14, 13:13, 15:7, etc.). Many of these observations owe to Dayton
Hartman. Dayton Hartman, “The Historic Case for the Trinity,” in Answering Islam: a Christian-Muslim dialog,
1999, www.answering-islam.org/authors/hartman/trinity_historic.html, accessed April 15, 2014, pt. 1, sec. 2, subsec.
1.
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It is striking that only one of the three men say that he will return to Sarah so that she will bear a child
(“I will return . . . .”; v. 10). It is hard, from a canonical or systemtic perspective, not to think of the Holy Spirit’s
visitation to Mary, the mother of Jesus, so that Mary would conceive (it is obviously analogical). The two men of
chapter 19 that go to Sodom tell lot (v. 13) that they are about to destroy the city and that these two men were sent
by YHWH. By analogy, only the Son and Spirit are sent to humanity. Then, in v. 14, Lot reports that YHWH is about
to destroy the city despite the fact that the men said they were going to destroy it (v. 13). How far this is taken as
pertaining to the Trinity is hard to decide, but easier depending on the type of theology being used: difficult on
biblical theology, easier on systematic and practical theology, and easiest in the constructive theology pursued here.
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Some might object that the later narrative of Genesis 19 identifies two of the three men as angels. Three
cursory responses refuse to concede the claim that Genesis 18 insinuate that the three men are YHWH in some way.
First the Hebrew
’āk (angel;  ) ַמ ְל ָאְךhas equivocal meanings because it can stand for, and is used this way in
Scripture (i.e., Gen. 32:1 – 7, where it is used twice of humans), just someone who is a messenger. It can also mean
“angel” in the supernatural sense of those mysterious beings who are waiting and serving around God’s throne and
doing tasks God assigned them. Secondly, the angel of YHWH is conveyed as YHWH at places (i.e., Zech. 3). Thirdly,
the author of Hebrews in the NT is overtly presenting a Christocentric angelology, meaning that the author of
Hebrews plays on the equivocal meanings above by comparing Christ to the angels, but, as the proclamation to the
entire book of Hebrews announces (vv. 1 – 3), He is the supreme messenger/angel of God (Heb. 1:1 – 14).
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objected that no prominent contemporary Old Testament scholars would interpret the text of
Genesis 18 – 19 as has been done here. This is to be expected, though, since the biblical theology
task is not the canonical or systematic theological task. The tasks are different, but they provide
results that reciprocially inform each other.321
The discontinuity — despite all the Western Church owes St. Augustine — of the
formula, “the New Testament is concealed in the Old and the Old is revealed in the New,” is a
bit too strong. To say that the New is altogether concealed in the Old dissembles the evidence of
Old Testament Scripture, resulting in a difficult concession to Islam.322 Based on these limited
aforementioned observations, the New Testament is intimated in the Old and the Old Testament
is explicated in the New. Said in biblical fashion, the OT provides the seed (intimation), and the
New Testament unpacks the seed unto Christ (explication).323 Rather than claiming that the New
Testament is concealed in the Old Testament, an appeal can be made to the Torah, held to be
Scripture by both Muslims and Christians, which Scripture already indicates some differentiation
of the one God.
Returning to Fairbairn’s advice, these Old Testament observations support Fairbairn’s
prescription to start thinking on threeness before oneness, or threeness in oneness. Threeness is
not to be considered in light of the “Say not Three” mentioned in the Qur’an (Surah 4:171). This
321

The point of all this is that the grammatical historical method of interpretation is only one step in the
theological task. There remains canontical interpretation, intertextuality, retrospective interpretation, and sensus
plenoir, among others.
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St. Augustine, Quaestiones in Heptateuchum, bk. 2, chap. 73; St. Augustine, A Treatise on the Spirit and
the Letter, in Anti-Pelagian Writings, Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 2007,
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf105.xi.i.html, accessed April 20, 2014, chap. 27.
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Paul’s argument (Gal. 3:15 – 19) that seed be taken as singular and not as a collective noun, and, then,
applied to Christ is a teaching already entailed in the Torah itself (cf. Gen. 15:3 – 5 and Num. 24 1 – 20, especially
verse 17). Sailhamer has done phenomenal work in convincingly showing this. John H. Sailhamer, The Meaning of
the Pentateuch: Revelation, Composition, and Interpretation (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2009), chap. 8.
Kindle.
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reference to “Three” is offset against the oneness of Allah immediately following: “Desist, it is
better for you; Allah is only one Allah; far be It from His glory that He should have a son . . . .”
(4:171). The threeness of which Fairbairn speaks is of the Hypostaseis, not the ousia. In other
words, the Christian doctrine of Trinity agrees that “God is only one God,” which it cogently
expresses in terms of ousia. Christianity does deny, though, the Qur’an’s assertion that the Deity
should not have a Son.
To begin with threeness is to begin with the internal differentiation of the Triune God;
threeness, however, does not impugn the oneness of ousia. The vague differentiation internal to
God incrementally revealed across early history (in the canonical books of the Torah) conveys
that this differentiation — which God reveals about Godself — is important for describing and
understanding Who God is. The lynchpin text for all worship of YAHWEH, Deuteronomy 6:4,
presents both a meager averseness against unitary monotheism and a piece of evidence for an
internally differentiated monotheistic God. If understanding YAHWEH to be a unicity is
constitutive of a so-called “pure-monotheism,” why does YAHWEH muddy this purity by
revealing Himself in terminology indicative of some plurality or differentiation?
Fairbairn’s point is sound because human cognitive processes, when thinking about the
Trinity (the epistemic staring point), are sequential. It is not for affirming what the Trinity is
ontologically. In this regard, the Oneness and Threeness must always be held in proportionality,
never with one emphasized more than the other. Is there a basis for thinking of YAHWEH in terms
of diversity from the Torah? Hopefully, the aforementioned texts are evidence of this. The most
important Old Testament text on this matter from the Torah — and perhaps the entire Old
Testament — is Deuteronomy 6:4. It uses ‘ ad instead of ā îd, which undergirds that thinking
of God in terms of some differentiation in the Old Testament is not an imposition of New
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Testament revelation upon the Old. Although a question of theological method, the theologian
may then take another methodological step, or he may even start there: the Old Testament can be
used for systematic theology, following the retrospective interpretive method Jesus commends in
Luke 24:44.
The threeness of the Trinity, therefore, is expressed in the Hypostaseis of the Father, the
Son, and the Holy Spirit. To speak of the ousia (oneness) of the Trinity necessarily leads to
speaking of the threeness, and vice versa.324 Each One of these Hypostaseis is in one ousia
(homoousia) with the other Two, and thereby working, willing, and acting in perichoretic intrarelationships.325 For each Hypostasis is indwelling the other Two, so They are enhypostatically
one (ousia).326 They exist perichoretically, that is, the Hypostaseis exist in mutually
interpenetrating intra-relationships ad extra.327 The extent of this interpenetration (

ōē

)

is complete so that Their ousia is one and the same.
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Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 29.2 and 31.14.
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St. John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith, 186 and 202; St. Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 1, chap.
12. Kindle; Volf, Allah, 130 – 131 and 137 – 138. St. John of Damascus’ comments on the one nature and activity of
God is one of the best summaries on the matter (202): “The abiding and resting of the Persons in one another is not
in such a manner that they coalesce or become confused, but, rather, so that they adhere to one another, for they are
without interval between them and inseperable and their mutual indwelling is without confusion. For the Son is in
the Father and the Spirit, and the Spirit is in the Father and the Son, and the Father is in the Son and the Spirit, and
there is no merging or blending or confusion. And there is one surge and one movement of the three Persons. It is
impossible for this to be found in any created nature.”
326

The use of enhypostasis follows the terminology laid out in chapter two: that one hypostasis only exists
in the other hypostaseis of the Trinity. With this said, St. John of Damascus identifies at least three different ways
this term can be used; the denotation used here resides closest to the second he describes. St. John of Damascus, The
Philosophical Chapters, chap. 44.
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I have outlined the development of perichoresis in Gregory Nazianzen and Maximus the Confessor in
my article. Brian Scalise, “Perichoresis in Gregory Nazianzen and Maximus the Confessor,” Eleutheria 2 no. 1
(2012), 58 – 76. The following citations represent the data investigated in this article. Gregory Nazianzen, Epistle
CI, sec. 4; Oration 18.42; Oration 30:6: there are two references in
ō ō, the verbal form of
ō ē here;
Oration 31.14; Maximus the Confessor, Quaestiones Ad Thalassium; Ambiguum 2; Ambiguum 3; Ambiguum 4;
Ambiguum 5; and Second Letter to Thomas. Maximus’ works were not investigated exhaustively, but those listed
were analyzed closely.
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A consequence of taking each One as fully enhypostatically abiding in the other Two is
that each One may be considered autotheos, God in Himself.328 It is impossible to divide the
ousia, but, because of the limitations of human cognition and language, the Father, or the Son, or
the Spirit might be the object of the mind’s attention.329 The human mind’s epistemic weakness
may only have One in view, but to mentally attend to any One of Them is to attend to all Three:
Philip asks Jesus to show him the Father with Jesus’ response being, “Have I been with you so
long, and you still do not know me, Philip” (John 14:8 – 9)?330 Each Hypostasis of the Trinity
perichoretically and homoousially share divinity in common with the other Two because They
are “one in ousia, Three in properties.”331 The dynamic reality of the one divine essence/ousia is
fully the Father’s, fully the Son’s, and fully the Spirit’s, thus the Hyposteseis are equal in every
respect, one Monarchia, one Greatness, ergo one God.332 St. John of Damascus precludes the
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Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 29.2; 31.14; and 40.41.
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Hence, the importance of analogies, or vestigia (trace, imprint) in this world, are not to be scoffed at
although every analogy for the Trinity only goes so far before it fails to represent the Trinity. St. Augustine, On the
Trinity, bk. 9, chap. 5. Kindle. Augustine’s analogy of mind, knowledge, love is does well to represent much truth
about the Trinity. Timothy of Baghdad, Apology for Christianity, pt. 1.Timothy of Baghdad offered a number of
interesting analogies: the human body and an apple in terms of its wholeness, scent, and taste. He also uses the sun
and light, but this one is quite common.
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St. John of Damascus, The Orthodox Faith, 186; Gregory Nazianzen, Oration XL, chap. XLI.
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Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 31.9. “What then, say they, is there lacking to the Spirit which prevents His
being a Son, for if there were not something lacking He would be a Son? We assert that there is nothing lacking—
for God has no deficiency. But the difference of manifestation, if I may so express myself, or rather of their mutual
relations one to another, has caused the difference of their Names. For indeed it is not some deficiency in the Son
which prevents His being Father (for Sonship is not a deficiency), and yet He is not Father. According to this line of
argument there must be some deficiency in the Father, in respect of His not being Son. For the Father is not Son, and
yet this is not due to either deficiency or subjection of Essence; but the very fact of being Unbegotten or Begotten,
or Proceeding has given the name of Father to the First, of the Son to the Second, and of the Third, Him of Whom
we are speaking, of the Holy Ghost that the distinction of the Three Persons may be preserved in the one nature and
dignity of the Godhead. For neither is the Son Father, for the Father is One, but He is what the Father is; nor is the
Spirit Son because He is of God, for the Only-begotten is One, but He is what the Son is. The Three are One in
Godhead, and the One Three in properties . . . .”
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St. John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith, 186.
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danger of thinking in composition, saying, “without any composition or blending such as is the
coalescence of Sabellius.”333
P

ō ēsis was developed to convey the reality of the three Hypostaseis residing within

each Other, the Father in the Son, the Son in the Father, the Spirit in the Father, and the Spirit in
the Son, while excluding notions of mixing or composing.334 It is in this sense that saying each
Hypostasis is perichoretically related is also to say that Each is enhypostatically in the Others ad
extra, but without confusion or division although demanding distinctions of the Hypostaseis.
P

ō ēsis serves the theological purpose of clarifying how the Hypostaseis are one rather than

separate the Hypostaseis of the Triune God because it provides a kind of “conceptual bridge” for
connecting the “how” or “mode of being” of the Hypostaseis intimately to the “what” of the
ousia. The homoousion already implies distinctions since it means “same being,” intimating the
“same to whom” question noted earlier in the “Survey of the Literature” section.335 The
Hypostaseis are not only in relationships, but in intra-relationships, which, borrowing Torrance’s
term, may be called “divine-onto-reltationships.”336 Each Hypostasis of the Trinity is only who
He is based on the divine-onto-relationships inherent to Him; and this coinherent unity is one
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Ibid, 187.
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Scalise, “Perichoresis,” 58 – 76. How this comes about in Gregory of Nazianzus and how his thought is
advanced by Maximus the Confessor is the topic of this article.
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Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 166. “Thus in their Communion in Love with one another
they are three Persons, one Being. Their differences from each other as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, instead of
separating them from one another involve a ‘sort of ontological communication’ between them, and as such are
constitutive of their Unity in Trinity and their Trinity in Unity.” Torrance cites Nikos Nissiotis. Nikos A. Nissiotis,
The Orthodox Ethos, ed. A. Philippou (Oxford, 1964), 43.
336

Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 166. “Divine-onto-relationships” need to be distinctly
differentiated from “human-onto-relationships.” The differences include, although not limited to: (1) humans
experience part of their distinction from one another as separation from one another, whereas the Hypostaseis do not
experience Their distinctions by separation; (2) human cognitive oneness is achieved through distinct separation,
whereas “divine cognitive oneness” owes both to the oneness of nature and the perichoretic intra-relations; and (3)
divine relatedness is always utterly open between the Hypostaseis, whereas human relationships always entail
limitation and weakness, wherein open communication is always finite and flawed.
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because of the homoousial nature of the Father, Son, and Spirit.337 It is adequate to say that
perichoresis presents God’s oneness as “k

ō

” because the Father, Son, and Spirit are

inseparatably one and the same nature.338 There is no exact representation of this in creation. To
say, also, that God’s ousia is k

ō

is correct since God is His homoousially one “divine-

onto-relationships” among the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. Whatever qualifies divinity is true
of all three Hypostaseis, that is, They are homoousial to One Another. To think otherwise is to
impose separation into God’s ousia (His inherent nature), mutilating Him by depriving or
separating a Hypostasis from Him and, thereby, rupturing His ousia of a wholative-constitutive
Hypostasis — not a partative-composing Hypostasis.339
Miroslav Volf records al-Razi’s objection to the Trinity based on the incarnation of the
Son only, not the other two Hypostaseis of the Trinity, resulting in more than one divine essence
needed. This objection would only work if the perichoretic mutually constituting Hypostaseis of
the Trinity could be divided, but They cannot. The One ousia of God is the intra-related
Hypostaseis. The Son is in the Father while incarnated (Jn. 10:38). Volf concludes, “. . . the three
337

This term is built from ousia and the prefix, in Greek, homo, which together denotes “same being.” Used
as an adjective, as I have done here, it centers the meaning of the nature of God (ousia theou), not as some lifeless
substratum, but as a nature inherently relationaland lively. Conceptions of a “fourth thing” in the Trinity are
altogether wrong since it introduces a fourth something into who/what God is.
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James Torrance, Worship, 21.
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St. Athanasius, Against Arian, bk. 1, chap. 9 and 29. “. . . the Son, not being a work, but proper to the
Father's essence, always is; for, whereas the Father always is, so what is proper to his essence must always be; and
this is his Word and his Wisdom. . . . For the offspring not to be ever with the Father is a disparagement of the
perfection of his essence." St. John of Damascus, On Heresies, 156. Timothy of Baghdad, Apology for Christianity,
pt. 1. “. . . so also if one separates from God His Word and His Spirit, He will cease to be a rational and living God,
because the one who has no reason is called irrational, and the one who has no spirit is dead. If one, therefore,
ventures to say about God taht there was a time in which He had no Word and no Spirit, such a one would
blaspheme against God, because his saying would be equivalent to asserting that there was a time in which God had
no reason and no life."
The term above, “wholative-constitutive” is designed to note that each of the hypostaseis of the Trinity
occupy the same divine “space” ad extra (on a spatial analogy), so removing any One of the hypostaseis is the same
as removing the entirety of the One God. To repeat, any One of the hypostaseis are only who They are by virtue of
the other hypostaseis residing wholly and perichoretically in Each. Maximus the Confessor makes this point in a
longer way. Maximus the Confessor, Chapters on Knowledge, Second Century, chap. 1.
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“Persons” mutually indwell each other [and] . . . God’s acts towards all that is outside God are
undivided. . . . It is not that one divine “Person” inheres in Jesus, while the other two continue to
remain together in “heaven.” Rather, the one God, in the “Person” of the Word, becomes
incarnate.”340
Does the complexity of the Trinity’s oneness argue on Islam’s behalf since Allah’s
appears easier to understand? The idea of Allah being One prior to creation seems
simple, but, in reality, no one has ever experienced this idea of a lonely unicity. Once someone
thinks he has “got it,” he denounces that he “got it.” Precisely because once someone engages a
lonely omniscient unicity, that omniscient unicity is no longer lonely, but, instead, now in
relationship to the person thinking. Everyone is born in relationships because human conception
is an act of relationships (i.e., sex). Further, a human is his relationships.341 Every human is in
some respects biologically his parents, spiritually related to the Deity, and cognitively related to
parents and others. To affirm the unipersonal nature of Allah — that

allows for neither

external nor internal differentiation — is to affirm a mystery that no human has any concrete
experience of at all. The reality humanity finds itself in is one patently colored by relationships at
every turn. No human knows what it means to exist apart from relationships since it is
impossible for a human not to be in relationships. Therefore, if Muslims claim that the oneness
of Allah is easy to understand, such a claim would not resemble the actual difficulty of the
doctrine.342
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Volf, Allah, 137 – 138.
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This affirmation is to be seen in the light of the earlier comments in chapters one and two.
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Of course, the difficulty is exacerbated when thinking about Allah’s existence in eternity past, but it is
still a difficulty even when thought about in relation to creation. The entire idea of “one-and-another,” as argued in
the last chapter, is altogether creaturely according to Islam, and, so, applying this creaturely concept to Allah is an
utter violation of Allah’s
. Can Muslims affirm that Allah is One without imposing the creaturely idea of “one-
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Does the doctrine of the Trinity’s oneness have difficulties when thought with creation?
Without creation, the Hypostaseis constitute the relationships perfectly and perichoretically that
the one God is homoousially. This ousia (what) is one “in three Hypostaseis” (how), as
Damascene affirmed earlier (chap. 2). Jesus describes His oneness to the Father in the neuter ν
(hen; “one thing”) rather than the masculine εἱς (heis; “one person”), delineating Their oneness
in terms of “what” rather than “who” (John 10:30).343 When thinking of God’s oneness, it is
God’s ousia that is in view. God’s ousia is never to be left unhinged from the distinctions of the
Father, the Son, and the Spirit, and the distinctions of the Hypostaseis should not be left
unmoored from the ousia. The distinctions of the Father, Son, and Spirit, establishes a foundation
for the notion of otherness and personal otherness.344 This is not unimportant towards the
question of God’s oneness in view of creation. Since God is internally differentiated (“the how”
of the Hypostaseis), external differentiation (in creating) does not seem strange, being only an
analogical representation of the differentiation of the Hypostaseis by what is not God (i.e.,
creation).345 The differentiation of creation is explained by the immanent differentiation that
subsists among the Hypostaseis by the manner of Their personal distinctions. The unity and
and-another” onto Him? If not, Islam’s doctrine of Allah, and His oneness, is readily more complex than prima
facie.
343

If “one” was masculine, then this Scripture would support some form of modalism by confusing the
Hypostaseis, but “one” is neuter, leaving open the question of precisely “what” constitutes the Father’s and Son’s
oneness. It is not being suggested that this text teaches that the Father and Son are in one nature (homoousial to One
Another); rather, this text is part of the scriptural theme developed in the New Testament linking Jesus’ identity to
Yahweh’s identity. This “link” led to the theological debates of the second and third century of the Common Era,
culminating in the Nicene Creed (325 C.E.) with its later expansion to the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed (381
C.E.).
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Zizioulas, “Otherness and the Being of God,” in Communion & Otherness. Zizioulas walks through the
dangers of taking “substance” in the Greek philosophical sense as rightly predicated of God. The danger is
introducing a fourth principle in God, rather than just the three. Zizioulas also is uncomfortable with “substance” in
this way because a substance can will nothing. Only persons can will anything to be or to occur. Thus, Zizioulas
maintains that the divinity must be seen to freely and causally flow from the Monarchia of the Father.
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Two of the best discussions of the relationship between contingent reality and God in recent years has
come from the mind of Torrance and Hart. Thomas Torrance, “God and the Contingent Universe,” in Divine and
Contingent Order (Edinburgh: Oxford University Press, 1981). Hart, “Creation,” in The Beauty of the Infinite.
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unities found in creation are explicated by the homoousia of the one God. If irreducibly
complexity is an accurate description of creation’s inherent structural realities, then these unities
are of differentiated type, not the undifferentiated type.346 Thus, the two essential variables for
the equation of contingent creation are established (i.e., unity and diversity) in the nature of God
theTrinity.
Contingent reality is not fully dissimilar from the Trinity, but, rather, the creation is the
Trinity’s analogical correlate in its unity and differentiation.347 Contingent reality does not
invade or question God’s oneness, but creation is its analogical expression.348 God’s ousia is
explained farther by the homoousion, which entails God’s internally differentiation manner of
existing presented by the homoousial Hypostaseis. God’s ousia is expounded by the “samenature-intra-relationships” that He is. Since the Father knows the Son, and the Son the Spirit, and
the Spirit the Father, there is eternally “other known” and “being known.” The blueprint, then,
for what “otherness” involves is intimately present in God’s loving k

ō

. This blueprint only

needs represented, analogically, by those things that are not God, i.e., creations: “And E ō
[pl.] said [sg.], “Let Us make humanity in Our [pl.] image [sg.], like Our [pl.] similitude [sg.]”
(Gen. 1:26; trans., grammatical brackets, and italics mine). Here is the mysterious call of God to
that which is not, and to what is not God. All creation, and any particular being, is always
groundless in itself, having been called from nothingness (i.e., no-thing-ness; not the confused
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Stephen Meyer, Signature in the Cell (Harper’s Collins, 2009). Kindle.
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Hans Urs von Balthasar, Presence and Thought: An Essay on the Religious Philosophy of Gregory of
Nyssa, trans. Mark Sebanc (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1995), 134 and 140. Balthasar cooridinates the external reality
of the visible church with its invisible coherent unity as the mystical Body of Christ, humanity united in terms of
Gregory’s theosis or divinization.
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Zizioulas, Communion & Otherness, 16 – 18.
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“nothing” that, thought to be something underlying being, becomes “something”).349 Each
Hypostasis lives by virtue of the relationships that each One is involved in homoousially and
perichoretically. Thus, the ousia of God includes His koinoniac dynamism, which is constituted
by the perichoretic same-nature-intra-relationships. This dynamic ousia (divine Others in ontorelations) is analogically represented by humans as real contingent others who can become
related to God.350 Since creation is analogically similar to the Trinity in its unity in diversity,
Christianity is not committed to weigh the dissimilarity of the Deity nearly as much as Islam.
The distinctions/otherness of the Hypostaseis are expressed analogically by creating distinct
others, namely, creatures.
With these heavy laden comments on oneness completed, the next sections narrow in on
the matters of distinctness and relatedness. Along the way, just as in chapter three, the doctrine
of the Trinity will have to account for how it can ground the personhood of human persons.
Then, a minor excursus and summary will lay out the Trinity’s relationship to creation in view of
the three categories of oneness, distinctness, and relatedness.
Distinctness
Hypostasis is almost a shorthand way of saying “that which marks distinction in the
Trinity.” To speak biblically of these distinct Hypostaseis in relationships is to speak of the
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Maximus the Confessor, “Chapters on Knowledge,” in Maximus the Confessor: Selected Writings, trans.
and notes George C. Berthold, THE CLASSICS OF WESTERN SPIRITUALITY: A LIBRARY OF GREAT SPIRITUAL MASTERS,
ed. John Farina (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), chap. 6.
This appears to be a syntactic-semantic conclusion based on the verb b ’, taking God as its only subject
across the OT in the creating it indicates (Gen. 1:1).
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The analogy is that of coming to know and love God’s ousia by God’s revelation conjoined with
humanity’s experience and acceptance of that revelation. This is analogical because humanity experiences God’s
ousia always at a distance whereas the hypostaseis know and love perfectly, in perfect perspicuity, and in full
immediate access because They are the one ousia.
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causal relations among the Hypostaseis (John 15:26; John 1:18).351 On the relational taxonomy
presented here, Vanhoozer’s covenantal relations are a helpful supplement.352 This is no denial
of the causal relations, and their impact on Trinitarian thinking down through the ages. When
discussing these causal relations, there must be caution against a certain “metaphysicalism” or
“staticalizing.” The Scriptures’ narratives situate μονογενης (John 1:18;
begotten God/Son”) and ὃ . . . ἐκπορευεται (John 15:26;

k

ē : “only

: Spirit “who proceeds”

from the Father) in contexts of lively love, purpose, and joy (John 1, 15:26, 16:12 – 15; Matt.
3:13 – 17). Simply, these terms are personal; John even breaks grammar rules in order to convey
the personal character of the Spirit by using the masculine demonstrative pronoun ἐκεινος
(ekeinos: “that person”), instead of the neuter ἐκεινο (ekeino: “that thing”), to describe Him in
John 15:26.353 These terms, Father, only-begotten Son/God, and the proceeding Spirit, envisage
activity, love, favor, and joy more than inert notions of causes, substratum, or immobile ideas of
layers. It is better — and certainly paying far more tribute to the lively life of God presented in
the Scripture — to use a woman pregnant in the womb to talk of the Trinity than depersonalized
ideas.354 Perhaps someone could even dare to speak of sex along with the entire procreational
351

It is observable from early church history (Origin) to the Trinitarian expert, St. John of Damascus. St.
John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith, 182; Origin, On First Principles, 1.2.2. Origin is careful to note just how
personal the Son, God’s Wisdom, is.
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Vanhoozer is not the first to notice the personal character needed to talk of God the Trinity. Sergius
Bulgakov, The Wisdom of God: A Brief Summary of Sophiology (London: Williams and Norgate, 1937), 24 – 25;
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pleasure as better analogies than the doldrums of depersonalized metaphysical speech. Of course,
using the analogy God has chosen for Himself is far too risky; it is better to build a wall around
God in the stolidity of onto-theological discourse.355 Earlier (chap. 2), attention was paid to
Genesis 1:26 – 28 and 2:24. ’ā ā in 1:26 is best translated as “humanity” since verse 27
clarifies that ’ā ā refers to both male and female (they together are the image of God). Then
after God blesses them, He commands them to have sex to fill the earth (“Be fruitful and
multiply”). It is the very first thing God commands of humanity in Genesis 1. The causal notions
of the Father, begotten, and proceeding have prominence of place in any presentation of the
Trinity, but ever linked to the personal analogies humans offer in their various creative
endeavors, especially the analogy of procreation, if, at least, we are to listen/obey strictly to
God’s self-chosen analogy in Genesis 1:26 – 28 and 2:24.
The term Father has been used in four ways in both Scripture and in theological
constructions, although only two of them are of current concern. It refers both to the one LORD
God as the Father of all things,356 but antecedently it refers to the Hypostasis of the Father.357 In
this latter sense, Father is a relative term, always demanding a Son.358 Further, God is Spirit.359
Thus the Hypostasis of the Father takes no superiority over the Son and the Spirit because, for
355

There is the larger question of whether onto-theology should be performed at all. The metaphysical
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Dogmatics, all could say, “God is,” despite even this deficiency of language. Jesus quotes Exodus 3:6 in Matthew
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in the Hebrew of Exodus 3:6.
356

Exod. 4:22; Isa. 1:2, 63:16, 64:8; Jer. 31:9, 3:19, 3:4; Hos. 11:1; Deut. 8:5, 32:6; Mal. 1:6; Ps 103:13;
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the Father to be Father, He is homoousially constituted with the Son and Spirit (1 Cor. 2:10 –
12). Nevertheless, the one LORD God is always orderly, the taxis of the Trinity forever being
Father, Son, and Spirit, concretized in Scriptural economic revelation.360 This taxis refers to
position, not rank, to disposition, not class, and to relational unity, not to hierarchical disunity. 361
The definition of “Father” as the one God of all creation is also a relative term, because
creation must exist for God to become the Father of it. This denotation for Father is a synonym
for Creator. The idea that the Deity might become Someone different than He was before
creation was a difficulty for Islam’s view of Allah. Does that same problem occur here? The
doctrine of God the Trinity presents the Hypostasis of the Father as eternal and, therefore, a
Father antecedent to creation. The one God as Father to creation is an expression of this former
eternal role — and as will be shown below, the act of “creating” includes all the Hypostaseis.
This giving life to creation, of course, is done analogically since God the Father of the Son does
not give life to creation in the same way that He gives life to the Son (John 5:26). Concerning the
latter, Origen rightly observed that “Wisdom was generated before any beginning that can be
either comprehended or expressed.”362 Origen is referring to the divine Logos when He speaks of
Wisdom in this context, and, just before in the same chapter, Origen says that the Son is born
“without any beginning.”363 A father is a life giver. This statement holds true when thinking of
God the Father of the Son, God the Father of creation, and for every human father and their
offspring. As the Father is a Father to the Son by timeless generation (ἀχρόνος) internal to the
immanent Trinity so also is He the Father of creation external to the immanent Trinity, not by
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timeless generation, but by spatio-temporally creating contingent creatures.364 It follows that if
He is the Father of creation, likewise are the other Hypostaseis since the Three in Their ever
living k

ō

constitute the one God and Father of all creation. The point of all this is that God

does not find Himself becoming a Father, but, instead, is a Father both before creating and after
(Eph. 3:14 – 15).
These distinctions of the Hypostaseis in the Trinity do not violate their oneness in either
ousia or working.365 Enough space has been devoted to the oneness of ousia, so a word on Their
working will supplement. Any suppositions that there are three consciousnesses independent of
One Another in the Trinity are dissimilar Scripture because whatever the Father does, the Son
does likewise, and whatever the Father gives, the Son gives, and the Holy Spirit gives (John
16:14 – 15).366 The best analogy for understanding the one activity and “intra-related
consciousness” is the harmony of music, or the elaborations of Scripture itself.367 God is a poet,
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taking themes in the Old Testament (intimations; e.g., Gen.3:15: seed, protoevangelion) and
elaborating them in restatements and creative presentations later (explication; e.g., Christ) of
earlier content. The Hebrew poetry of the Old Testament also provides large scores of synthetic
parallelism, where one line is restated with further explanation. The goal is to refuse to
understand the Father’s statements as exactly repeated in the exact same ways by the Son (and
the Spirit). There is no way to make sense of the I/Thou discourses between the Father and the
Son in the Gospels if this is done (e.g., John 12:28). If the Hypostaseis are presented as three
centers of consciousness, then the homoousial and perichoretic intra-relational communication of
these “centers of consciousness” need to be stressed.
One possible interpretation of Jesus’ baptism, aiming to stress “oneness-in-threeness”
communication, is that the Father’s voice from heaven points out the Father’s Word (Christ is
even that Word then) and the Father’s delight (well-pleased). The Son is that Word elaborated in
humanity even as Jesus sanctifies Himself in baptism. The Spirit glorifies the Son by creatively
illuminating Him as the One the Father glorifies in the Father’s pleasure in the Son. All this is
one expression, though, inasmuch as God’s pleasure is packaged together with holiness/sanctity
and glory/illumination. Another interesting point is that baptism itself is a sign of coming into
union with the Trinity, either by the Gospels’ imagery (but especially Luke-Acts; Acts 1:5; Luke
3:16) of Christ baptizing someone into the Spirit or the Pauline imagery of the Spirit baptizing
someone into Christ (Romans 6: 1 – 4; 1 Cor. 12:12 – 13).
Apocalypse (Revelation), noting their elaborations. Then, the artwork of the Christian catacombs is analyzed to note
or record any similar thematic elaborations or favorite themes from Scripture. Karl Barth uses “aesthetically” to
convey the subjective side of experiencing the beautiful in terms of the emotions of joy, gladness, pleasure, and
delight. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. I/II (Peabody: Hedrickson, 2010), 652 – 654. Beale and McDonough
point out the donation (intimation) and later elaboration (explication) by the imagery of the Temple in Ezekiel
becoming a garden city in the Apocalypse (Book of Revelation). G. K. Beale and Sean McDonough, “Revelation,”
in Commentary on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament, eds. Beale and D. A. Carson (Grand Rapids:
Baker Academic and Apollos, 2007), 1085.
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What is needed is a tertium quid between appropriating someone else’s speech/thought
and isolated formulation of one’s own speech/thought. On the human analogy, each person
knows that the thoughts of her mind (consciousness) are a confluence of her own thoughts
together with the appropriated thoughts of others. Child development towards speech is a fine
example. A child’s hearing and appropriating those phonetic speech/thoughts is united with some
measure of creativity of his own. Another helpful analogy is beauty because it is a union of
content with form (on a classical-objective model of beauty).368 Although the activity of thought
of the Trinity is one, this requires identity of content, not homogeneity of expression. The
oneness of thought in the Trinity takes as part of its formation those distinctives proper (i.e.,
properties) to the Hypostaseis, however the “movement occurs” — from Father, by the Son, in
the Spirit or a harmonic symphony in Their choral thunderings. An example of this might be
God’s thought to save humanity by giving of Himself. The Father gives by giving up His Son to
death, and the Son gives by giving Himself and, positively, taking on humanity so as to articulate
the giving the Father does (the divine cannot suffer and die). The Spirit gives by guiding the Son
on earth in the Son’s purpose of giving Himself, that purpose likewise the Father shares, and the
Spirit gives of Himself by indwelling and, so, linking humanity to God’s relationships in himself
in God’s k

ō

of joy, gladness, and love. All of this, linked intimately to the homoousia, is

one thought, motion, and activity of the one God giving of Himself variously stylized (content
expressed in different forms) by the Hypostaseis. The “taking up,” i.e. appropriating, of another’s
thought does not demand homogeneity but just referential identity.369 Variously expressing the
thought-content does not suppose deficiency of the initial thought, but, in the fellowship of the
368
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Trinity, there is already laid out the gratuitous play of variation, creatively expressed in the
“styles” proper to each Hypostasis. After all, my thought is always distinctly mine, but never
without influence from others. Every person who has ever written a research paper, cited
someone else, quoted a movie, retold a joke, sang along with a song, or reenacted some event
knows that his or her thought is richly communal, that is, human cognitive oneness occurs.
According to the Trinitarian ethos, the isolated psyche is a myth, a mythos denying the intrinsic
reality of the world endowed with relationships.
Artistry, then, is a better cognitive metaphor for dealing with God the Trinity than
metaphysics or rote depersonalized analogies.370 God’s self-chosen analogy of humanity in unity
(Gen. 1:26 – 28, 2:24), especially in the aspect of procreation, highlights the artistic dimension of
humanity. Creativity, procreativity, and play are all connoted in artistic expression and sexual
activity (within marriage). Similarly, Jesus notes the importance of children, those who make up
the kingdom of heaven (Matt. 18:2 – 3). What is childlike? It is hard to bring what a child is like
to mind without ushering in the attendant realities of laughter, playfulness, and creativity: in a
word, gratuity. Both the image of humanity in Genesis and the image of a child in the Gospels
are analogies for what God is like. God is identified by his gratuity in the sense that He never has
needs (He is the prodigal God; Luke 15:11 – 32): the perichoretic intra-relationships among the
Hypostaseis are similarly qualified by this unending playful (without a need) k

ō

. By

analogy, humans experience human cognitive oneness, experienced by all in the days of their
childhood. In sex and in the offspring so produced, there is a biological oneness in humanity. A
child is the best example of being of the same substance of the parents although distinct as well:
Trinitarian indeed. These are all analogies, but God’s chosen analogies. In view of this
370
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discussion, God’s chosen analogy of humanity in relationships precludes the worn out baggage
of isolated consciousness while retaining distinctness (with separateness) of human persons
within the broader reality of relationships, in love, in sex, in human cognitive union, in play, and
in worship of the one God, Father, Son, and Spirit, Three in One.
Relatedness
By means of recapitulation, the former discussions laid out the following on the
relationships in the Trinity. God is internally differentiated, and, as a consequence, God is never
lonely. Humans may be limited in their epistemic abilities, but if the human mind attends to One
of the Hypostasis, it necessarily attends to all Three since They are homoousially united in Their
perichoretic “divine-onto-relationships.” God chose humanity in relationships (male and female;
uniting in one flesh) as His analogy, His image bearer(s). Similarly, the important Hebrew term
’e

(“one” in Genesis 2:24) is used to describe YHWH in Deuteronomy 6:4, which suggests

some internal differentiation or diversity. Considerable amount of space was spent on the
“working” of all three Hypostaseis of the Trinity. Whatever is done by Them, it is done
homoousially and perichoretically together, hand-in-hand. This working together is not strange
in view of Their having Their ousia together. They are One God and so cannot be divided, in acts
or ousia. P

ōē

prescribes the intra-related, interpenetrated, unconfused, wholly

coinherent, unmixed, and lively dynamism of the Hypostaseis of the Trinity. This term speaks to
ousia and the relationships that the homoousia is (onto-relations). Each Hypostasis of the Trinity
is so enhypostactically (ad extra) related that a removal (if possible) of One Hypostasis would be
a removal of a wholative-constitutive Hypostasis. In other words, God would cease to be.
Except for the distinctions (properties), each Hypostasis has proper to Himself all things
are shared in common. These properties differentiate in terms of each Hypostasis’ manner of
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existing in the relations God is. Thus, there is no difference whatsoever in the ousia each
Hypostasis of the Trinity are. As conveyed in the economic revelation deposited in Scripture,
there is genuine recognition and response among the Hypostaseis. There is some measure of
I/Thou-ness. Thus the k

ō

that God is among the Hypostaseis includes “other known” and

“being known.” Reciprocity obtains, explained to some degree by their stylized form of
communication. Although the Hypostasis of the Father is viewed as the fons divitatas, and the
Planner of creation, redemption, and eternity, the Son is not in slavish obedience. The Spirit is
not either by extension; neither the Son nor the Spirit can be since the monarchia of God is true
of all three Hypostaseis. Jesus is free to lay down His life and take it up (John 10:17 – 18). The
Father’s love is evidenced by this “charge” He gave the Son. There is a unity here between
obedience and freedom.371 This makes sense in view of the covenantal intra-relationships God is.
Love is demonstrable in the Trinity by way of trusting, fulfilling, obeying, allowing for
freedom, recognizing, rejoicing, delighting, knowing and being known, and orderliness. The
Holy Spirit is also the Spirit of Truth. All three of these characteristics are shared by the Father
and the Son: They are Both holy, Both Spirit, and Both the Truth. The Spirit’s personal nature
must be emphasized because He does not only act as a sort of hub in Whom the Son and Father
meet, but He engages in the delight of the Father, the recognition and being recognized by the
Son, and creative elaboration of the life of the Son (i.e., four Gospels emphasizing different
themes), who is the perfect Image of the Father. All this is observable in the baptism of Jesus.
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The Spirit is part of the advocacy team that the Son and Him make, for They are Both sent, Both
Illuminators, and Both the joy of God (Romans 14:17). This list and these comments could no
doubt be extended, but that would be a digression. This is sufficient to show the true personal
nature and true relatedness the Spirit is in with the Father and the Son. Echoing back to the
Augustinian formula appropriated by some Muslims, the love of God the Trinity consists in
Lover (Father), Beloved (Son), and Love (Spirit). Thus love based on the Trinity is not a vortex
of self, self, and self. Instead, it is a picture of love defined by being for the other, in the other,
and with the other. Love here is profoundly relational and makes others necessary for love to
occur at all.
Humans on this paradigm are designed to be interrelatedly together (not intra-relatedly
like the Trinity); this is integral to humans being personalized. God the Trinity shows that the
antecedent reality that constitutes “a human person” is one of love: for the other, in the other
(cognitive or sexual, as appropriately applied), and with the other. God the Trinity is always
faithful to His Word and Spirit, both in keeping to His Word and remaining consistent in His
Spirit, both in the divine-onto-relations the Father has to the Son and in the divine-onto-relation
the Father has to the Spirit. Similarly, the Word is an articulation of the Spirit (which is the Spirit
of the Father and Son) and the Spirit the intimate logic of that Word — the Spirit probes the very
depths of God (1 Cor. 2:10). What does it mean for a human to be personalized in view of this
theology of anthropology? Human community, or k

ō

, is always necessary for

personalization. One’s mind must express one’s word and remain true to what one speaks
(Vanhoozer’s ipse-identity formation). In so doing, one’s spirit is either formed into being
characterized by covenant-keeping (staying true) or covenant-breaking. The contours of love are
spelled out well by the above phrases: for the other, in the other, and with the other. A human in
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relationship must be for the good (as designed by God) of the other: care, concern, moral
excellence, and enduring faithfulness. He must be intimately united as well (in the other), either
by human cognitive union or, in marriage, sexual union or, in begetting, biological union. There
is nothing quite so satisfying than being known so well that a friend or spouse might know what
will be said, thought, or acted on next (fruit of human cognitive union). Lastly, to love like the
Trinity is to be share life communally, but this community among humans is interrelational
rather than intra-relational. This is expressed solidly in steadfastness and faithfulness. Christians
especially are to abide together as this is connected to abiding in God (1 John 3:23 – 24). To
mimic God’s love in God the Trinity so as to be personalized is to be in community, unity in and
despite distinctions, cognitive/sexual/biological harmony, refusing full homogenizing, and to
refuse isolation. That is, humans are to be in an oneness together (like the Trinity), distinct
within that unity (like the Trinity), and harmoniously related, just as God the Trinity.
Conclusion
This wide-ranging discussion through Trinitarian dogma is admittedly quick.
Investigating the Trinity by the three categories of oneness, distinctness, and relatedness
demanded certain theological terminology to qualify these. The discussion above was especially
fluid because of the striking entailments the Trinity expresses: to speak of oneness brings with it
distinctness and relatedness, and to speak of distinctness, oneness and relatedness, of relatedness,
distinctness and oneness. There are high points that are worthy of repeating before moving into
the comparative conclusion of this dissertation.
The Trinity refuses to be qualified by any formulation of the one or the many. Internal
differentiation is offered instead as the answer the Trinity gives to the most basis quality of
existence. This internal differentiation consists of three hypostaseis. They are not to be viewed as
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compounded or blended; rather, They are one simple essence in three perfect (wholative)
hypostaseis.
Human limitations make formulating and discussing the Trinity difficult because the
cognitive abilities always must have a starting point. Thinking on the matter begins either with
focus on threeness or oneness. This concession, albeit necessary in view of human finitude, does
not repudiate the ontological status of the Trinity as proportionately a one-in-three in and a threein-one.
The Torah, which is shared by Islam and Christianity as Scripture, intimates diversity in
unity. Genesis 18 was especially important since its intimation was stronger than the other
evidences in the Torah. The Gospels do not only intimate internal differentiation of the one God,
but narrates how Jesus is God but can converse with the Father all the same. A theoretical
interpretation of Jesus’ baptism was offered as a potential articulation of this truth. Appropriated
speech with the same referential identity in various stylizations is possible, even in the human
realm, so how much more so with the perfect direct communication shared among the
hypostaseis in the one ousia that They are.
The one ousia of God is His onto-relationships as Torrance has said so well in recent
years. Perichoresis serves the distinctions well by highlighting difference while indicating
perfect coinherence — i.e., enhypostactically ad extra — thereby supporting utter unity. There is
no perfect analogy for this in creation; ergo, God the Trinity has a mysterium that goes beyond
creaturely reality, but not without considerable analogies. St. Augustine’s analogy of
mind/thought/love can be complemented by the analogies of word/thought/love and
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beauty/form/matter. To repeat, these are only analogical expressions, not identical
representations (but the Son of God is).
The Deity as Trinity will be compared with the Deity as Allah to see which doctrine
better accounts for the Deity’s chosen analogy of humans in relationships (Gen. 1:26 – 28; 2:24).
After this paratactic comparison, some consequences will be outlined. These are both in terms of
practical and theoretical ramifications.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
Introduction
A paratactic comparison concludes this dissertation. First, a short section in this
introduction readdresses the issue of Islam’s affirmation that humans are not made in the image
of the Deity, thus questioning the criteria and abductive argumentation used throughout this
work. Next, each salient point derived from chapters three and four on oneness, distinctness, and
relatedness are compared, considered both without creation (or before the Deity created) and
with creation (after the Deity created). Following this, there is a chart that simplifies all of this
data into an easily accessible form. Then, a return to the thesis of this project is revisited in view
of the foregoing analyses to demonstrate the Trinity’s eminence over

Allah in both

explanatory depth and scope. Lastly and in closing, some foreseeable consequences from this
investigation and promising trajectories are outlined.
Humanity is not completely dissimilar to Allah according to Islam
A segment of thought in Islam is that man is nothing like Allah. This is in opposition to
Genesis 1:26 – 28 and 2:24, understood in the Christian tradition as humanity being in God’s
image, His supreme analogy. Before looking at why it seems that Allah is like humans, it is
notable that this comparison would be legitimate even if this Muslim position could be
convincingly defended: that man is nothing like Allah. The Trinity would still be a far more
explanatory thesis towards explaining human relational reality than “dissimilar”

Allah.

Perhaps some Muslims will say, “Of course that is so; humanity is absolutely dissimilar to Allah
since Allah’s thirteen essential attributes include the attribute of dissimilarity.” Muslim denial of
the similarity between Allah and man would affirm that Allah does not explain human reality
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and relating; ergo, the explanation of the Trinity would be leaps and bounds beyond Islam in its
explanatory depth. The Muslim allegation that Islam does not teach that Allah is similar to
humanity, though, seems to give them an easy escape and weakens the potency of this critique of
Islam. Therefore, a brief review of some points from chapter two revisits why the Muslim denial
of the similarity between Allah and humanity is unconvincing.
The Qur’an uses creaturely analogies to describe Allah, likening Him to creation and
personal relationshiops of humans. One-and-another relationships arrive according to Islam by
the act of creation. Muslims can relate to Allah, which, in turn, means that Allah shares in that
relationship. Thus, as part of analogical predication (cf. chap. 2), there is some univocal meaning
of “human relating” that is common to and therefore rightly predicated of Allah as well. This
makes Him like humans in His relating even if the disparate elements in analogical predication
vastly outweigh the univocal elements. More significant is communication. Specifically,
communicative-speech is a human experience. This idea precedes humanity’s creation in Islam
because the Qur’an, Allah’s Speech, is eternal. The notion of Allah and His Speech being a
means of communication is an eternal reality, and humans find themselves in the same situation
in regard to using speech to communicate. Therefore, the human reality of speech and relating to
others via speech makes Allah and humanity more than “totally dissimilar.” The “ninety-nine
beautiful names” (many of them at the least) demand human realities to give a basis by which to
understand those names applied to Allah — analogically of course. If these “ninety-nine
beautiful names” require human reality and relationships to make them conceivable of Allah,
how does this enforce Allah’s complete disparity from humanity? It does not, but, rather,
reinforces the sameness (univocity) between Allah and humanity. To object that the “ninety-nine
beautiful names” do not teach anything about who Allah is (or what His essence involves) is
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ta’tîl, divesting Allah of His attributes. It would further pit someone against Al-Ghazālī’s
position, who a fortiori did allow for analogical interpretation. Claiming Allah to be “utterly
other” is near to if not full agnosticism. Lastly, “other” is a term and concept derived from
creation. To use it in the phrase “utterly other” is to predicate something of Allah that is
creaturely, namely, “otherness” (cf. chap. 3, semantic issues). It is to be recalled at this point that
the nature of Allah provides no grounding for “otherness.”
Affirming a transcendence of Allah that makes Him utterly beyond violates
because Muslims are vehement in their affirmation that Allah is One, indicating the unipersonal
nature of Allah and His simplicity. To affirm

, Muslims must apparently use the

creaturely concrete “single thing,” abstract from that the imagined idea of unrelated,
undifferentiated, and lone unicity, and then predicate that of Allah (per Al-Ghazālī’s method in
chap. 2). Unless Allah is to become a transcendental One wholly devoid of any representation in
human reality, this analogical imaginative idea of a lone unicity must be allowed. Perhaps just
thinking of a singular person would be an allowed analogy as well, but if so, then humans are
again like Allah to some degree, however marginal. If it is affirmed that neither of these
analogies are allowed, what is left is an impenetrable transcendence, that is, agnosticism. To say
that Allah is One (

), when there is no way to concretely conceptualize this, evacuates this

saying of meaning (cf. chap. 3, conclusion). Already intimated above, the Qur’an cannot be
considered a book of only guidance without betraying the contents of the Qur’an, like Surah 112,
which indicate things or characteristics of who/what Allah is.
The Qur’an is a book of address, speaking to potential creations that would exist after
Allah created. This suggests that the Qur’an is a true “other” to the extent that it is dissimilar
from Allah by addressing and describing creatures in a conversation only possible after Allah
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creates. This, of course, is not according to the majority Islamic view since Allah and His Speech
are not to be understood binitarianly. The Speech (Qur’an) and Allah form a relationship that is
understandable only in view of the human realities of internal dialogue or relating in a context of
someone else’s speech and oneself. Each person often speaks in such a way to disclose
something of themselves and to direct others’ thoughts just like the Qur’an discloses something
of Allah and directs humanity. Al-Ghazālī, Ibn Taymīyya, and Ibn ‘Arabī’s tendency to see all
reality as illusory or somehow one is understandable — more or less depending on which of
these persons is in view.372 If all reality is illusory or somehow monistically (emanation) one,
then many of these critiques are avoided since all would just be Allah. Taking this stance is a
fundamental refusal of realism and of the doctrine of contingent reality — which is a major trend
following Ibn Taymīyya’s affirmation even if he, in other places, speaks in emanationist terms.
A final tangent concern before moving into the bulk of this chapter involves the nature of the
Qur’an in view of Allah. If the Qur’an is not fully representative of Allah, then how is it
retractable to Allah’s essence as

demands? If the Qur’an is considered actually other,

then how does not shirk occur, the Qur’an being associated with Allah as something separate
from Him and dissimilar from Him in some measure?
Paratactic Comparison
Oneness
Without creation, oneness in Islam conveyed by

means uniqueness and

simplicity, conveying that Allah is unipersonal with no internal differentiation. In Christianity,
oneness is conveyed by God’s ousia, which involves the “manner of existing” of the three
Hypostaseis, who are perichoretically related, homoousially one, and enhypostatically in one
372
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another ad extra. With creation,

has to deal with the problem of plurality and difference.

Differentiation obtains at the time of creation according to the logic of

because this

differentiation has no precedent in Allah Himself prior to creation. Differentiation in Christianity
has the internal logic of the Trinity’s internal differentiation as its precedent. Islam cannot say
that Allah just analogically represents the logic of Himself since differentiated reality is
antithetical to

Allah. Christianity, however, can affirm that that is precisely what

occurs. The logic of differentiation is already set within God the Trinity, and, so, reality is
merely an analogical representation of “unity in divesity.”
Distinctness
There is no otherness in Allah prior to creation. There is otherness in the Trinity prior to
creation in the three hypostaseis that God is. There is no recognition and response of another in
Allah before creation. There is both response and recognition in God the Trinity prior to creation.
In Islam, creation introduces others (otherness), either as illusory (emanation) or a true others
(contingent). If creatures are true others, then dualism and/or plurality obtain. This makes Allah
the Different One among other different ones, but without any substantiation of how “Allah the
One” could produce diversity. If illusory, then others are just apparitions, oddly seeming to be
real. This idea of Allah being a Different One among different ones occurs at the time of creation
since differentiation prior to this was not. Others are always already present in God the Trinity.
The logic of different ones among different ones is inherent in the perichoretic same-nature-ontorelationships that God is. Thus created reality with all its different ones is, again, an analogical
representation of the Trinity.
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Relatedness
There is no communion in Allah prior to creation; God the Trinity is communion before
creation. In Islam, community obtains by creation; in Christianity, community is only patterned
after the community that God’s ousia is by virtue of His perichoretic same-nature-ontorelationships. If reality is illusory as some strands of Islamic thought offers, then community is
never formed. Christianity refuses to suppose that community is illusory since this would oppose
the internal differentiation that the Trinity is and God’s self-chosen analogy of humanity in
community (Genesis 1:26 – 28; 2:24).373
(Dissimilarity), Transcendence, and Creation
Allah’s dissimilarity (

;

) likens Allah to creation since differentiation

arrives with the coming of creation. Uniqueness before creation has no standing in Allah since
uniqueness supposes difference, but there is no difference internally or externally to Allah prior
to creation. God the Trinity has room for uniqueness and dissimilarity in the hypostaseis God is.
In Him, difference is already conveyed in the Hypostaseis, and uniqueness is only an extension
of the idea of difference. Christianity takes creation as an analogical representation of who and
what God is, but otherness in humanity is different than that of the Trinity since human otherness
entails separateness whereas the homoousial and hypostatic otherness in the Trinity is
inseparable. Christianity does not hold that God is totally dissimilar to creation, but, instead, says
that creation is similar and dissimilar to Him (which is what an analogy does; Gen. 1:26 – 28;
2:24; Rom. 1:20). The affirmation of Allah’s utter transcendence, i.e., dissimilarity, (

;

historic attributes; Surah 112) violates the dissimilarity it is aiming to establish because the logic
of one-and-another is entirely creaturely according to Islam, and so, likens Allah to creatures

373

Torrance, Divine and Contingent Reality, 34 – 38.
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rather than distances Him from them. It cannot be claimed that Allah is “utterly other” without
violating the claim: it is self-referentially defeating. Muslims who hold that Allah is utterly other
(radical transcendence) cannot claim that nothing from creation is predicable of Allah, but then
affirm that the positive attribute of

is known. It is a contradiction. If Al-Ghazālī’s

analogical predication is permitted, then Allah is the same to humanity in some ways and
disparate from them in others. Can “otherness,” though, be predicated of Allah even on AlGhazālī’s analogical process of predication? If “otherness” is a predicate only proper to
creatures, then it cannot, but, if it cannot, then how is it possible to think that Allah is
transcendent but still accessible?374 Transcendence on Christianity allows for dissimilarity to
stand (omniscience, self-sufficient, etc.) while allowing the “one-and-anotherness” of creatures
to analogically represent God the Trinity’s “one-and-anotherness” that the hypostaseis are
perichoretically. The logic of “one-and-another” of creatures analogically represents the divine
reality in Christianity while it is altogether contrary to Allah as lone and solitary in Islam.
Semantic Matters towards describing Allah vis-à-vis the Trinity
Representing what a lone unicity is prior to creation in Islam is difficult to convey
semantically because once someone tries to articulate it, they are in violation of the lone unicity
idea they are seeking to put forward. The Trinity before creation is more tenable based on the
creaturely analogy of “one-and-another” that is represented all over creation. The Trinity is never
lonely, so to think of God the Trinity in lone terms is always to not attend rightly to the Trinity.
Thus, the one relating to the Trinity is affirming the reality He tries to understand. He is always
an “other” thinking of “another” (and so two), thus experiencing “one-and-anotherness”
374

“Transcendence” implies “other,” “separate,” or “distinct.” If “otherness” is not applicable to Allah
because it is a predicate only proper of creatures, then stating that Allah is transcendent will have to make use of an
equivocal meaning for the implied notion of “otherness” entailed in “transcendence.” Thus, the claim that Allah is
transcendent will predicate “otherness” equivocally, leaving whatever “otherness” means of Allah in no way the
same to what “otherness” means predicated of creatures. Thus, Allah’s “otherness” will be unknown (agnostic).
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analogically to the “one-and-anotherness” of the Trinity. In a strict way, nothing in creation
resembles

Allah if irreducible complexity is true, so how does affirming

not

become vacuous without holding to a doctrine of creation as illusion?375 Everything in creation
in its diversity in unity, and human in their intersubjective relationships, analogically represents
the Trinity. To affirm God the Trinity’s oneness and distinctions is accomplishable although not
without its mysterium.
Humanity as Image of Allah vis-à-vis Image of Trinity
No personal distinctness is internal to

Allah, either before or after creation. On

the contrary, personal distinctness is always in God the Trinity before and after creation. The fact
that humanity would be created to be personally distinct from others is antithetical to Allah’s
immanent nature as lone, but the Trinity is the antitype for the analogical representation of
humans as distinct from others. Human persons are always in relationships anywhere they are;
similarly, God the Trinity, as humanity’s antitypical logic, whether focused on the Father, the
Son, or the Spirit, represents this truth. The Hypostaseis of the Trinity are only who They are
based on their enhypostatic relationships. Thus, that any particular human is who they are by
virtue of the relationships he or she is in is not strange.376 This is only an analogical
representation of God the Trinity, but antithetical to Allah unless Muslims concede that Allah’s
identity is constituted together with the creatures He comes into relationship with after creating
(making Allah dependent).

375

For instance: Stephen Meyer, Signature in the Cell (Harper’s Collins, 2009). Kindle. Perhaps a Muslim
might try to appeal to the cosmological idea of a singularity as representing Allah. This will not work, though.
Because Allah is the Creator, the singularity stands in relationship to Allah, thus constituting two things. How would
diversity come out of absolute oneness in the first place?
376

Humans become who they will be as well since they are finite, and so, they lack completion, needing to
become so as to be overcoming this finitude.
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Allah as the personalizing One vis-à-vis the Trinity as the personalizing One
The nature of Allah indicates that if Allah is the Personal One and the One who
personalizes, then becoming truly a person would take exclusion of others. Solitude is necessary
to replicate how Allah existed and how, in a different way, He exists now. In this sense,
community is always in the way of any person becoming personalized since such community is
always an invasion of the necessary solitude to become personal. Contrarily, God the Trinity as
the Personal One and the One who personalizes, based on the inner logic of the Hypostaseis in
intra-relationships, manifests that community is necessary for someone to become truly personal.
Only by being for, with, and in others can someone become personal, that is, truly human —
hence the two greatest commands. Also, as worked out in chapter three, the Qur’an and Allah
showed an inherent tension in this regard because the Qur’an commanded humans to be persons
in a different way than how Allah is a Person, eternally as well as presently. Of course, if the
Muslim’s denial of humanity’s similarity to Allah is correct, the problem is partly resolved.
Above, however, I reviewed why the Muslim claim to the fundamental dissimilarity between
Allah and humans is significantly unconvincing.
The Formula of Lover, Beloved, and Love predicated of Allah vis-à-vis the Trinity
The formula of lover, beloved, and love is heavily different in Islam than in Christianity.
The formula in Islam can be restated as self, self, and self. Allah is the Lover, He loves Himself
(beloved), and the activity of that love is only Allah Himself. In Christianity, the Father is the
Lover, the Son the Beloved, and the Spirit the personal communion and activity who is Love.
The formula in Christianity can be restated as “one among others in loving communion and those
others with the one,” the Father is for, with, and in the Son, the Son in the same way of the Spirit
and the Father, and the Spirit is for, with, and in the Father and the Son.
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Allah
Without Creation
Is humanity
similarity to the
Deity?
What does oneness
mean?

A lone unicity,
unipersonal and
simple; no external or
internal differentiation

What does
distinctness mean?

No otherness,
distinctness; no
recognition and
response to another

What does
relatedness mean?

No communion

What does
or transcendence
mean in view of
creation?

Does not apply since
There would need to
be something from
which to be different
for transcendence or
dissimilarity to obtain

Does humanity
analogically
resemble the
Deity?

No personal
distinctness in Allah

How is a human to
become truly
personal based on
the ontology of the
Deity?
How is the
formula, lover,
beloved, and love
to be understood?

The Trinity
With Creation

Without Creation

Official stance is that
humanity is utterly
dissimilar; many
teachings in Islam
contradict this (as above)
A lone unicity, unipersonl
and simple; external
differentiation created in
an antithetical way to
Allah’s lone existence

With Creation
Humanity is made in the
Image of God; humanity is
God’s supreme analogy

Three homoousial
Hypostaseis
perichoretically related
constituting internal
differentiation but no
external differentiation

Otherness, distinctness
introduced by Allah’s
creating; this otherness
handled as illusory or
contingent
If contingent, communion
obtains in contrast to
Allah’s nature; if illusory,
then communion does not
obtain but only apparent
Since difference occurs
by creation, dissimilarity
likens Allah to creation
rather than utterly
distancing Him from it;
further, that the 99
beautiful names’ needed
analogical explanation
from humanity violates
Allah’s attribute of
dissimilarity
No personal distinctness
in Allah; personal
distinctness comes with
creation, making Allah
dependent on creation for
His relationships; Allah’s
nature is antithetical to
human existence as oneand-another, unity-indiversity

Otherness, distinctness
represented by the
Hypostaseis;
Hypostaseis recognize
and respond
Trinity is communion

Solitary and lone

Self, Self, and Self

Three homoousial
Hypostaseis perichoretically
related (internal
differentiation); external
differentiation created in an
analogical way to the
Trinity’s internal
differentiation
Otherness, distinctness comes
by creation as an analogical
representation of the
otherness, distinctness in the
Trinity
Community of humanity is an
analogical representation of
the Trinity’s communion

Difference is always
already among the
Hypostaseis of the
Trinity; transcendence
does not occur though
until creation

Transcendence of the Trinity
is extends beyond the
sameness entailed in
analogical predication,
allowing for sameness
between creation and the
Trinity and strict disparity as
well (which is what an
analogy does)

There is personal
distinctness as one-andanother, unity-indiversity

There is personal distinctness
as one-and-another, unity-indiversity; ergo, the Trinity is
the antitype of humanity as
one-and-another, unity-indiversity

Humans would need to
avoid community so as to
be solitary and alone to
achieve becoming like
Allah

Community: for, with,
in others

Humans are a means to
articulating Allah’s selflove as this vortex of
Self, Self, and Self; if
humans replicate what
Allah does in this love,
narcissism is love

One for the Others,
with the Others, and in
the Others; the Father
for, with, in the Son
and Spirit, the Son, the
Father and Spirit, the
Spirit, the Son and
Father

Humans would need to make
sure to uphold community by
motions of “for-ness,” “withness” and “in-ness”; this
makes sense of the two
greatest commandments
Humans are to be for others,
with others, and in others in
order to analogical represent
the Trinity
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Return to the Thesis in View of Paratactic Comparison
This dissertation aimed to inquire into the nature of the Deity in view of human
relationships. Humanity’s relational reality is constituted by distinctness, relatedness, and
oneness (hereafter this will just be referred to as “human reality”). Every human is in an
inescapable context of these three things, and these three things are intuitively evident; even as
someone reads this, they assume these. In short hand, does Christianity’s doctrine of Trinity or
Islam’s doctrine of

more adequately explain human relationships and their irrefragable

inescapability? Although much of this dissertation moved back-and-forth between focusing on
the nature of the Deity with creation and focusing on it without creation, in conclusion, it is the
immanent reality of the Deity that is of primary concern. Accordingly, the following comments
emphasize the nature of the Deity when thought without from creation.
The oneness every person has with other persons due to either biological (offspring; sex)
or cognitive oneness intimates — based on the likeness of humanity to the Deity in either Islam
or Christianity — a reality of persons in a union, which constitutes who they are as this oneness.
Allah as the

Deity does not have a framework where His oneness is constituted with

any others, internally or externally, especially as He is immanent in Himself. God the Trinity,
however, is a oneness that is ousia in divine-onto-intra-relationships, explaining the ousia-like
oneness of humanity (biological) and the human cognitive oneness experienced with others via
their interrelationships among other persons. God the Trinity explains the reality of human
oneness while Allah’s oneness can only explain a singular person, isolate and alone, which does
not represent how human reality exists. In terms of explanatory depth,

Allah lacks

resources to explain the biological and cognitive oneness each human experiences every single
day of his life. Allah has no oneness within Him that is constituted by union with others, either in

149

nature (in ousia) or cognitively (meeting of the minds/Hypostaseis/persons). To ground the
oneness humanity experiences finds no basis in Allah, which enlarges the ambiguity in seeking
to explain human oneness according to Islam. Why should the way humans experience oneness
be this way if Allah’s oneness is not that way? Reliance on the attribute of Allah’s dissimilarity
as a means of escape will not suffice since, as the foregoing arguments have demonstrated,
predicating dissimilarity to Allah likens him to humanity rather than distances Him from
humanity. Recalling the logic of

, there was no one for Allah to be in cognitive oneness

with before creation. That humans could come into cognitive oneness with Allah does not help
Islam’s case because this is not a resource mined from what Allah is immanently. Instead, the
possibility of this oneness is a creational resource, only possible with the coming of creation, but
the resource is not patterned after the nature of Allah. For argument’s sake, though, suppose that
a Muslim appeals to the attribute of dissimilarity to successfully escape the question of why
humanity experiences oneness so differently than Allah’s

oneness. Even with a

successful escape, the ambiguity of explicating the human reality of oneness would not be
assuaged in the least. The doctrine of

Allah would still lack resources — or at least

humans would not know what they are — to explain the human reality of oneness. The doctrine
of Trinity, on the contrary, has resources to explain humanity’s experience of both biological
oneness and cognitive oneness. Biological oneness is analogically explained by the homoousia of
the one God and human cognitive oneness is analogically undergirded by the Hypostaseis’
thinking as one — along with willing and acting. The doctrine of the Trinity has sufficient
resources to explain humanity’s biological and cognitive oneness. Furthermore, clarifying how
the nature of the Trinity undergirds and elucidates humanity’s oneness is done with relative ease.
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The distinctness of each human person is obvious, but this distinctness is never bereft of
others’ influence. Hence, human reality only has a definition of “distinctness” within a context of
others. Allah, as lone, neither internally nor externally differentiated before creation, has no
category of “difference” or “distinct” at all. There is no “one-and-another” in Allah before
creation, and so, Allah does not explain the human reality of distinct persons among other
distinct persons. The explanatory depth of the doctrine of

Allah cannot even break the

dirt towards grounding “one-and-another.” Further, Allah’s ability to be a Different One among
different ones comes with creation. There is no distinctness pre-creation, and certainly zero
personal distinctness by virtue of Islam’s doctrine of

Allah. The Trinity, however, is

precisely Hypostasis-among-Hypostaseis, each One who They are based on the perichoretic and
homoousial intra-relationships the one God is immanently. Their ousia, action, volition, and
thought are one without dissolution of the distinct Hypostaseis. By analogy, each human
person’s thought is his thought as always heavily enriched with the influences’ of that distinct
person’s relationships. This contour of distinctness in human reality is easily explained by the
nature of the Trinity, the explanatory depth burrowing deep into the ground. Human persons are
always distinct within personal relationships that influence who someone is; the divine
Hypostaseis of the Trinity are always distinct by virtue of the personal relationships that God the
Trinity is immaently.
Finally, what of relatedness? Every human is always related from conception, never
alone.377 Allah, though, was ever alone. He had no relationships beyond that of with Himself. If
someone suggests that Allah’s knowing of Himself constitutes a grounding for knowing another,
then such an equivocation would need to be clearly spelled out. There is a reason, after all, why
377

A human life begins at conception. Cf. Job 10:11 – 12 and Psalm 139:13 – 14.
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there is language for reflective thought and separate language used for thinking of others — like
just done. This is a sleight of hand, making knowing self to mean knowing another; these are two
different notions, and one cannot be reduced or made convertiable with the other.
Still, someone might persist. It is evident that Allah is omniscient according to Islam. He
is unlike a human person in the sense that a human, having limited knowledge of himself, might
find something out about himself that seems altogether alien to him. It cannot be thought that
how humans discover things about themselves is also something the Deity does since
omniscience barrs such a possibility. If someone teaches that Allah can discover Himself in order
to ground relating in His nature, this is tantamount to making Allah ignorant of Himself in some
manner — a heavy price to pay. Another objection is conceivable. If God the Trinity is
omniscient, then how can the Hypostaseis know One Another as distinct persons, which suggest
some independent consciousness not perichoretically shared among Them? A difficult objection
this is indeed; nevertheless, the comments made earlier that referential identity of the content of
thought/speech does not preclude creative stylizations among the Hypostaseis of the Trinity: the
New Testament does point to such a reality. Thus, Their thought/speech is one, but always as a
creative symphonic play as onto-thought (extending the idea of onto-relationships of Torrance).
The Triunity of thought owes to the Oneness of thought as much as the Oneness of thought owes
to the Triunity of thought. Once these past two assertions are purified of their temporal
limitations, the idea of sequence (distance of time) is removed, making the Oneness of thought of
the Three a harmony with no intervals, spatial or temporal, to suggest any separation. The One
God is the same-nature-intra-relationships of the Hypostaseis, and so, there is no way to “get
behind” this reality to parse out a thought as merely belonging to One of Them. In short, God is
always already diverse in all His unity of thought. There is mystery here, and we cannot go
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further without losing grasp of the concrete, economic revelation of Jesus Christ. To go so far —
but to explain as much as one can — and no farther is a mantra that both Islam and Christianity
sing.
Allah is alone, and He has no relationships. The Trinity is always k

ō

.

Allah, even after creating and so relating, has no relationships with equals. The Trinity is always
a communion of equals, although with the allowance of taxis. The Trinity sets a basis by which
to understand relationships among equals with certain orderliness to it.

Allah, however,

can only set forth an example of superior to inferior type relationships.

Allah cannot

explain human reality because human reality is always relational; Allah, immanently, is
antithetical to this human reality. Not only does there seem to be no explanatory depth, Allah’s
nature is inimical to human relational reality.

Allah cannot explain the mere

existence of relationships, and He especially cannot explain their inescapability, having been
isolate and lone for eternity past. The Trinity does explain both the mere existence of
relationships and their inescapability. Since God the Trinity is only who He is based on the
homoousial and perichoretic relationships He is immanently, each Hypostaseis of the Triune God
is only who He is by virtue of the other Two being “in” Him, and so, related to Him. Human
reality is the same in some ways. Each human person is who they are by virtue of her
relationships (but not denying their distinctness and separateness in them), and humans are
always in relationships everywhere they are just like God the Trinity is always in relationships.
Again, there is both ease and elucidation attributed to the doctrine of God the Trinity’s
explanatory depth on human relational reality. For every human, there is a matrix or web of
relationships that are inescapably proper to him. Wherever he goes, those relationships append to
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him (foregoing memory corruption or other brain illnesses).378 Said differently, those
relationships are part of him; they inhere in him to the extent that they reside in him by means of
his mind, memory, and thought. Likewise, Each One of the Hypostaseis of the Trintiy is Who He
is based upon His coinherent relationships to the other Two, Who constitute the matrix of God
the Trinity’s intra-relational reality. Perichoretically, the Hypostaseis are in One Another ad
extra.379
At this point, the objection that the Trinity still leaves questions, or generates new ones,
about how the nature of the Triune God accounts for human reality could be posed. This is as it
should be. The person who poses this question, however, cannot impose a standard on just how
much has to be explained for a theological hypothesis (i.e., an nature of the Deity) to be
satisfactory. Where would this interrogator get such a “satisfactory” standard? In this sense, what
are in competition are worldviews. Criteria are deployed by which to measure the success of a
theological hypothesis — or a worldview hypothesis since some are not theistic. These criteria
act as a control on the project and against the researcher’s biases. This dissertation tested two
models of the Deity to see which better accounts for human reality in terms of explanatory scope
and depth. Yes, the Trintiy could leave more questions about human reality, but we are interested
in whether or not God the Trinity answers more questions about it than Allah. So far, the Triune
God’s explanatory depth delves far deeper than that of Allah.

378

It may be objected that earlier it was argued that conceiving “others” in one’s mind did not constitute
actual “otherenss.” This argument stands unimpeded because what is argued here is that humans engage actual
others, and then, those relationships are proper to him by means of memory/mind. The argument here is not
postulating that the mind’s conceiving provides a basis for “otherness,” but that the mind is used to continue in
relationships with others that already actual are and have actually been engaged as true others.
379

That is, to the utter ends, in all the divine space: everywhere One is, so also are the Others, as thought
about in terms of a spatial analogy.
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The Trinity explains human reality better than

Allah in each individual category

of oneness, distinctness, and relatedness. The cogency of these explanations is multiplied by the
cumulative case the three explanations have together against Islam. The scope of this inquiry
included the mere existence of human relationships, their inescapability, and investigation into
oneness, distinctness, and relatedness. The doctrine of

Allah could account only

marginally on the contour of oneness while the rest of the scope hardly had any explanation or
grounding. God the Trintiy could account for the entire scope and could do so in substantial
ways as noted in the earlier comments on explanatory depth. Human reality is a reality of
biological and cognitive oneness; so also is the Trinity’s oneness in terms of ousia and distinct
cognitive stylizations among Them.

does little to explain the human reality of oneness

since it can only get so far as an imagined singular person outside of a context of relationships —
which no one has ever experienced concretely. There is no such thing as distinctness in
Allah (pre-creation), but there ever is in God the Trinity. Human reality is one marked by being
distinct although not alone (and separate), and so also is it with the Hypostaseis who unitarily
constitute the Trinity but not with Allah. Allah has no relationships before creation and no
equality of relationships ever, forever loving Himself. God the Trinity is a community of coequal Hypostaseis in loving communion. Human reality is relationships, and so it is with the
Trinity, but not with Allah. In each category, the Trinity explains human reality in far greater
ways than

Allah. Together, the case for the Trinity and against

Allah is made

all the more potent. The Christian doctrine of Trinity has greater explanatory depth and scope
over the

doctrine of Allah in accounting for human relationships, their inescapbility,

and the specific relational contours of oneness, distinctness, and relatedness.
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Allah sets

no basis for the inescapability of human relationships since He is ever the lone Deity whereas the
Trinity is forever the God who is community.
Ramifications of this Study
Hospitality through serious Consideration
This paratactic comparison lays out a number of things. First, Christians should show
hospitality and respect in their dialogues with Muslim. This can be done both in demeanor and
by taking Muslim concerns serious. To this end, this dissertatin has tried to listen to the voices of
some of the most prominent figures in Islamic history. At the midway point of writing, I
consulted with two local Islamic leaders both in regard to some of my content and, especially, to
see what they thought about my selection of historic Muslim representatives. Both Al-Ghazālī
and Ibn Taymīyya were applauded, but they knew little of Ibn ‘Arabī. Furthermore,

is

itself an emphasis in Islam, but not just an emphasis. It is the emphasis that has an influence on
all of Islam. What is important to Muslims has been upheld by centering this work’s attention on
it.
Is the Deity of Christianity the Deity of Islam?
This close comparison of these two Abrahamic faiths analytically demonstrates that
Christians and Muslims do not worship the same Deity. Although someone may object that this
only becomes clearly demarcated in view of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed and the
Trinitarian exposition of Scripture that it represents, the New Testament is itself strongly
binitarian (“God the Father and our Lord Jesus Christ . . .”). Moreover, it can be argued that the
Book of Ephesians can be designated triadic in the way it deals with the Father, the Son, and the
Spirit (e.g., Eph. 1:17, 2:20 – 22).380 The claim that Christians and Muslims do not worship the
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Letham, The Holy Trinity, 73.
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same Deity is demanded mostly by the unipersonal nature of Allah, i.e., He is a unicity. In view
of

ō ēsis, each Hypostasis of the Trinity is rightly called autotheos (God in Himself), or

using Athanasius’ terminology,

kē

ē (“complete Godhead”).381 To recall, for

ē

one of the Hypostasis to be removed from the ousia of the one LORD God is to remove a
wholative-constitutive Hypostasis. The one LORD God would be deprived of a Hypostasis that
was wholly definitive (and interpenetrating) of who the one LORD God is in Himself. There can
be no objection to such a thought even if it cannot be replicated in creation so long as it is
Christianity’s right to define its doctrines.382 For instance, to ask the question of how there can be
room for the other Two Hypostaseis if one of the Hypostaseis is wholly constitutive of the one
LORD God is only to think compositionally about something that can never be thought about in
terms of composition. To force this upon a Trinitarian understanding of God is an unwelcomed
and inaccurate intrusion from outside Christianity’s long doctrinal history of

ō ēsis —

anyone who has studied the doctrine from Athanasius and the Cappadocian Fathers forward
knows that compositional thinking about the one LORD God is anathema. Instead,

ō ēsis

maintains that each Hypostasis has the other two Hypostaseis enhypostatically indwelling Him
ad extra; there is “no space” in which one Hypostasis abides where the other Two are not
immanently present. The point of this brief recap is that the one LORD God is tripersonal (τρεις
ὑποστασεις) oneness (μια οὐσια), but Allah is unipersonal (μια ὑποστασις) oneness ()توحيد. To
remove one Hypostasis of the Trinity is to dis-integrate the God that, once ruptured in this way,
is no longer the God. Therefore, to move in one’s thought from Trinitarian monotheism
(Christiantiy) to unipersonal monotheism (Islam) is to do radical violence to the Triune God.
381

Athanasius, Ad Serapionem, 1.16 and 24.
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Although no one thing directly replicates the Trinity in creation, abstracting certain ideas and combining
them into one achieves a working theoretical knowledge of God the Trinity, even if that knowledge is flawed and
partial.
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Allah and God the Trintiy are not convertible, so they cannot be exchanged (in thought
or as objects of worship) as though they roughly represent the same thing. In New Testament
thought, to have the Son is to have the Father (1 John 2:23; 2 John 9). They are a package, but
the Son is the Gate to the Father. Whoever accepts the Son, this person necessarily accepts both
the Father and the Son. As noted formerly, to think about One of the Hypostaseis of the Trintiy
always entails thinking about All of Them. Just as this point is made in the New Testament (esp.
John 14 – 17; Mt. 11:27; Rom. 8), so this point was made across the course of this dissertation —
it is a package deal.
John of Damascus and Timothy of Baghdad were right in their analysis that taking away
God’s Word or His Spirit would be blasphemy and a mutilation of God. Timothy states it well: “.
. . if one separates from God His Word and His Spirit, He will cease to be a rational and living
God . . . to say about God that there was a time in which He had no Word and no Spirit, such a
one would blaspheme against God, because his saying would be equivalent to asserting that there
was a time in which God had no reason and no life.”383 John of Damascus’ critique of Islam’s
view of the Deity is as precise as it is forceful:
For the word, and the spirit, is inseparable from that in which it naturally has
existence. Therefore, if the Word of God is in God, then it is obvious that He is
God. If, however, He is outside of God, then according to you, God is without
word and without spirit. Consequently, by avoiding the introduction of an
associate with God you have mutilated Him. It would be far better for you to say
that He has an associate than to mutilate Him, as if you were dealing with a stone
or a piece of wood or some other inanimate object. Thus you speak untruly when
you call us Hetaeriasts; we retort by calling you Mutilators of God.384
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These comments resonate well with this dissertation’s findings precisely because there is
analogical reasoning occurring in both. Although both that God is Spirit and that He is clearly
“rational” (Logos) are revelatory givens, the analogical human correlates cannot be overlooked
in the epistemic grasping of what this means. If humanity had no spirit and no ration, whatever it
would mean for God to have either of these will be unknown to humanity or will remain forever
ambiguous. If humanity has both spirit and ration, then this experience functions as the
analogical correlate by which to grasp, to some certain degree, how God is/has Spirit and Logos.
For both Timothy of Baghdad and John of Damascus, God’s revelation that He is Spirit and
Logos are evident in the Scripture, and these are further supported by the constitution of
humanity.385 The intuition of the similarity between the Deity and humanity undergirds their
thinking, as just cited. It is not to be missed that this intuition is also a revelatory data-point
because God chose humanity as His supreme analogy. These quotes bring out an assumption that
might not be shared by Muslims at that time. Is humanity similar to the Deity so that humanity is
a reliable analogy? Both John of Damascus and Timothy of Baghdad are arguing not long after
the establishment of Islam as a religion (roughly 150 years afterwards), so clearly demarcated
lines on matters of analogical predication are unlikely in view of the great theological debates
during the 8th – early 9th century within Islam.386 This seems probable since the debate of the
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createdness or uncreatedness of the Qur’an will not be settled until after the death of both John
and Timothy.387 Official rule on how the Qur’an is to be interpreted, as analogically predicating
creaturely realities of Allah or not, surely depends on its nature as created or uncreated.
The assertion that Christians and Muslims are not worshiping the same Deity can be
made more pointedly: can someone still worship the one LORD God if the Son is removed as an
object/Person of worship? Or said differently in New Testament terminology, can someone
refuse the affirmation that “Jesus Christ is LORD” and still worship the one LORD God (Phil.
2:6 – 11; 1 Cor. 12:3; Rom. 10:9)? The Greek of the same is stated, “ ē

.”

That Kurios is designed to identify Jesus with YAHWAH is an assertion that has been rigourous
vetted, and now has become rather uncontroversial.388 In the rightly celebrated Creed (or hymn)
deposited in Philippians 2:6 – 11, the name Jesus Christ is both identified with YAHWEH by
Kurios and by Paul’s modification of the Old Testament text of Isaiah 45:23.389 Jesus Christ is
called Kurios in v. 11, and Isa. 45:23 is modified from saying that YAHWEH will be bowed to
(“To me every knee shall bow”) to “at the name of Jesus every knee might bow . . . .” It should
not be overlooked that YAHWEH identifies Himself as Savior just two verses earlier in Isa. 45:21:
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M

‘ is the Hebrew term for Savior.390 This term is cognate with the Hebrew word for

salvation, which is Jesus’ name, yᵊ ‘ . A Muslim cannot make this identification, but they
instead understand such an identification as shirk, the great sin (Surah 4:48, 171). Muslims abide
somewhere in the middle of the two responses to Christ that 1 Cor. 12:3 records: “Therefore I
made known to you that no one who is speaking in the Spirit of God speaks: “Cursed is Jesus,”
and no one is capable of speaking, “Jesus is LORD,” except in the Holy Spirit” (trans. mine).
Muslims cannot become binitarian because of shirk, which means the divine Son of God is never
part of their worship. The New Testament, however, makes the affirmation of the Son as divine
— often by means of the appellation of Kurios — the litmus test for worship of the true God. To
add further offense, Larry Hurtado has decisively showed that such worship of Jesus was part of
the earliest Christianity.391 In other words, Jesus being worshiped with God was not a corruption
of an earlier tradition; Jesus-worship was the earlier (and earliest) tradition.
John of Damascus and Timothy of Baghdad appear to assume that Muslims and
Christians do worship the same Deity. What is striking is the referral to the Prophets both John
and Timothy make. The referent begs the question of whether they are referring to the notion of
the Judaeo-Christian canon of the N v ’

or the Islamic classification of Abraham, Moses,

David, and Jesus. John’s strong accusation, “The Prophets and the Scriptures have delivered this
to us, and you, as you persistently maintain, accept the Prophets,” seems especially out of place.
Why press this point (“as you persistently maintain”) if it has no basis of authority according to
390
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the Islamic canon? They could be talking past one another, however. Or John Damascene knows
what Muslims hold to be Scripture, and he is just that confident in his ability to debate from
those texts — like the ones the prophet Moses wrote. Whatever the case, the core matter is why
these two great Christian apologists accept the Muslims to be worshiping the same Deity.
Furthermore, if they accept this, why have I judged differently? There is more than one way to
answer this, but a case for rejecting the proposition that Muslims and Christians worship the
same God can be made from the term and concept of “Father.”
Calling the Deity “Father” is something with which Muslims are neither comfortable nor
willing to accept.392 There is good reason for this just like there is good reason for why
Christians are both willing and comfortable with calling God “Father.” In view of the
comparison done herein, Allah is not an eternal Father but the one LORD God is an eternal
Father. As noted many times now, the Hypostaseis are only Who They are by virtue of the
coinherence with the Others. Although the “Fatherliness” of the one LORD God owes to the
properties of the Hypostasis of the Father,

ō ēsis, or the sharing of the same “divine

space,” guarantees that the properties of the Father subsist coinherently together with the
properties of the Son and the Spirit while protecting the properties specific to the Hypostasis of
the Father, preventing confusion or mixing. There is no principle of Fatherhood in Allah while
there is a principle of Fatherhood, namely the properties of the Father, in the Trinity. How, then,
could the “Deity of Muhammad” be the Father of the Son of God? The Hypostasis of the Father
is the Father of the Son while the ousia of the one LORD God is indicative of what is predicable
of all three Hypostaseis, leaving the distinctions (properties) of the Hypostaseis in tact. By virtue
of the Hypostasis of the Father, and His designation as the Fons Divitatis, “Father” is a term
392
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rightly predicated of both the Hypostasis and the ousia of the one LORD God.393 To ask if Allah,
as unicity according to the doctrine of

, is the Father of Jesus Christ is to ask a question

that is historically only askable of a Father, an emphasis Jesus brings out after His resurrection:
“Do not cling to me, for I have not yet ascended to the Father; but go with my brothers and say to
them, ‘I am ascending to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God.’” (John 20:17:
Esv). There is a distinction in the way God is the Father to humanity (your Father) and in the
way God is a Father to Jesus; Jesus never calls God His Father together with others. The point is
that the emphasis of God as Father is a Christian one, not an Islamic one. To suppose that
Christians and Muslims worship the same God as Father, at least if done by a Christian, is to
impose a term and concept onto the Islamic notion of Allah, which is foreign to how Muslims
think of Him. Of course, all of the complicated argumentation may be unnecessary. It is enough
to note that “Father” is not a term predicable of Allah before creation, and Muslims are not
comfortable with it even applied to Him after creation.
How, then, is God the Trinity and Allah the same Deity? Their natures radically differ
before creation according to each religion’s respective doctrines. God as Father is an essential
feature in the Old Testament, in the New Testament, and in Trinitarian articulation. Is God as
Father cast aside so easily for the sake of identifying with Muslims even if for evangelistic and
missiological purposes? Muslims think that the peoples of the book (Jews and Christians)
worship the same Deity, but this is because the Qur’an plainly affirms this. Christians, however,
are not under any compulsion from their Scripture to think similarly. The aforementioned New
Testament texts about “only those who have the Son have the Father” more than subtely suggest
that Christians do not worship the same Deity as Muslims. These texts teach that Christians
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should be hesitant to identify their Deity with other deities that exclude the Son, which is
especially true of Islam because they voraciously deny that Christ is the Son. Perhaps many
Christians just do not know how central God as Father is to the entire canon of Scritpure, as the
eternal Father of the Son (immanent Father of the Son), as God the Father of creation (=
Creator), as the Father of the incarnate Son of God, Jesus Christ, as the Father of reconciled
creation (the prodigal Father), and as the Father of believers in Christ. The point is that God as
Father is a backbone theme to the entirety of the canon. It cannot be set aside without utterly
destroying the narrative of Scripture. There also is the possibility that the New Testament claims
that Jews during the time of the writing of the New Testament worship the same Deity as
Christians (Rom. 9:4; 10:2) — although these Jews do not have the Son. Supposing so, can a
similar claim be made for Muslims? It seems evident that comparing Jews living during the
writing of the New Testament and Muslims is comparing apples to oranges. More specifically,
some of these Jews believed in YAHWEH with openness to the possibility that Jesus was to be
identified with YAHWEH, openness made possible and derived from the Tanahk. Only a partial
hardening occurs to Israel (Rom. 9 – 11) after all. Muslims practicing Islam are not in a position
of openness but of closeness to this possibility, this closeness made possible and derived from
the Qur’an. In short, Jews were in an open-ended role while Muslims are in a closed-ended role.
Thus far, these comments have been limited to the Jews in the 1st century. What of the
situation today? The Qur’an demands that Jesus be identified as a prophet, not as God; the
Tanakh, however, the Hebrew Scripture, does not deliberate on who Jesus is. Each and every
person is unique in their religious journey, so these comments are generalizations at best. It is
fathomable that a religious Jew today might have never been posed with making a decision about
Jesus. This is not the case with Muslims. They follow the Qur’an, which prescribes that Jesus
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(Isa) was only a prophet, not the Son of God. Even today it is possible that a Jewish person is in
an open-ended position while the Muslim is still in a closed-ended position because of the
teaching of the Qur’an. Said differently, openness to Yahweh through the Hebrew Scriptures
does not demand closeness to Jesus as the Son of God (it might even demand openness to Him),
but openness to Allah through the Qur’an does demand closeness to Jesus as the Son of God.
To extend the question of the supposed sameness of the Trinity and Allah, is identifying
Allah and the Trinity as the same Deity careless or is it born from prima facie commonality?
Certainly, it can be thought that Christian theologians, pastors, and saints everywhere are
interested in finding common ground with Muslims because of similarities between the two
religions. Finding similarities does not necessitate that one of the similarities be the worship of
the same Deity. Illustrative of this point is karma. At first glance, karma appears to be the same
as the principle of “you reap what you sow.” After closer examination, it is seen that karma
functions on a depersonalized principle of cosmic cause-and-effect instead of the personal reality
of God as Judge. In addition, karma supposes former lives that interdict on the current life
situation, that is, what someone did in those former lives fates what happens to her now.394 What
appears the same is demonstrably different after investigation of the ontology, or inner
functioning, of karma and the “reap what sown” principle. This, however, does not mean there
are no similarities between karma and the principle; it does mean that one is not the other. When
thinking about these comparisons, the mental imgery of off-centered circles is more helpful than
the imagery of being “in” or “out” of a box. The box imagery indicates that one either has it all
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right — or enough of it, however that is decided — or not. With off-centered circles, the circles
should not be centered, but either justified to the right or left, as follows.

Where each of the circles overlap in the top left indicates perfect theology, truly knowing what is
taught in Scripture in one’s mind. This, of course, is what salvation and sanctification are all
about (in this life and in eternal life), striving for proper thinking expressed in proper action as
formed in the image of the Logos of God — the double ontondra is intended. The smallest circle
indicates doctrine about the Gospel as deposited in 1 Cor. 15:1 – 5, without which the Gospel
would no longer be Gospel. The next biggest circle indicates first-order doctrine (monotheism
and polytheism would be included here), the next, second-order, and the largest circle, thirdorder. What is included in each category is highly debatable, but the key for the purposes here is
that standing in the smallest circle is to be in salvific standing with God by virtue of the Son:
“Now I am making known to you, brothers, the gospel which I myself proclaimed to you, which
you indeed received, in which you surely stand, through which you certainly are being saved —
in the certain Word I myself proclaimed to you if you are holding fast [to the certain Word] . . .
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.”395 According to the foregoing emphases, the first circle is the Gateway to God, that is, to be in
the first circle is to “have the Son.” There is a way in which theology is perfectly formed in the
mind, namely, where the outer lines of the circles all overlap. Someone could “have the Son”
(Gospel), but could be very off in other orders of theology. Thus, for each individual person,
their beliefs could be charted on these circles. Pertaining to the Gospel of the Son of God, a
Christian who accepts 1 Cor. 15:1 – 5 will have the belief charted within the first and smallest
circle. This same person’s eschatology could be well off, however, plotting this third-order
belielf (debatable of course) in the largest circle far away from where all the lines of the circles
overlap. The framework for the entire chart is a theistic universe. Since “no one who denies the
Son has the Father” and “whoever confesses the Son has the Father also,” there is no way that a
Muslim can have the Father, and there is no God without the Father — the same could be said of
the other Hypostaseis in terms of autotheos. Historically, the Father is seen as the fons divitatis
or the causal unoriginate One in the Trinity, so to exclude Him is a specially strong elimination
of God altogether.396 For a Christian, the smallest circle and the first-order circle will certainly
overlap because it is impossible to have the Son without the Father while no other worldviews
worship the same God because whoever “denies the Son” does not have the Father. Wherever
Islam is plotted in the first order circle, it will not be on the overlapping lines with the smallest
circle. Before the objection is raised that the same would go for Jews, the word “denies” in 1
John 2:23 should be highlighted. The teaching of the Qur’an denies Jesus as God the Son in one
of the most important Surahs, Surah 112. A Jewish person could be aware of Jesus as the Son of
God and reject Him. Then, this Jew would be under the darkness of alienation from the Father
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following the doctrine of 1 John 2:23. To recall, however, the Hebrew Scriptures do not
preclude, and may oppositely intimate, Jesus as the Son of God. So then, a Jew today could just
have no exposure to the Gospel. There are no doubt manifold complications, and the chart could
be improved and explicated more richly, but this “ramifications section” is designed to point, not
exhaustively expound, so more could be said, but this suffices.
Ethics of Love
There are a number of ethical implications that center around love. The ramifications are
not small when dealing with ethics, so this needs considerable attention. Love is a dangerous
thing to tamper with, but tamper we must if we are to understand it and live it. The Christian
doctrine of God the Trinity is consistent with the two greatest commandments. First, humanity is
to love God with all their heart, soul, mind, and strength. Then, they are to love their neighbor as
themselves. This is fitting since these two actions occur in the Trinity. In regard to the first
greatest commandment, God loves God, which is to say, God the Father (autotheos) loves the
Son (autotheos), and the Spirit (autotheos) loves the Son (autotheos) and so forth. To love one’s
neighbor as oneself fits with Trinitarian logic as well. In the Trinity, the Neighbors of the Father,
for instance, are the Son and the Spirit, yet these Two are also so intimately indwelling the
Father that all Three constitute one ousia together. For the Father to love Them is for Him to
love Others and, in loving Them, He loves Himself. This love is an out-pouring love (Rom. 5:3),
taking the other Hypostasis so loved as an end-in-Himself. Someone might say that this is
speculative; but it is not. How God loves humanity in His giving of the Son displays a God of
preeminent love who is “in it” for others, even weak, dirty, and evil humans (Rom. 8:32).397 This
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is what the Gospel is about and this is the message of the New Testament. Jesus links the
Father’s love for Him to the Father’s giving kāv

(Hebrew for “Glory”: John 17:24) to Him,

which is the item of greatest gravitas in all reality (cf. the Hebrew term kāvē = weighty). How
One of the Hypostaseis of the Trinity loves Himself is plain. He does this by always giving of
Himself over to the Others, being for Them, with Them, and in Them just as was marvelously
displayed in the incarnate life of Jesus Christ. He was for humanity, with humanity, and is now
in humanity because He does not leave His beloved to become orphaned (John 14:17 – 18).
What is required of humanity, namely, to love God and to love others as oneself, is a mimesis of
what the one LORD God does in Himself among the intra-onto-relationships the Hypostaseis
constitute among One Another.
The backdrop of an interpretive schema based upon the doctrine of God the Trinity
ensures against an inherent narcissism overemphasizing the second half of the second greatest
commandment: “Love your neighbor as yourself” (emp. mine). The narcissitic tendency can put
undo weight on self-focus. In the Trinity, for One of the Hypostaseis to love Himself never
occurs by independently or solely thinking about how He wants to be treated, and then applying
that logic to how He treats the other two Hypostaseis. Rather, to love Himself is always already
for Him to be involved with the other Two, with Them, in Them, and for Them. In the Trinity,
since They share perichoretic relationships and one and the same ousia together, to love Oneself
always occurs by loving Others.To act like the Trintiy in this regard is not to isolate and meditate
on how to love others well, and then apply that once it gets figured out — a dangerous centering
on how I want to be treated. To learn this loving of oneself in the manner consistent with the
Trinity requires the practice of giving of oneself, to be for others, with others, and in others. This
is an essential selfless love that only recognizes love for oneself as achievable by perpetually
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centering-in on loving others. Both the one who loves and the beloved share in one love, edified
and rejoicing.
What is the nature of love based on Allah? As the Augustinian formula appropriated to
Allah showed, the designations of lover, beloved, and love each only take one person as the
referent, Allah. Before creation, this can only mean that the only type of love was a reflexive
love, that is, Allah loved Himself. If this love is not to change with the coming of creation, then
Al-Ghazālī is right. Creatures become conduits or agents by whom and through whom Allah
loves Himself. Allah is not devoted to loving others due to His nature like the Trinity. Instead,
His Taw

nature is about loving Himself. After creation, He loves creatures as agents through

whom to realize His love for Himself. Creatures are not loved just because they are others, but to
the extent they fulfill loving Allah properly — this might be a bit of an overstatement.
Nevertheless, the Qur’an does emphasize Allah not loving certain types of persons: boasters
(Surah 31:18), arrogant boasters (Surah 57:23), the exultant (Surah 28:76), the unjust (Surah
42:40), unbelievers (Surah 3:32; 30:45), the treacherous (Surah 8:58), unfaithful (Surah 22:38) or
ungrateful, mischief-makers (Surah 5:64), the extravagant (Surah 7:31), or those who exceed
limits (Surah 2:190).398 This does fit well with the nature of Allah as Taw

and with the

foregone discussion of loving those who fulfill loving Allah properly. If human persons are
agents through whom Allah loves Himself, how could this love flow through humans who are
disruptive and polluting Allah’s commands? Unlike God the Trinity, there is no “one-andanother” in Allah that could act as a basis for the inherent correctness of loving others as a
purpose unto itself. Instead, what is found in Taw

Allah is the inherent correctness of loving

Himself (or for humans, of loving Allah). “Humans” being “others” is not enough to make them
398
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worthy of love. On Islam, how could it be? Taw

Allah had no others with Him for eternity

past, and otherness (esp. personal otherness) is not part of His constitution. To say that otherness
— someone being other than oneself — was a basis of love from an Islamic point of view, would
be a repudiation of Allah’s love for Himself, which excludes all notions of otherness in its
eternal Taw

past. Simply, just existing as “another” is not enough to warrant love from

Allah. Love is not linked to this concept of “one-and-another” in the nature of Allah. This notion
of “one-and-another” as a basis for what constitutes love is replaced in Allah’s Taw

nature

with “humans should love Allah because Allah loves Allah,” not because Allah is the Other, but
because He is Allah. When a human loves Allah this is in truth a pathway of Allah’s love for
Himself that courses through this human person.
This seems to be narcissism. A question every person should ask himself is how he feels
when he knows that he is being used as a means to something else. For instance, when someone
uses a person for his ends, not because of the value of a person in herself, what intuition comes
to mind? This is especially plain in the case of marriage. Men and women who marry for money
are spoken of derisively. What drives this pejuritive intuition appears to be the knowledge of
improper value. When someone uses a person as a gateway to money, there is an elevation of the
importance (value) of money over the person. The person who is spiritual and eternal is lowered
in importance below what is material and temporally passing. Of course, the situation is very
different when the Deity uses humans to glorify and love Himself because He uses what is
dependent in its spiritual and eternal nature (humans) to glorify and love He who is selfsufficiently spiritual and eternal. In this case, what is of lesser value is used for the purposes of
the higher value. Even in these cases, though, there still arises the sense that there is some moral
impropriety. For instance, killing a thousand to save a million will be bitter sweet because there
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is something inherently right about saving lives, but, at the same time, there is something very
wrong about taking these lives even though it means the saving of many more lives. What is
found is that there is a conflict between humanty’s moral intuitions — that being used is evil —
and the rational logic “using lesser things for greater things” makes. A counter-example is
readily available against the logic of using lesser things for greater things. It is rationally
arguable — although often to be met with moral disgust — that the health and stature of the
human species is a higher value than the lesser value of an individual human with genetic
defects. Thus, eugenic programs for the elimination of the genetically undesirable are justified on
the mere logic of “lesser valued things should be used for the greater valued purposes.” A similar
example is euthanasia where the good of society (greater value) and conservation of resources
for the continued flourishing of human life (greater value) takes precedent over helping an
elderly person live. If Allah uses people as conduits for loving Himself, why do humans shutter
at some of these ideas as morally repugnant? On Islam’s view of love as Allah loving Himself
(following Al-Ghazālī), would not the opposite response be expected, that of moral praise and
approval? The nature of the eternal love of Allah being self-love (or reflexive love) provides vast
questions about human ethics. These issues can only be anecdotablly raised, but they are worthy
of further exploration.
A very real question arises about views of the Deity that propagate an essential self-love
and self-glorification without any focus on otherness: do these pass muster according to the
human experience of love? This question is as much for Islam as for certain trends in Christian
circles that emphasize God’s self-glorification without attention to the Trinity’s essential “oneand-anotherness.” It might be supposed that humanity is totally depraved, in the full sense, which
would mean that the moral intuitions coming from within humanity are not to be trusted.
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This supposition is an in house Christian matter since original sin does not factor into
Islam’s protology. Although original sin is a certainty on Christian theism — at least from the
time of the Augustine-Pelagius debate — just how to understand the taint sin has upon humanity
is debatable. Intuition does provide a resource for theologizing, although the theologian must
account for the effect of original sin in the manner he draws from intution. What does intuition
intimate about someone who designs plans for others to glorify him? Do we feel loved when
someone puts us into these designs? The likely answer is no, but how someone answers will
undoubtedly change when the Designer is the Deity. When He is the Designer, this question now
has two answers. 1) It is improper for a human to do this, but 2) not for the Deity. Prima facie,
this appears pious enough, but does this reinforce the notion that lesser valued things should be
used for greater valued things? It does, and it does so in the most radical way because what could
be a higher value than the Deity’s desires? The Deity has the right to do what He wants with His
own things — as the imgery of the potter and clay indicates. This logic of ownership is
acceptable enough, but does Scritpure support this sort of self-centeredness?399
Allah’s nature leaves no option but self-centered self-love, and three of the great historic
thinkers of Islam do not shy away from such a reality. Whereas Christianity, again, has resources
to try to deal with the problem of love becoming narcissism by means of the doctrine of Trinity,
Islam has none. Allah’s nature based on

demands His love to be a self-love because there

is no one different from Him to be an object of His love prior to creation. However much Allah
is said to love creatures, this cannot be the purest and primal instance of love since to affirm such
would make Allah’s love dependent on creation. Even if Islam upholds that Allah does love
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creatures, this love must be derivative, and must serve Allah’s love for Himself. The activity of
Allah’s love, its form as it were, would change its cyclonic pattern if the derivative love for
creatures did not ultimately return to the cyclonic winds of Allah’s love for Himself. Rather than
Allah’s love being definitively a love centered on Himself, it would become a love definitively
centered on creatures, or on others. Such “other-focusedness” is inimical to Allah’s eternal
Ta

nature, which appears to demand that Allah’s love for creatures is always ultimately

about Him loving Himself. Ibn Taymīyya said that love for creatures is always subordinate to
Allah’s love for Himself. 400 Al-Ghazālī states that Allah really only loves Himself, and Ibn
Arabī affirms the same.401 Citing these authors at this point is to show that this is not a nonMuslims’ view of the Din of Islam on the topic of love; these three authors, especially AlGhazālī, are representative of major Islamic thinking. On this note, it would be hard to find
someone more representative of Islam than Al-Ghazālī, as Volf claims, from any age.402
What emerges is a view of love, of the most basic and primal love, which is essentially
self-centered. To a non-Muslim ear, this may sound alarming. However, if all creation is illusory
or emanational on Islam, as the above authors either teach or suggest, then a human who loves
others really loves Allah. Similarly, for Allah to love Himself — creation qua emanational or
illusory — can occur by loving creatures because they are really only Him. There is, therefore, a
possible way for devotees in Islam to prevent their love from transforming into narcissism.
Whether this can be done in practice or not is another question. To identify a creature with Allah,
400
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because creation is believed to be illusory, is tantamount to shirk. Hallāj was killed for such
identification. Furthermore, majority (Sunni) Islam is hostile to anthropomorphizing in varying
degrees depending on the group, sect, or individual. It is hard to see how creation can be viewed
as illusory or as emanational without going beyond anthropomorphism to full-fledged pantheism
or panentheism. Not to be missed is that non-self-centered love could only be salvaged for the
human creatures Allah created. They could be focused on others as apparations who really are
Allah; still, a human creature could just as well see himself as an apparation of Allah, making
himself the center of his love thereby transforming love into narcissism. Non-self-centered love
could be maintained for the devotees to Islam but not for Allah Himself. Indeed, for Allah to do
so would be a repudiation of the nature of Allah’s eternal love for Himself.
Perhaps, love according to Islam would fare better if creation is considered truly
contingent. Human creatures would not be Allah, so could Allah love them? If Ibn Taymīyya’s
thought is followed, then, yes, He can, but He does so only in a subordinate fashion to how He
loves Himself. Allah’s love for Himself is preeminent over and proceeds eternally before His
love for creatures. Maybe this is why there are so few verses that focus on Allah’s unconditional
love for creatures in the Qur’an (Surah 5:54 and perhaps19:94 and 20:39), and how many focus
on compassion (most of the Surahs include the title “All-compassionate/merciful” attributed to
Allah) or love because of proper behavior (e.g., Surah 61:3, 49:9, 60:8 to cite only a few). In one
verse, there is a reversal of Jesus’ teaching about love and enemies:
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Surah 60:1: Do not take My enemy and your
enemy for friends: would you offer them
love while they deny what has come to you
of the truth, driving out the Messenger and
youselves because you being in Allah, your
Lord? If you go forth struggling hard in My
path and seeking My pleasure, would you
manifest love to them? I know what you
conceal and what you manifest; and
whoever of you does this, he indeed has
gone astray from the straight path.

Matthew 5:43 – 45: You heard that it was
said: You will love your neighbor and hate
your enemy. But I myself say to you: “Love
your [pl.] enemies and pray on behalf of the
ones who are persecuting you [pl.] in order
that you should become sons of your Father
who is in heaven [trans. mine, grammatical
brackets mine]

Jesus, in the New Testament, says that loving enemies puts a person on the straight path (“. . .
sons of your Father . . .”), but Allah in the Qur’an declares that His enemies are not to be loved
or else the one who does this has gone off the straight path. Is this reversal linked to the nature of
Allah? Maybe it is, but who could really judge this without immense historical speculation? On
the one hand, the God of Jesus Christ loves His enemies by doing kindly by them, making the
sun to arise upon the wicked and sending rain on the unrighteous (Mt. 5:45). Jesus commands the
servants of God to act in this manner because that is how God acts. Allah, on the other hand,
commands His servants to act like Him. Whoever is His enemy in terms of human persons who
are opposed to the Din of Allah (Islam; cf. Surah 60:2 ff.), He commands that His servants treat
them as enemies as well. This comparison illustrates, tentatively, a difference in taking love as
essentially self-centered or other-centered. A love that is other-centered will overcome the
failures of this other person so as to love another; love that is self-centered will distance others
who fail to uphold and join in that love. The wicked and unrighteous are loved by God in
demonstrable ways that the servants of Christ are to mimic while those who oppose Islam — the
ambiguity of how to identify who these are is alarming — are neither loved by Allah nor should
the servants of Allah love them. Allah’s love for Himself takes priority over love for human
creatures, which is always “subordinate,” to use Ibn Taymīyya’s term. This prioritization will
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turn love into conditional love because the upholding of Allah’s love for Himself, by living as
Allah commands among perhaps others things, is the condition that must be met for Allah’s love
to flow through someone.403 So far as someone lives according to the Din, they meet the
condition(s) to be loved by Allah, which is itself to be used by Allah as a conduit for Allah’s
loving of Himself.
What to do with the Qur’an’s viewpoint of love and how that view syncs (or not) with
Allah’s love for Himself is another issue. Should the Qur’an’s commands that involve loving
activity be interpreted in view of

or not? First, imposing the theme of love onto the

Qur’an has to be modified a bit. The command to “love one another” does not appear in the
Qur’an, but the Qur’an is full of examples and commands about showing mercy and compassion,
which can be unpacked to show the love entailed in them. The notion of mercy in the Qur’an is
similar in its nature to love in the New Testament because both zone in on “giving for the good
of another.” Surah 90:17 states, “Then he is of those who believe and charge one another to show
patience, and charge one another to show compassion.” The question to ask is, “How should a
person show compassion?” Under the logic of Christian Trinitarianism, showing love is to mimic
the one LORD God both in His immanent relational reality and in His economic dealings with
creatures. Beyond this ontological reality underpinning the act of love, there are the commands
to love. The commands to love are grounded in the Trinity’s immanent relational reality, which
means that the commands are not arbitrary, but, instead, invite creatures to mimic the drama of
love ongoing in the one LORD God. To be loving is to be godly, i.e., like God. Since it does not
make much sense to say that Allah shows Allah compassion, the word “love” will have to be
substituted for the term “compassion” in the following discussion. Hopefully, this will not be
403
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seen as inappropriate since the basis of both the Christian notion of love and the Islamic notion
of mercy is “giving for another’s good.” On the logic of

, the immanent reality of Allah’s

love is one of self-love. Because Allah’s love for creatures is always subordinate to His love for
Himself, Allah’s giving of mercy or love or compassion to creatures is always in service,
ultimately, to Himself and in fidelity to His love for Himself. No doubt the servants of Allah
must follow the commands of the Qur’an, but how are they to go about following the commands
that entail loving activity, like showing compassion or “enjoining one another in goodness
(Surah 5:2)?” Are the servants of Allah to mimic Allah’s manner of loving? The logic of a
human appropriating how Allah loves Himself might go like this: “I love myself, and I allow
others to participate in my love of myself so long as they do not interrupt that love because my
love for them is always subordinate to my love for myself.” It is possible that someone will
object that no one should act like Allah in this regard, but the point is, if a human did act like
Him, it would be similar to this description. It cannot be forgotten that there is no “one-andanother” in Allah immanently.
Another difficulty arises. Why not just say that Muslims do mimic how Allah
economically loves creatures? If the asking of such a question is designed to claim that Allah
loves them based on their otherness, then the Islamic doctrine of

has been forgotten,

which refuses to base love on otherness/difference. Allah loves creatures as a means to loving
Himself. Thus, to mimic how Allah economically loves is to love them only as a means to loving
Allah: “Love for Allah is preeminent to love for other humans, therefore showing love to other
humans always occurs by treating the human loved as a conduit by whom to love Allah.” For
being an Islamic view on love, this sounds strangely “Christian” in its logic, but three additions
should be mentioned. (1) Paul notes that “the whole law is fulfilled in one word: ‘You shall love
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your neighbor as yourself.’”404 (2) God’s giving of the Son of God for humanity to live
demonstrates, as risky as this sounds, that God loves humanity more than He loves Himself
(Rom. 8:32).405 He died so humans might live. (3) Jesus’ identification in Matthew 25 is
shocking; “For I was hungry and you gave me food . . . Lord when did we see you hungry and
feed you . . . And the King will answer them, “Truly, I say to you, as you did it to one of the least
of these, my brothers, you did it to Me.” Concerning (1), the immanent logic of the Trintiy
makes “loving another” an end in itself because loving oneself is contained in loving another.
Regarding (2), if God put His love of Himself before His love of humanity, how then would
Christ be crucified? In view of (3), it is the act of love to another human that Jesus praises
because to love others well evidently is to love Christ well, rather than making them a means to
loving Christ well. The bottom line is that the nature of the Trinity displays a love that is
essential “other-focused” while Allah’s nature displays a love that is essential self-focused. In
this sense, the Islamic and Christian view of love is radically different. There is some overlap,
however, between the Christian and Islamic view of love as practiced by believers in the sense
that for a human to love other humans is to love the Deity. For Christians, to love oneself and
God — by glorifying Him by acting like Him just as commanded — are achieved and contained
in loving others, which is one reason why St. Paul can proclaim that the whole law is
summarized in the second greatest command. For Muslims, humans are means to loving Allah
because humans are, to Allah, a means to loving Himself. Since there is no “one-and-another” in
Allah, for a human to love another well without intending to love Allah through that action poses
a rialry between the devotee’s love for Allah and his love for another human. The Muslim must
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always “subordinate” (Ibn Taymīyya’s term) his love for others to his love for Allah whereas a
human’s love for the Trintiy is contained in loving others because such loving others is mimesis
of the Trinity’s inner immanent life.
An added question is, “What makes giving this love allowable?” For someone to be
“another” is enough for the Christian because God is Trinity, but Allah “loves not” certain types
of “others.” This means that the Muslim should not love them either if their action is thought to
be opposed to the Din of Islam. Although Surah 60:1 – 2 is clear that those not to be loved are
those who oppose Allah’s truth and belief in it, how to determine what constitute’s opposition to
the Din of Islam is ambiguous. Surah 60:1 – 10 records that those who are enemies, but evidently
not enemies of the Din, can be treated justly and kindly (v. 8). Those who made war on Muslims
on account of the Din of Islam cannot be befriended. To become friends with these enemies is to
become unjust in Allah’s eyes (v. 10). The hermeneutical question of how to apply these texts
today will have weighty consequences. Verse 1 makes it clear that the Messenger was driven out.
These are the enemies of the Din, but how would one envisage the Messenger’s rejection today?
This section on ethics cannot be emphasized enough. Given recent wars in the Middle
East, the radical Muslims’ attacks on the world stage, and the increasing poplularity of moderate
Islam in the West, what love is and how to practice it deserves much attention. Love will save
the world. Whose love can accomplish this is the question. The link between the nature of the
Deity and love must be addressed, readdressed, and distributed. It is not enough to say that all
religions or even some religions roughly teach the same thing about love. Because of the
Trinity’s unique nature, shared by other religion or worldview, it is not an overstatement to say
that love on Christianity is a Christian love. It is Christian because it is Trinitarian, and it is
unique to Christianity because there is only one religion that maintains the Trinity as its doctrine
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of the Deity. Islam has its own view of love likewise linked to the nature of Allah. As the
foregoing discussion demonstrates, the contours of Islamic love versus Christian love are not the
same. They could not be unless the natures of the Deity matched between the two religions; they
most certainly do not. How humans practice love, therefore, will differ according to their view of
the Deity because the nature of the Deity forms and controls what love is. This cannot be
unpacked more, but what appear to be marginal differences in the inner logic of love will result
in canyon-sized gaps in the way the differences are enacted in daily life.
Socio-Political Concerns
How should members of society think of one another? Should there be equality among
members or inequality? The Western heritage takes the former as a given: equality for all. The
thought that largely undergirded this attitude is that all were created in God’s image. As such, all
must be equal. Islam does not share this vision of humanity made in the image of God, however.
There must be another way to ground equality among humans for Islam. As this dissertation has
argued, though, maybe Muslims should give up their resistence to anthropomorphizing. If they
did, then man could be taken as an image bearer of God, and then, equality among them could be
established upon this. Their resistence is readily inconsistent and, because of this inconsistency,
uncompelling and little more than a fideist expression with no reasonable defense. Qutb
nature.406 His logic seems to be, “Since

grounded equality among humanity on Allah’s

Allah is one, so should humanity be.” This logic draws a different conclusion than what Qutb
hopes. Rather than establishing equal “rights” among members of humanity,
individual rights altogether. Allah’s

questions

nature is not differentiated whatsoever — neither

internally nor externally, neither in terms of Hypostaseis nor in terms of unretractable attributes

406

Qutb, Milestones, 25.

181

— so how will the importance of individual man be upheld? On the nature of Allah, it cannot be
since Allah is one, without distinction prior to creation. His oneness does not include a protection
of distinction because there is no distinction in the pure

of Allah. Rather,

upholds homogeneity for all, not distinctions for all and certainly not rights to protect individual
distinction.407 In the vast ocean of human particularities across the span of this planet, how could
such homogeneity be achieved? Is tyranny the only answer, or could every person on the planet
be convinced of his or her own freewill to adopt homogenous practices with every single other
person on the planet? It is almost frightful to imagine such a set of circumstances of complete
homogeneity;408 it even seems hostile to something that makes humanity humanity, namely, the
drive to be different and distinct. Tyranny, then, is the way forward to establish homogeneity
because humanity will not be robbed of their distinctions without a fight. Qutb confirms, “This
power must be all levels; that is to say, [the Islamic community] must have power of belief and
concept, the power of training and moral character, the power to organize and sustain a
community, and whatever physical power is necessary, if not to dominate, at least to sustain
itself . . . .”409 This brings up the next point: the Qur’an’s most primordial and original vision of a
relationship is one of inequality, between Adam and Allah.
The irony of Qutb’s aim in his little book, Milestones, is that he sought to question all
human dominion, reign, and power, before the reign of Allah,410 but, in his visage of Allah as
supreme, he provides a tyrannical paradigm that the rulers he opposes would applaud and
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recognize as their own. Allah is rabb; Adam is ‘b , slave. There is no paradigm of equality based
on the theology proper of Islam because Allah is not internally differentiated in terms of
Hypostaseis. The object of Muslims’ worship is of a Rabb who shares power with no one. Do
humans become like what they worship? This seems likely, but Islam’s focus on orthopraxy
cannot be forgotten. How much influence the contemplation of Allah should be accorded in
informing that practice is an open question. The supposition that Christians should contemplate
God to become like Him because humanity is made in His image is not a point of similarity
between Islam and Christianity. The drive to contemplate the Deity will therefore differ between
Muslims and Christians along with the attention paid to that contemplation. Nevertheless, a few
Islamic States do uphold Sharia Law to the extent of disallowing other manners of life, with any
deviance punished. It is not an erroneous intent to think that the theological vision of the
relationship of Rabb Allah with ‘b humanity undergirds and informs hegemonic tendencies.411
Such a supposition is not ignorant to other motivations for hegemony like the political, fiscal,
industrial, and societal. The contention is rather that theology must be on this list, and perhaps it
411
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should be weighted more greatly than other items. Is Allah

? Yes, He is, ergo,

homogeneity is affirmed. Is Allah alone with no equals? Yes, that is right, ergo, sole tyrannies
are the human performances of this quintessential theology of the inequality of relationships.
Muslims do have other ways to uphold equality, but it is a significant concern that a vision of
Allah does not.412 Rabb Allah is no community and has no equality with anyone. These

Taw

concerns could be contested on the basis of certain teachings from the Qur’an, but they would
not be completely dispersed. Allah remains who and what Muslims worship, and how Allah
exists and His nature are matters a devotee thinks about.

Allah remains a significant

influence on the religious Muslim as the popularity of Al-Ghazālī’s Revival of the Religious
Sciences testifies.413 Both what the Qur’an teaches and Allah’s nature have to be treated as
separate influences on Muslims because the Qur’an is not strictly a revelation of the identity of
Allah. In Christianity, Scripture is identified with revealing God’s identity and God’s will for
humanity, but this is not how revelation is understood in Islam. It is primarily about revealing
Allah’s will for humanity. A very different picture is given in the nature of the Triune God. God
the Trinity is internally differentiated community as Father, Son, and Spirit, a community of
equality. Here again, as with the idea of love earlier, the nature of the Deity is going to affect the
notion of community and the fabric of how relationships are understood.
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Christian apologetics can be categorized into the three major categories of two-step, onestep, and presuppositionalism. In these three broad categories, inductive, deductive, and
abductive arguments are used. The classical model of apologetics will often build its argument
around a number of deductive arguments, whose conclusions follow necessariliy from the
premises. Deductive arguments include the cosmological argument, the ontological argument,
teleological argument, and the moral argument. Inductive argumentation can be used to support
these deductive arguments’ premises. For instance, through inductive accumulation of data about
the cosmos, the premise in the deductive teleological argument that the cosmos is finely tuned
can be reasonably held and justified. The abductive argument uses data, and the more certain the
data the more reliable the argument. Furthermore, these data are set against other known
background knowledge — this knowledge is relative to the inquiry. It is the theory used to
account for this data without doing violence to background knowledge that strengthens this
theory as the “best explanation.” It has become fashionable and useful in apologetics to
appropriate a cumulative case apologetic. Instead of just using one strand of argumentation —
for instance, rational deductive, inductive evidential, or historical abductive — the apologist will
use all of these in an attempt to win the day by a tours de force. The argument used in this
dissertation, the abductive argument from human relationships, can become part of a cumulative
case apologetic.
First, how this argument was designed and used in the dissertation is honorable to
Scripture. Genesis 1:26 – 28 and 2:24 demand careful consideration of humanity communally
conceived as God’s supreme analogy. The entire enterprise of anthropology must be brought
under the scrutizing and judgmental light of God’s revelatory voice (i.e., Scripture). If humanity
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is to be considered in terms of a male and female in sexual union, then isolate and autonomous
models of anthropology are judged guilty by the court of God’s Word. Indeed, autonomous
humans, ruggedly individualistic, could well be both a fictive reality impossible to achieve but
desparately attempted and a sinful continuation of the alienation that separates both God from
humanity and man from man.414 The more fragmented humanity becomes the more dimunition
of what humanity is designed to be.
Second, the abductive argument from human relationships adds another argument in a
two-step apologetic. To review, two-step is where the apologist first establishes the likelihood of
theism (1st step), then he gives a second set of arguments to demonstrate that Christian theism is
the most likely out of the theistic options (2nd step). The most common and often persuasive
argument in the 2nd step is the argument of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection. It is, also, an
abductive argument, taking the data and, then, inferring to the best explanation of that data
against the known background knowledge. The abductive argument from human relationships
can add another argument to the 2nd step that not only supports Christian theism but Trinitarian
Christian theism. The only imagined competitor that the Trinity has towards explaining human
reality in a comparable manner may be some form of polytheism. Although I cannot explore this
now, the biological union (ousia-like), that is, biological entailments every child has of his
parents, appears to be inimical to an ultimacy that would be demanded by a plurality (or diversity
in separateness) of gods. The abductive argument from human relationships can be repackaged
to meet challenges of other worldviews.
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It cannot be insignificant that God created Adam with Eve within him. This way of
thinking about it might be a bit odd, so thinking about it as God knowing that He would create
Eve by using part of Adam might be better. Procreation is all the more telling because of how
one person dwells within another person in the process of conception and carrying a new human
life to term. Surely, the case can be made that becoming ’e

flesh (one flesh) speaks to both

intercourse and the literal biological union of human genes in a new fleshly one (a child).
Procreational-human-reality, chosen by God as His analogy (esp. Gen. 2:24), more than subtely
suggests a Trinitarian theism. The Christian apologist should not balk at the rich use of Christian
resources as playing unfairly on home turf. Every worldview has to generate explanations of
reality according to its view of things. That Christianity in its unique view of God as Trinity
would have such a powerful explanatory thesis on the dimensionality of human reality speaks to
the Christian worldview’s sufficiency. The question for Christianity’s opponents is, do they? In
this dissertation, it has been demonstrated that the worldview of Islam cannot explain human
reality to near the degree that Christianity is capable. This is not to say that the day is won for
Christianity, but it is to say that so long as this abductive argument from human relationships
contra Islam can reasonably be defended, at least one battle rages on towards victory.
Every person experiences his reality as being in oneness to others, distinct from others,
and related to others. As noted well earlier in this paper, it is the undeniability of these evidences
that emboldens the abductive argument from human relationships. Unless someone embraces
non-realism, it is hard to imagine that any of these three can be escaped. Modern science has
made biological oneness all but certain. Cognitive union is expressed in one degree or another in
every informative engagement — whether with the newspaper, internet, or conversation. That we
are distinct from one another is so obvious it is hard to even argue for this. What is more
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claryoiant than this, even as someone reads this as distinct from me? That all stand in
relationships is something impossible to escape by just existing. The concrete occurance of one
person in another person in a woman’s pregnancy is well explained by the Trinity in terms of
ō ēsis, one Hypostasis (Person) in the other Hypostseis (Persons). Does any other
worldview have as an explanatory thesis for the procreational reality of humanity as does
Trinitarian Christian theism? If it is allowed that demonic possession is real, then not only is
there a concrete human example of one person in another, but there is also a spiritual reality of
one spiritual entity (demon) occupying the same space as another spiritual entity (the human
possessed). There may be other worldviews that can compete; this is an inevitiability as long as
people care about the cogency of their worldview. Time will tell if any other worldview can give
the type of explanation that God the Trintiy is capable of doing towards these human realities —
oneness, distinctness, and relatedness.
Ongoing Research
Powerful questions about how metaphysics/ontology influences or coordinates with
anthropology certainly come out of this study. Every worldview has to account for human
phenomena, which includes the ability of how to even ask the questions of anthropology. For
instance, anthropologists know well that being human raises the question of “ensoulment,” but
this question is only raised with a certain metaphysical or ontological horizon.415 If a
philosophical naturalist or a materialist are asking the questions of what being human means, it
would be strange for “ensoulment” to be included, at least so long as “soul” is taken in the
traditional Judaic or platonic notion. How the theological horizon of the Trinity or Allah’s
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ontology coordinates (or not), explains, and grounds anthropology has been considerably
analyzed herein. There is nevertheless much remaining work in what it means to be human in
view of the Deity. There must be two movements in inquires into the Deity-man relationship.
One movement is anaphatic or “from above,” and the second movement is cataphatic or “from
below.” First, what is humanity expected to look like in the case of this Deity (or that Deity)?
Second, humans understand what it means to be human by their cognitive faculties and
experiential realities, so what sort of Deity is expected from this cognitive and experiential data?
It is the movement between the two data sets (theology and anthropology) that will continue to
enrich both disciplines.416 This question is as important for Christians’ dialogue with Muslims as
with secular naturalists. The “dimensionalities” of what it means to be human based on any
survey of humanity now or past includes a desire for transcendence. This has been spoken of in
the anthropological categories by the terms of openness and exocentricity. Christians and
Muslims both should continue to develop respective anthropologies along side those of secular
humanism. The stark comparison between theistic anthropology and secular anthropology will
blaze transparent by this side-by-side comparison. Modern Christianity has significant resources
for this task, especially if pulling from historical theology and writings on the

ō

.

Modern Islam has few (at least readily available in English), but Islam does have historic
resources. The attribute of dissimilarity, predicated of Allah, precludes modern Muslims from
even an initiation of such inquiry. Muslims, however, need not settle for the prohibition against
anthropomorphizing; they have, after all, Al-Ghazālī to rally behind because, as observed
formerly, he did argue for the use and legitimacy of analogical interpretation.
416
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Analogical predication of human reality to God has long occurred in Christianity, and, as
a result, it is recognized that in each anthropomorphism there is theomorphism as well. This is a
natural outgrowth of relating the semiotic realities of lingual ration to the ontological reality of
God and humans. Every analogy (ligual-semiotic) contains an equivocal aspect and a univocal
aspect; therefore, humans and God (ontological realities) are dissimilar and similar. The
similarities owe to God’s coordinating humanity to “look like” Him, and the dissimilarities arise
from humanity’s true contingency. Strictly speaking, humans represent God; God does not
represent humans. The unoriginate God is ever presencing, so He is not re-presenting anything;
everything else represents Him, and humans do so in particularly holistic ways. As a
consequence, for every anthropomorphism, there should always be the paratactic package of
theomorphism-anthromophism. Every anthropmorphism always contains a theomorphic aspect
and an anthropomorphic aspect. In this regard, anthropomorphisms are convertible with
theomorphisms. Whether using the term “anthropomorphism” or “theomorphism,” both the
anthropomorphic and the theomorphic aspects are contained in the reality being spoken of. To
speak, for instance, of the hand of God is to speak theomorphically or anthropomorphically
depending on which aspect is under analysis; the focus on one or the other, however, is only
isolating one or the other for the purposes of thought because the occurrence of a human “hand”
being predicated of God is to speak theomorphically-anthropomorphically. The theomorphism
should always be arranged first in the construction of “theomorphism-anthropomorphism” so
that this syntax presents the causal reality that anthropomorphism (form of man) depends upon
and so comes after theomorphism (form of God). Said differently, the theomorphic aspect in
every anthropomorphism presents the univocal likeness between God and humanity while the
anthropomorphic aspect contains the interval of analogical extension.
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Why it has become fashionable in most discussions in biblical theology to find in
Scripture only anthropomorphisms, and to speak with this term, is vexing. The importance of
anthropomorphisms is their function in mediating content-full data about God. Where, then, is
the language of theomorphisms? There is a very real question here about the influence of
secularism in all domains of the academy and popular writing, whether evangelical or otherwise.
The gaging of the theomorphic emphases in anthropomorphisms needs unsilenced. This question
is as important for general revelation expressed through humanity as it is for special revelation in
Scripture. Scripture includes human influence by God’s choice to communicate through humans
without turning them into automatons — dictation theories in Christianity are all but abandoned
for good reasons. This means that it is accurate to speak of an anthropomorphic aspect even in
God’ revealing of Himself; He does not drop the Bible out of the sky. Indeed, in the only account
of all Scripture where God writes something Himself, He still does so on a tablet in semiotic
forms Moses and the Israelites could understand (Exod. 31:18). In other words, He
communicated anthropomorphically. Then, there is Jesus Christ. God’s premeire revelation and
exegesis of Himself (Jesus) occurs through a person who, according to Nicene orthodoxy, was
fully man. Evangelicals must wake from their docetic slumbers; and liberal Christianity needs to
stir from their Samosataian nightmares.417 The enchanting spell Hume and Kant cast on modern
man is waning in its power; a robust presentation of analogical predication’s theomorphic
emphasis can be a reconnection of the immanent with the transcendent.418 That there are
theomorphic aspects and anthropomorphic aspects must be equally emphasized in theories of
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analogical interpretation to model what has occurred in God’s self movement of revealing
Himself.
Islam faces the terrible conclusion that maintaining Allah’s utter dissimilarity to creation
is agnosticism. There is certainly more than one voice among Muslims themselves in this regard,
but the distancing of Allah from creation is the general trend. It is understandable that there is
more than one interpretation on difficult matters of theology. The issue at hand, however, is not
with multiple interpretations, but with the viability of Islam as a distinct tradition apart from
agnosticism. To put it differently, the theological task can only begin with knowledge of Allah; if
there is no way of knowing Allah, then there is no theology of Allah either, not because the
theology is not there (ontology), but because humanity has no access to it (epistemology). There
are other matters of Islamic theology that need clarification so as to remove what appear to be
contradictions. The Cambridge Companion of Classical Islamic Theology, used regularly
throughout this treatise, is a wonderful source for articulating the difficulties and the
complexities Islamic theology has faced. The task that falls to Muslims today is to elucidate
these matters. This will include political maneuvers as much as religious sensitivities for
Muslims. Under the traditionalist emphesis that innovation (or explanation) is bad, Muslim
theologians must not only deal with the arguments and theology, but with the religious
communities’ disposition on such theologizing. This is further complicated by the fact that
religious community and government are interpenetrating realities in much of the Islamic world.
As a Christian who applauds the great richness of historical Islamic theology, I, for one, am
eager to see what Muslims can produce today. Seyyed Hossein Nasr is a prominent and
impressive scholar, and he acts as a contemporary example of Muslim excellence in theology
and philosophy. The faithfulness to “reasoning logically” that Al-Ghazālī and Ibn Taymīyya
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demonstrated can act as guide for modern Muslims to help resolve these matters. Their writings
are available and could be mined for their richness, and then modern Muslim theologians could
put these gems to work in Muslim religious thought. To return to the major concern, utter
dissimilarity between Allah and creation places an impenetrable divide where Muslims are
locked into only knowing things in the world while Allah at His transcendent distance is never
reachable, which means He is not knowable either. Does affirming with Surah 112 that there “is
none like unto Him” require full out apophaticism? The answer lies in the meaning of the word
“like.” If, on the one hand, it means that nothing is exactly like the Deity, then analogical
predication is possible, as Al-Ghazālī taught. If, on the other hand, it means that nothing is like
the Deity in any way, then analogical is impossible and agnosticism’s haunting moans will
drown out the calls of the minaret.
Some may attempt to note the similarities between Islam and Christianity in the practical
experience of mysticism. They are only largely similar, though, if the particular form of
Christianity is totally apophatic in its theological method. Otherwise, Christianity affirms and
can reasonably defend positive knowledge of God: this type of theology would be both apophatic
and cataphatic. A mystical experience can be set against what is positively known about God to
judge the truthfulness and validity of such an experience. Islam’s theological method, it is
claimed, is apophatic; Allah is only known by what He is not. Mysticism on total apophatic
theology will still only leave the Muslim with agnosticism because there is no positive
knowledge of Allah by which to adjudicate if the mystical experience is truly an experiencing of
Allah or some other spiritual entity. The same would hold true for forms of Christianity that are
totally apophatic in their theological methodology. At this point, mystics of either Christianity or
Islam may still assert that they know because they have had the “immediate access” or “sight” of
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the Deity and there is no question to the experiencer. The truth of their claims may be veridical,
but appeals to subjective experience without any other corroboration cannot be communicated,
failing to convince others in the process. The matter is further complicated by the fact that
mystical descriptions are ambiguous, as reading differing accounts shows, especially if one reads
accounts from different cultures and religions.419 The question is held out if one’s mystical
experience ever really coordinates with someone else’s mystical experience so that they might
corroborate one anothers’ experiences. Can the ambiguity entailed in describing such
experiences be overcome? A mystical experience that becomes an overriding belief for a
particular worldview against claims to the contrary might suffice for that person’s ongoing faith.
The articulation of the mystical experience will continually face the problem of
incommunicability, and, so long that it does, fail to convince those who are not fideistically
ready to jump on board.
Islamic anthropology is currently developing by Muslims themselves rather than by
Western eyes. A major category used in anthropological studies is “intersubjectivity.” Describing
anthropology in Islamic cultures faces little problem if done from a naturalistic or materialistic
set of presuppositions. The theological or Qur’anic questions will not be asked in an
anthropology that is descriptive of Islamic persons (persons in an Islamic culture) that supposes
the world is nothing more than the natural realm. Muslims will have problems with this since the
Din requires the knowledge of Allah to be spread across the world.420 When anthropological
questions are asked of the theology of Allah or of the revelatory content in the Qur’an, a number
419
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of challenges arise. Can the Qur’an account for the nature of human reality, or does the Qur’an
just discuss how to act in community without explaining why humanity’s ontology subsists in
this communal way? Does this mean that the framework of humanity’s ontology is arbitrary? If
arbitrary, why does humanity have so many qualities similar to Allah like volition,
understanding, reasoning, and moral apprehension? The biggest problem is that the Qur’an is the
Speech of just One. Why does community exist? How can Islam explain intersubjectivity? Is the
anthropological task an exercise in obfuscation based on the bent towards understanding creation
as illusory? Can the multiplicity of persons ever be resolved in view of

Allah, or is this

just the intractable problem of the one and the many once again? There are plenty of directions
that need explored.
The most dangerous question dealt with the Qur’an as other than Allah. It is claimed that
the Qur’an is Allah’s Speech, but it is Speech primarily about guiding humanity, not about
revealing the nature or properties of Allah. If the Qur’an is not representative or identifiable with
the nature or properties of Allah, then who or what should it be identified with? If not
identifiable with Allah, how is it retractable to Allah in order to protect the doctrine of
Taw

?421 A potential way of answering this is to say that humanity has been eternally in the

mind of Allah, which means that the Qur’an as Allah’s Speech has forever been in this role of
guidance and dialogue with humanity. This might create more problems than solutions.
Immediately, there is the awkward supposition that the Qur’an is addressing Allah in terms of
guidance towards the objects of Allah’s mind, humans. These humans, however, do not exist at
this point, so is the Qur’an addressing and dialoguing with Allah? Of course, even asking the
question this way conjures the spector of shirk. Taw
421
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Qur’an cannot be said to “address” Allah since this supposes distinction between the Two, and
this starts to appear much like the Father and His Logos of Christianity. The underlying tension
comes from the fact that the Qur’an is eternal, but those addressed by the Qur’an are not. Taking
Taw

seriously will require thinking of the Qur’an as simply Allah speaking. Does Allah,

therefore, speak to Himself forever in the past in terms of giving directives and commands to
humans yet to exist? Why would He forever speak this way to creatures who do not exist
forever? This is strange and it seems oddly inefficient. If Muslims could unpack this for the rest
of us, it would go a long way towards Islam’s coherency. This will require the use of both
theology and philosophical reasoning, so time will tell if the ancient bias against philosophy will
hold out.
Further work needs done on how to understand Islam’s stance on revelation in
comparison with Christianity’s doctrine of the same. It is frequently packaged with Christianity
and Judaism as a revelatory religion of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. The revelatory
expression in Islam will have to differ considerably from Christianity and Judaism because of
Islam’s departure from the

ō

.422 Islam is revelatory; there is no doubt of this, but the

purpose of revelation in Islam is not properly about the Deity’s self-giving, like in Christianity
(and Old Testament Judaism). Throughout this work, the abandonment or upholding of the
similarity (analogy) between the Deity and man has played a major role in what to make of
humanity. The ramifications were demonstrable within this study because Christians use the
analogy while some Muslims try to deny it. The point needs to be pressed that Islam cannot
escape understanding Allah through understanding humanity and human reality. To say that
422
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“Allah wills it” will be ambiguous unless this speaker first knows what it means to say that “man
wills it.” The continuation of such a denial counts against both Islam’s coherency and cogency.
In view of this study, categorizing Islam as a religion of revelation may stand, but it should not
stand together with Christianity (and maybe Judaism as well, depending on the type or time).
Christianity takes all creation, man, Scripture, and especially Jesus Christ as God’s self-revealing
and communicating Himself to man, not that each revelatory component listed does so in the
same magnitude. Some Islamic positions deny the similarity between Allah and man, creation
and man, and maintain that the Qur’an (Scripture) is mainly about Allah directing humanity, not
revealing Allah. On Islam’s model of revelation, it is not a surprise that Muslims are far more
apophatic in their religious thinking than Christians. Another groundbreaking work like Avery
Dulles Models of Revelation would go a long way towards distinguishing the rightful similarities
and dissimilarities between Christianity’s view of revelation and Islam’s view. The groundwork
for revelation respective to each religion has been done. It only remains to set the two side-byside in a rich, comparative manner. The need is great both because of reductionism that pluralists
can impose and to make plain the real differences in their doctrines of revelation along with the
ramifications.423
From this study, the Deity-world relationship stands prominent. Christianity has long
held to the stance that creation/world is contingent, both from scriptural semantic reasons (e.g.,
 ב ָָראGen. 1:1) and theological reflections (e.g., holiness as separateness). This does not mean that
there has not been any deviance, but the ongoing centrality of ex nihilo is not in doubt —
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creation is out of nothing, not out of God or the ground of divine being. Islam needs a
centralizing epicenter similar to this on its doctrine of creation. That Islam is reported to maintain
multiple doctrines of creation does not speak well of

. If there is only one Deity, why is

there multiple ways to take how creation came about? From this study, Islam’s dotrine on
creation placed creation as illusory in the dominant position. If creation is taken this way in
Islam, work needs done to show how shirk is viable when creation is illusory. The preeminence
Allah is given in Islam’s attempts to keep Him utterly separate — although not succeeding as
much as would be liked — which accords importance to the doctrine of creation as contingent.
Really, then, Islam needs to construct a clear, cogent, and defensible doctrine of creation as
contingent. Fideisitically affirming creation as contingent is not going to satisfy the minds of true
seekers, like Al-Ghazālī.424 The great thinkers of Islam interrogated in this work, however,
usually took creation as illusory. As noted by Ayman Shilhadeh, Ibn Taymīyya may have even
allowed the idea of creation as eternal to be considered.425 Why is Islam’s doctrine of creation so
confused? This needs cleared up.
The binitarian nature of Islam must be emphasized as a means to conversation between
Christians and Muslims.426 It seems that Muslims really are de facto binitarian monotheists, but
formally they claim to be unitary monotheists. The Qur’an as other is problematic for Muslims
because the Qur’an begins to look associated with Allah (shirk), but this difficulty may be a
bridge between Islam and Christianity. What the Qur’an is to Isalm as Allah’s Speech is what
424
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Christ is to Christianity as God’s Word (not a 1:1 comparison though). For Muslims to
demonstrate that they are not binitarian monotheists will require them to clarify how the Qur’an
is retractable to Allah’s pure

nature. As argued many times throughout this

dissertation, doing this will be hard because of the dialogical character of the Qur’an with
humans. How can what is eternal (Qur’an) have an eternal dialogue with what is not eternal
(humans)? Why does the Qur’an prescribe a communal way of life for humans that is so contrary
to Allah’s way of life as alone? These are just a few example matters that would need to be
illuminated. Otherwise, Christians can discuss and address the nature of the Qur’an as Allah’s
Speech, and, in this sense, as Allah’s ration inasmuch as speech is always accompanied with
ration. To speak of the Qur’an in this way as a distinct eternal reality from Allah is similar to
speaking of the Logos as a distinct eternal reality from the Father. Although this is not a one to
one comparison, the similarities are striking. The issue should be pressed until the Qur’an is
admitted to be distinct from Allah or one with Allah. If the Qur’an is ultimately distinct from
Allah, then why the Qur’an is allowed to be distinct while the Son, Christ, in Christianity’s
doctrine is not must be asked. This is a missional and reasonable dialogue. It is reasonable
because double standards should make anyone uncomfortable. It is missional because Muslims
should know how very close their belief in the Qur’an as a distinct eternal reality is to the
Christian doctrine of Christ as the Logos of the Father.
There is need for more research on how Islam can or could maintain “distinction” before
creation. Not only does distinction need substantiated but also personal distinction. Suggestions
of “distinctions” in the mind of Allah threaten

. Moreover, Allah’s personal distinction,

whether it is argued that distinctions are in the mind of Allah or not, resides in and depends on
the coming of other personal beings, namely, humans. Thus, Allah’s personal distinctness from
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humans will always act to make Allah similar to humans in the personal distinctness they
introduce when they are created. Sufis discomfort with dualism, in view of this, is justified. How
can undifferentiated Oneness (Allah) produce multiplicity in the first place? This question might
very well be the hardest to overcome.
The semantic issues need much attention both in the potential of Muslims resolving them
and in Christian apologists polemic against Islam. First, how can Allah’s oneness be affirmed? If
all creation has no evidence of the type of oneness Allah is said to have, that is, a oneness apart
from all other things that is truly alone, how does a Muslim go about the affirmation?
Furthermore, if all examples of oneness in creation are dissimilar to Allah in Allah’s pure lone
oneness, is affirmation of such oneness by a human idolatrous? If Allah is utterly dissimilar to
creation, then any affirmation of Allah’s

will not be worthy of Him. Should Muslims

stop their affirmation, then, since the affirmation is just a vacuous statement? Why is “otherness”
allowed to be predicated of Allah by Muslims? The “one-and-another” paradigm is developed
and framed by the coming of creatures. How is this creaturely framework allowed to be applied
to Allah? Is this not anthropomorphizing? The point of all this is that “one-and-anotherness” is
not framed in Allah Himself, so where does it come from?427 Muslims could just fall back on
Allah’s transcendence, appealing to the mysticism entailed. This, however, will count against
Islam’s coherency and cogency in conversations about comparative religion. The human desire
for explanation and understanding is not a Western cultural phenomena, as Al-Ghazālī, Ibn
Taymīyya, and Ibn ‘Arabī make manifest. So long as humans develop systems of understanding
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(e.g., mythos), Islam as a religion will need to justify its use of language and how such language
is viable.
There is a new opportunity both in Europe and in the United States of America in the
early twenty-first century to converse, confront, and differentiate what Christianity has to offer
from what secularism has to offer. Posing the situation this way is a generalization; still, the
battle of these times in Western developed countries is largely between secular humanism and
the Christianity’s continuing cultural influence. The former is composed of naturalistic,
scientific, materialistic, and neo-religious ingredients; the latter may no longer be explicitly
practiced or even relevant to many Westerners, but the values and laws in many Western
countries reflect Christianity in the cultural infrastructure. This situation provides a constrast
where many enjoy this Christian infrastructure — not that all of it is from Christianity — while
holding Christianity as passé, contemptuous, or of little importance. To this attitude, where it
exists in individual persons, Christians can say, “This is how Christians think of man and why,
so how do you and why?” Anthropology is a major discipline in secular universities, and
Christianity has a unique way to handle the question of man. John Zizioulas has settled the
matter on whether contemporary Christianity’s view of God as Trinity can handle both otherness
and communion as equally ontologically weighty.428 Thus, the contemporary question of man
and why it is the case that man experiences life as otherness and community has been answered
based on God as Trinity. Human intersubjectivity is explained by God’s intrasubjectivity.
Christian anthropology goes farther in answering this reality than anything that can be offered
from any other worldview. This sounds like an overstatement, but anyone who has considered
rightly the radical uniqueness of God as Trinity knows that this incredible theology will have
428
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resources no other craft, worldview, or ontology may possess. The question of the one and the
many has overcome many would-be answers to it, but God the Trinity illuminates the problem
and demonstrates that the very question of the one and the many is a fictive and idolatrous way
of thinking about the God-world relationship. Christian anthropology has this rich backdrop for
its development; it should craft its viewpoint and propagate it as an alternative to secular
humanist anthropology. The resources of God the Trinity are truly invaluable. Christians aligned
with Nicene-Constantinopolitan orthodoxy are Trinitarian, and it is high time to think in accord
with this rather than thinking about God like a Muslim would.
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